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研究生:傅彥凱
研究生(外文):Fu, Yan-Kai
論文名稱:選舉與財政政策制定----台灣政治預算循環之實證分析
論文名稱(外文):Elections and Fiscal Policy Making : An Empirical Analysis on the Political Budget Cycle in Taiwan
指導教授:林鍾沂林鍾沂引用關係羅清俊羅清俊引用關係
指導教授(外文):Lin, Chung-YiLuor, Ching-Jyuhn
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立臺北大學
系所名稱:公共行政暨政策學系
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:公共行政學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2003
畢業學年度:92
語文別:中文
論文頁數:205
中文關鍵詞:政治景氣循環政治預算循環選舉預算財政政策制定混合迴歸
外文關鍵詞:Political Business CyclePolitical Budget CycleElectionsBudgetingFiscal Policy MakingPooling Regression
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:19
  • 點閱點閱:976
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:244
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
政治景氣循環理論強調執政者會在選前透過各種經濟政策工具的操弄,如貨幣供給、政府支出等,以影響總體經濟情況的表現,如減少失業率、降低通貨膨脹率、提高經濟成長率等,使國家的經濟狀況在選前呈現成長與富裕的景象,以增加執政者當選的機會。亦即執政黨會在選前採取寬鬆性政策,選後則採取緊縮性政策,整體經濟情勢就在這一鬆一縮的波動情形下,形成所謂的政治景氣循環現象。然而過去文獻多偏重於中央層級選舉的討論,少有論及地方層級者,唯本研究認為地方首長於選舉前討好選民的動機與中央之執政者並無二致,兩者同樣以獲取選票為目標。中央政府的執政者,為了鞏固政權,一切會以勝選為優先目標;地方政府的執政者自然也不例外,為求繼續掌控地方資源,施政時也不忘有選票的考量。因為中央層級的總統及立法委員選舉關係著整個政權的維繫及統治的正當性,即便是地方層級的縣市長選舉也攸關政黨執政版圖的大小,重要性不容輕忽。於是本研究除了探討中央是否存在政治景氣循環現象之外,也將分析觸角延伸至地方層級,同時並將研究重點鎖定在政治預算循環部分。準此,在中央政府方面,研究期間訂為民國六十年至九十年止(1971-2001),利用中央政府總預算資料同時並採用考慮時間遲滯效果的一階自我迴歸模式,觀察中央政府在制定相關的財政政策時是否有選舉因素的考量,而偏好採用某些特定的財政政策工具,以吸引民眾關注,獲取選民支持。另外,在地方政府方面,則將研究期間訂為民國七十七年政府解嚴之後至民國九十年止(1988-2001),利用台灣省各縣市政府總預算資料,進行混合迴歸分析 ,俾便於觀察縣市首長是否於選舉年有操弄財政政策工具,獲取選票之行為。是故,本研究欲藉用政治景氣循環理論來觀察台灣中央及地方執政者於各自選舉年操縱政府預算的意圖,並配合實證研究途徑,期望經由實證結果所獲得的發現對於窺探台灣中央與地方選舉年實際政治操作的全貌會有一定程度的幫助。
基於上述的實證研究,就學術貢獻而言,作者認為本論文應有幾個顯著不同於過去研究的內容:
第一、基於中央與地方的執政者皆有相同的政治動機,目標皆在贏得選舉,尋求繼續執政,因而可將研究對象由中央延伸至地方,一併考量兩者是否存在政治預算循環的現象。因此,本論文乃選定中央與地方兩者共有的財政政策工具作為實證觀察的重點,進一步拓展政治預算循環理論的適用性。
第二、政治預算循環的實證研究之所以未能產生統計明確的顯著結果,其中有很大原因是使用聚合性的資料,而使得實證結果可能與真實世界產生落差。所以在依變數的設定方面,實有必要將聚合資料予以細分,並配合適當的統計分析方法,相信對於直接觀察不同類型的政策工具所能產生的選舉效果實有莫大助益。
第三、鑑於過去的研究僅偏重在經濟變數的討論,而忽略其他的政治因素,例如選戰競爭程度、府會結構、及政策操控能力(自有財源比率)等變數其實也會造成政府財政預算收支的變動。因此,本論文在自變數的設定方面,除了將經濟變數視為控制變數加以處理之外,同時將重點置於其他政治變數的討論,而不侷限於選舉年變數,唯有如此才能精確觀測出台灣特殊的政治操作現象。
Political business cycle theory stresses that before the election incumbents will manipulate macroeconomic policy tools like money supply and government spending to influence macroeconomic performance, such as less unemployment rate, less inflation rate, more economic growth rate, which makes the country economic performance present the scene of growth and prosperity to increase incumbents’ opportunity for re-election. In other words, the party of the incumbents will adopt expansionary policy before the election and deflation policy after the election, so the whole economic situation forms political business cycle phenomenon because of the vibration caused by the expansionary and deflation policies. However, many of the past references focus on the discussion of the central government, but few are related to the local government. Thus, from this research we will learn that before the election the motivation to please voters of the local government is the same as that of the central government, so they have the same goal-- to gain the ballot. In order to consolidate the political power, the incumbents of the central government will ensure their election success; there is no exception of the local government, so to continue controlling local resources, the local government will take the ballot into consideration when carrying out policies. Because the central elections of the president and the legislator are related to holding the whole political power together and the legitimacy of the dominion, even County Magistrates and City Mayor Election are also related to the area of the party’s dominion, so the importance of that can’t be neglected. Therefore, this research tries to confer if not only the central government but also the local government has political business cycle phenomenon or not, and at the same time the research will also focus on the political budget cycle. Thus, during the research year of 1971- 2001 the central government uses the total budget resources, adopts the autoregressive model of first order with time lag at the same time, and observes when establishing some associated fiscal policies whether because of the election, the central government adopts some certain fiscal policy tools to attract people’s attention and gain the support of the voters. Besides, during the research year of 1988-2001 the local government uses the total budget resources from every county and city in Taiwan province doing pooling regression analysis to observe whether during the year of County Magistrates and City Mayors election people manipulate fiscal policy tools to gain the ballot. Thus, this research tries to use political business cycle theory to observe the intention of the central and local incumbents in Taiwan to manipulate the budget of the government. Besides, by using empirical research approach the researcher hopes to gain some results which would help a lot to explore the whole true manipulation of politics during the year of the central and local elections.
Based on this research described above, it has many different contributions from the past researches.
First, both the central and local government have the same political motivation to win the election and to continue to be in power, so the research should objects include both central and local government and the researcher take both of them into consideration to see if they exist in the political budget cycle phenomenon. Besides, this research adopts central and local government’s fiscal policy tools as the key points of the true observation and to adapt political budget cycle theory.
Second, mostly because of using pooling data, political budget cycle research can’t produce obvious significances, so there might be some difference between the research results and the situation in the real world. Thus, when setting up the dependent variable, it is necessary to analyze pooling data in detail with suitable analytical approaches. It helps a lot for observing different kinds of policy tools directly and producing election effects.
Third, many past researches focused on the discussion of the economic variable and neglected other political factors, such as electoral competition, the structure of the in power and supervising organizations, policy manipulation capacity, and so on, which makes the fiscal budgeting vary. Thus, when the researcher sets the independent variable, he not only takes the economic variable as control variable but also focuses on the discussion of other political variables instead of just taking the election year as the only variable. Only by doing so can the special political manipulation phenomenon of Taiwan be observed accurately.
目 錄
第一章 導論………………………………………… 1
第一節 研究動機………………………………………………..…1
第二節 研究目的…………………………………………………11
第三節 研究範圍與研究限制……………………………………12
第四節 研究架構與研究流程………………………………… 15
第二章 理論探討…………………………….….… 20
第一節 基本理論建構……………………………………………22
第二節 相關文獻回顧……………………………………………37
第三節 政治景氣循環理論在台灣的應用………………………51
第三章 研究設計…………………………………….56
第一節 研究假設…………………………………………………56
第二節 變數定義、操作化與資料來源…………………………65
第三節 研究對象與研究期間……………………………………73
第四節 統計分析方法……………………………………………76
第四章 中央政府政治預算循環之實證分析……...84
第一節 描述性分析…………………………………………… 84
第二節 中央財政支出工具的檢驗模型…………………………93
第三節 中央財政收入工具的檢驗模型………………………..103
第四節 綜合討論………………………………………………..113
第五章 地方政府政治預算循環之實證分析…….118
第一節 描述性分析……………………………………………..118
第二節 地方財政支出工具的檢驗模型………………………..127
第三節 地方財政收入工具的檢驗模型………………………..137
第四節 綜合討論………………………………………………..145
第六章 結論與建議 ………………………………148
第一節 研究發現………………………………………………...148
第二節 理論反思………………………………………………...156
第三節 政策建議………………………………………………...160
第四節 後續研究建議…………………………………………...165
參考資料…………………………………………….168
中文部分……………………………………………….………….168
英文部分……………………………………………….………….177
附 錄………………………………………………...193
附錄一 預期型態的介紹…………………………….………….193
附錄二 歷年中央與地方層級選舉時間表……………………..197
附錄三 中央政府政治預算循環模型的基本檢驗結果……..…198
附錄四 歷屆縣市長得票率……………………………………..199
附錄五 地方政府政治預算循環模型的基本檢驗結果……..…204
圖目次
圖1-1 研究架構…………………………………………………………………...16
圖1-2 研究流程…………………………………………………………………...18
圖2-1 政治景氣循環示意圖……………………………………………………...25
圖4-1 中央政府各項政事別支出的變化趨勢……………………...88
圖4-2 中央政府總支出、經常支出與資本支出的變化趨勢…………88
圖4-3 中央政府各項來源別收入的變化趨勢……………………...90
圖4-4 中央政府總收入、稅課及非稅課收入的變化趨勢…………90
圖5-1 地方政府各項財政支出的變化趨勢……………………….120
圖5-2 地方政府各項財政收入的變化趨勢………………………….121
表目次
表1-1 台灣政治景氣循環之相關實證研究……………………………………….9
表2-1 選舉前後失業率的變動趨勢……………………………………………...24
表2-2 政黨偏好與總體經濟目標之對照表………………………...27
表2-3 投機派模式實證意涵的比較表…………………………………………...34
表2-4 黨派模式實證意涵的比較表……………………………………………...35
表3-1 中央政府財政支出工具檢驗模型的依變數與自變數………..67
表3-2 中央政府財政收入工具檢驗模型的依變數與自變數………..67
表3-3 地方政府財政支出工具檢驗模型的依變數與自變數……...70
表3-4 地方政府財政收入工具檢驗模型的依變數與自變數…………...71
表3-5 控制變數的定義………………………………………………...71
表4-1 歷年中央政府各項財政支出成長率變化………………………..87
表4-2 歷年中央政府各項財政收入成長率變化……………………...89
表4-3 不同的選舉年界定方式所對應之預算年度…………………...92
表4-4 總支出的迴歸分析……………………………………………...95
表4-5 經常支出與資本支出的迴歸分析……………………………...97
表4-6 教育科學文化支出與經濟發展支出的迴歸分析………………..98
表4-7 社會福利支出與補助支出的迴歸分析………………………….100
表4-8 中央政府財政支出實證結果摘要表…………………………….102
表4-9 總收入的迴歸分析……………………………………………….105
表4-10 稅課收入與非稅課收入的迴歸分析…………………………….107
表4-11 我國近年中央稅減免項目……………………………………….107
表4-12 國民租稅負擔率………………………………………………….109
表4-13 各項來源別收入的迴歸分析………………………………….…111
表4-14 中央政府財政收入實證結果摘要表………………………….…112
表5-1 台灣省各縣市之自有財源比率………………………………….125
表5-2 不同的選舉年界定方式所對應之預算年度…………………….126
表5-3 地方總支出的迴歸分析………………………………………….129
表5-4 地方經常支出與資本支出的迴歸分析………………………….131
表5-5 地方各項財政支出的迴歸分析………………………………….134
表5-6 地方政府財政支出實證結果摘要表…………………………….136
表5-7 地方總收入的迴歸分析………………………………………….139
表5-8 地方稅課收入及非稅課收入的迴歸分析……………………….141
表5-9 我國近年地方稅減免項目………………………..…………….142
表5-10 地方政府財政收入實證結果摘要表…………………..……….144
表附三-1 中央政府實證模型檢驗結果摘要表…………………………198
表附四-1 第十屆(民國74年)縣市長選舉結果…………………….199
表附四-2 第十一屆(民國78年)縣市長選舉結果……………………200
表附四-3 第十二屆(民國82年)縣市長選舉結果……………………201
表附四-4 第十三屆(民國86年)縣市長選舉結果……………………202
表附四-5 第十四屆(民國90年)縣市長選舉結果……………………203
表附五-1 地方政府實證模型檢驗結果摘要表…………………………204
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李翠萍
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周育仁
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林錫俊
2000 《地方財政管理:理論與實務》,高雄市:高雄復文圖書出版公司。
2001 《地方財政管理要義》,台北市:五南圖書出版公司。
韋端
2003 《政府財政改革成效》,台北市:財團法人國家政策研究基金會。
徐仁輝
1999 《當代預算改革的制度性研究》,台北:智勝文化。
2000 《公共財務管理》(再版),台北:智勝文化。
2001a 《預算赤字與預算改革》,台北:智勝文化。
2001b 〈地方政府支出預算決策的研究〉,《政大公共行政學報》,5期,頁1-17。
徐湘林、袁瑞軍譯 Donald P. Green & Ian Shapiro著
2000 《理性選擇理論的病變:政治學應用批判》,台北:正港資訊文化事業有限公司。
郭昱瑩
2002 《政府預算的總體與個體研究》,台北:智勝文化。
黃上紡
1996 〈選舉與經濟--政治性景氣循環〉,《美歐月刊》,11卷5期,頁51-66。
1997 〈選舉性經濟循環與經濟選票競逐〉,《美歐月刊》,11卷12期,頁134-157。
黃世鑫
2000 《財政學概論》(修訂再版),台北:國立空中大學。
2002 《二0一0社會發展策略實施計畫》,台北:行政院研究發展考核委員會委託研究,財政與經濟組研究報告。
黃世鑫、徐仁輝、張哲琛
1995 《政府預算》,台北:國立空中大學。
黃俊英
1995 《多變量分析》(五版),台北:華泰文化事業公司。
黃俊杰、陳宜擁
2001 〈我國地方課稅立法權之層級化思考〉,《經社法治論叢》,27期,頁97-134。
黃英哲、劉瑞宇
1996 〈總體政策與選舉的關係─台灣地區實證分析〉,《企銀季刊》,19卷3期,頁104-112。
黃細清
1997 〈當前地方財源收入問題及改善之探討〉,《財稅研究》,29卷6期,頁24-39。
黃智聰
2001 〈台灣選舉與貨幣政策關係之初探〉,《中山人文社會科學期刊》,9卷1期,頁111-136。
黃錦堂
2000 《地方制度法基本問題之研究》,台北:翰盧圖書。
黃耀輝
1993 〈美國的政治經濟循環〉,《美國月刊》,8卷4期,頁60-73。
高安邦
1997 《政治經濟學》,台北:五南書局。
孫克難
1999 〈1980年代以來的財政收支與財政改革〉,發表於《1980年代以來台灣經濟發展經驗》學術研討會,中華經濟研究院主辦,三月二十六至二十七日。
2000a 〈財政收支、赤字與經濟成長─文獻探究與啟示〉,《財稅研究》,32卷4期,頁1-21。
2000b 〈健全地方財政之全面思考〉,《主計月報》,540期,頁11-18。
梁發進
1995 《總體經濟學》,台北:三民書局。
章國良
2001 《台灣之選舉與總體政策循環》,國立中山大學經濟學研究所碩士論文。
楊日青、李培元、林文斌、劉兆隆譯 Andrew Heywood著
1999 《政治學新論》,台北:韋伯文化事業出版社。
陳一新、鄧毓浩、陳景堯譯 Alan R. Ball & Guy B. Peters著
2001 《現代政治與政府》,台北:韋伯文化事業出版社。
陳敦源
2002 《民主與官僚》,台北:韋伯文化事業出版社。
湯京平、吳重禮、蘇孔志
2002 〈分立政府與地方民主行政:從台中縣「地方基層建設經費」論地方派系與肉桶政治〉,《中國行政評論》,12卷1期,頁37-76。
曾巨威
2002 〈評析「地方稅法通則」草案〉,《國政評論》,台北市:財團法人國家政策研究基金會。
程中平
1996 《公共性的失落與重尋─論社群共同體思想對公共行政研究之指引》,東海大學公共行政研究所碩士論文。
傅彥凱
2000 〈政府支出成長之政經決策因素〉,《復興學報》,民國89年12月,頁293-302。
2002a 〈民主政治下的經濟政策制訂:政治景氣循環理論之探討〉,《中國行政評論》,11卷4期,頁139-163。
2002b 〈地方政治預算循環之實證研究:以台灣省縣市長選舉為例〉,《行政暨政策學報》,35期,頁137-167。
楊雲明
1999 《總體經濟學》,台北:智勝文化。
張四明
2003 《績效衡量與政府預算之研究》,台北:時英出版社。
2002a 〈財政壓力下政府預算競爭之研究:台北市政府個案分析〉,發表於《預算平衡與中程計畫預算制度》學術研討會,世新大學行政管理學系主辦,三月十五日。
2002b 〈地方政府實施新績效預算制度之理論初探〉,《行政管理論文選輯》,16輯,頁357-384。
1999 〈美日政府預算改革的省思:以平衡預算赤字為觀察中心〉,《法商學報》,35期,頁187-216。
張正修
2001 《地方制度法理論與實用3:地方財政、財務行政及法治篇》,台北:學林文化。
張育哲
2003 〈由美國地方經濟發展的經驗檢視台灣地方政府經濟政策的未來走向〉,發表於《地方發展策略》學術研討會,佛光大學公共事務學系主辦,四月二十六日。
張則堯
2000 〈赤字財政與民主政治簡論─追述布坎南等對凱因斯赤字財政論的批判〉,《華信金融季刊》,10期,頁149-152。
張慈佳
2000 〈地方經濟之政治景氣循環現象-以台灣地區之縣市長選舉為例〉,《國科會研究彙刊:人文及社會科學》,10卷3期,頁362-377。
張瑞真
1998 〈地方政府之地價稅基與地方預算變動之研究-從政治景氣循環觀點分析〉,台灣經濟學會一九九八年年會之研討會。
2000 〈地價稅基與公共設施政治景氣循環之研究-以台灣省二十一個縣市為例〉,《科技學刊》,9卷3期,頁215-221。
劉彩卿、陳欽賢
2001 〈財政收支劃分法對鄉(鎮市)層級地方政府財政之影響〉,《經社法治論叢》,27期,頁134-157。
趙永茂
1998a 《台灣地方政治的變遷與特質》(二版),台北市,翰蘆圖書。
1998b 《中央與地方全線劃分的理論與實際》(二版),台北市,翰蘆圖書。
趙永茂、孫同文、江大樹編
2001 《府際關係》,台北:元照出版公司。
趙揚清
2002 〈地方政府財政赤字問題〉,《國家政策論壇》,2卷3期。
鄭武國譯 Anthony Giddens著
2000 《第三條路:社會民主的更新》,台北:聯經出版事業公司。
蔡吉源
1999 〈財政赤字與財政改革(1989-1999)〉,《理論與政策》,13卷4期,頁55-70。
2000a 〈地方財政問題應如何解決?桃園經驗談〉,《政策月刊》,65期,頁33-38。
2000b 〈桃園地方財政(1998-2000),《財稅研究》,32卷5期,頁1-20。
2001 《桃園去來》,台北:易風格數位快印公司。
蔡吉源、林健次
2001 〈由十年歲入預決算看桃園財政─兼論台灣地方財政問題〉,《財稅研究》,33卷1期,頁1-26。
蔡建樹譯 R. Carter Hill, William E. Griffiths & George G. Judge著
1997 《初級計量經濟學》,台北:台灣西書出版社。
鄧陽禧
1998 〈探索政府財政改善之現實與幻象〉,《會計研究月刊》,157期,頁113-121。
賴景昌
2001 《總體經濟學》,台北:雙葉書廊。
謝登隆、徐繼達
2001 《總體經濟理論與政策》,台北:智勝文化。
謝素芳
2000 《台灣民主化對財經政策的影響》,東華大學國際經濟研究所碩士論文。
羅清俊
1998 〈分配政策研究的發展與應用〉,《人文及社會科學集刊》,10卷4期,頁575-609。
2000a 〈猜猜看誰把醃肉帶回家了:補助款利益在縣市分配的分析〉,《人文及社會科學集刊》,12卷1期,頁1-45。
2000b 〈政策利益分配的型態:最小獲勝聯盟?還是通通有獎?〉,《政治科學論叢》,13期,頁201-232。
2001 《台灣分配政治》,台北市:前衛出版社。
羅清俊、陳志瑋
1999 《公共政策新論》,台北市:韋伯文化事業出版社。
羅清俊、萬榮水
1999 〈選舉與補助款的分配:綁樁?還是平衡地方財政?〉,《選舉研究》,6卷2期,頁:121-161。
羅慎平譯 Patrick Dunleavy & Brendan O’Leary著
1994 《國家論----自由民主政治學》,台北市:五南書局。
蘇彩足
1994 〈政府預算決策模式之探討:從中央政府總預算之編製談起〉,《中央學術論叢》,12期,頁:229-244。
1996 《政府預算之研究》,台北市:華泰書局。
1997 《政府預算審議制度之研究:理論與實務之探討》,台北市:華泰書局。
1999 〈民主化對於預算決策的衝擊與因應之道〉,《理論與政策》,13卷3期,頁:47-63。
2002 〈財政失衡與經濟失衡〉,發表於《當前重大公共政策議題》論壇,台灣大學政治學系主辦,十二月七日。
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