臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本論文旨在探討蒯因翻譯不確定說(以下簡稱為「不確定說」)之哲學意涵。為此，本文將分四大主題為之。第一個主題探討塞爾 (John Searle) 對不確定說之批評是否成立。對此，筆者主張吾人實可將不確定說區分為「超越觀之不確定說」(transcendent indeterminacy)與「內在觀之不確定說」(immanent indeterminacy)，而塞爾之批評之所以失焦，實為混淆上述區別所致。第二個主題則以「內在觀之不確定說」為探討焦點。筆者主張「內在觀之不確定說」將導致「字詞之無差別性」，而荒誕不經者，莫此為甚。故為今之計，唯有承認字詞之指涉實有事實可言。然若如此，則不確定說將無異於「譯不準」(underdetermination) 說。對此窘境，蒯因又有何解？此為本文之第三個主題。於此一主題中，筆者則試圖為蒯因解套。筆者主張克里普基 (Saul Kripke) 於詮釋維根斯坦 (Ludwig Wittgenstein) 後期哲學時之懷疑論模型，實為蒯因解套之不二法門。何以如此？蓋無論蒯因或此懷疑論模型，皆主張字詞所指為何並無事實可言也。然若如此，則維根斯坦後期哲學中對懷疑論之駁斥，亦應適用於駁斥不確定說，此則為本文之第四個主題。最後本文歸結如下：蒯因之不確定說與克里普基之懷疑論模型，實如一同素異構體；而此二說之立論根據，實有混淆「超越觀之不確定說」與「內在觀之不確定說」之嫌。若如此，則吾人實可將蒯因之不確定說分裂為二：其一類於懷疑論而主張「超越觀」，並堅持字詞所指為何並無事實可言；另一則類於後期維根斯坦，而強調「內在觀」之重要性。若蒯因立基於「超越觀」而發，則不確定說不啻為懷疑論之又一章；若蒯因立基於「內在觀」而發，則不確定說恰可指出「內在觀」無從迴避 (inevitability) 之特性。此為不確定說之重要哲學理趣。

The aim of this dissertation is to try to close the debate over Quine’s indeterminacy thesis. I will argue that there are two Quines, namely, Quine-I and Quine-II, underlying and generating all of Quine’s doctrines related to claims regarding his indeterminacy thesis. Quine-I maintains the external approach to theories of meaning, and Quine-II insists on the significance and inevitability of “working from within.” Indeed, as I will show later, Quine-I and Quine-II are so inconsistent with each other that there is no way to reconcile these two Quines. And, for reasons that will become clearer, Quine-I is more prominent in the texts than Quine-II. My strategy in arguing for this is as follows. In the first chapter, I set out different positions that Quine puts forward, mostly on the topic of indeterminacy. In order to do this, this chapter will center on the problem of whether it’s a plain fact that we know what we mean, a problem raised by John Searle. In doing this, I will discern two different strategies in the arguments for indeterminacy, according to which Quine’s indeterminacy thesis can be construed as containing two theses─that is, the immanent indeterminacy and the transcendent indeterminacy. In chapter 2, based on the results of chapter 1, I present my interpretation of Quine’s views and show its explanatory force. I will apply this framework to the problem of what Quine calls the homophonic translation or what Barry Stroud calls the problem of acquiescence. In chapter 3, I am going to argue that Saul Kripke’s sceptical doubt, as presented in his interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy concerning rule-following, forms a key feature upon which Quine’s indeterminacy thesis has to depend. Finally, in chapter 4, I suggest how this interpretation should be used in understanding and evaluating Quine’s indeterminacy thesis. I will concentrate on a Wittgensteinian response to Kripke’s sceptical doubt, here regarded as a kind of indeterminacy argument, together with Quine’s indeterminacy thesis, with an attempt to develop an extended, but still partial, response to this thesis.

Acknowledgements v
Abstract viii
Chinese Abstract x
Introduction. Some Puzzles about Quine’s Indeterminacy Thesis 1
I. Transcendent vs. Immanent 4
II. Indeterminacy or Underdetermination? 7
III. Scepticism and the Indeterminacy of the Mental 12
IV. Two Quines Intertwined 15
Chapter 1. Must We Know What We Mean? 21
I. Quine’s Indeterminacy Thesis 23
II. Must We Know What We Mean? 26
III. No Fact of the Matter? 30
IV. Transcendent vs. Immanent 36
V. Targets Missed 44
VI. Is the Indeterminacy Thesis a Reductio Ad Absurdum
of Behaviorism? 48
VII. Concluding Remarks 52
Chapter 2. Two Senses of Indeterminacy and Homophonic Translation 55
I. Two Senses of Indeterminacy 56
II. What Are Utterly Factual in Radical Translation
Situations? 69
III. Verbal vs. Objective, Empirical Differences Between
the Meaning of Different Expressions 74
IV. The Inevitability of “Working from within” 79
V. The Logical Consequences of the Indeterminacy Thesis 92
Chapter 3. Private Semantics 99
I. Triviality or Linguistic Monolingualism? 100
II. What Will Quine’s Demon Say About the Impassable
Language Barrier? 107
III. Inscrutability and Impenetrability 116
IV. Kripstein’s Sceptic 127
V. Impenetrability, Partial Penetrability and
Indeterminacy 135
VI. Facts of the Matter and Scepticism 143
VII. Quine and Davidson with Kripstein’s Sceptical Tone
152
Chapter 4. Semantic River and the Limits of Indeterminacy 157
I. Semantic River 158
II. Anti-realist vs. Anti-anti-realist Semantics 160
III. Internal vs. External Questions Again 169
IV. Are There Two Quines? 176
V. The Significance of Staying Aboard 185
Conclusion 189
References 199

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