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研究生:張志為
研究生(外文):Chin-Wei Chang
論文名稱:公司治理與公司價值相關性探討
論文名稱(外文):The relationship between corporate governance and corporate value
指導教授:陳家聲陳家聲引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chin-Shen Chen
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:商學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:一般商業學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2003
畢業學年度:92
語文別:中文
論文頁數:150
中文關鍵詞:公司治理公司價值
外文關鍵詞:corporate governancecorporate value
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自2000年美國能源巨擘安隆公司爆發作帳醜聞,並使世界知名會計師事務所安德森會計事務所因而倒閉,其涉案有關人員現正面臨美國證管會起訴,安隆案對國際金融市場之影響,不亞於1998年亞洲金融風暴所產生之影響。
  究其主因則為安隆公司公司治理機制不健全所致,故公司治理機制也應受到重視。因此本研究針對上市(櫃)電子公司,區分不同九大次產業,以公司治理特性及與公司價值之關聯性。
  茲對民國87年至90年所有上市(櫃)電子公司,删除資料不全之公司後,共得311家公司及588個樣本,分別作基本分析、相關性分析及複迴歸分析。結果顯示:
一、管理者持股比率與公司價值不呈顯著相關。
二、董監事持股比率與公司價值不呈顯著相關。
三、外資法人持股比率與公司價值呈正相關。
四、經理人兼任董事與公司價值不呈顯著相關。
五、大股東持股方式與公司價值不呈顯著相關。
六、公司負債比率與公司價值呈正相關。


Since 2000, Enron company that is the one of largest energy company in USA has been found accounting scandal. The syndrome of Enron case is that one of the most famous accounting offices closed. The managers of Enron company were accused them of cheating financial statements by SEC. The impact of Enron case in international financial market is more than it of Asia financial storm in 1998.
The main reason of Enron case is that the mechanism of the corporate governance didn’t make it effect. According the reason, companies have to take consideration in the mechanism of the corporate governance.
By using descriptive statistics, correlation and regression, the 511 samples of 311 firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC for the 1998-2001 periods are investigated. The results are as follows:

1. The relationship between the ratio of manager’s stock and corporate value is not significant.
2. The relationship between the ratio of Board member’s stock and corporate value is not significant.
3. The relationship between the ratio of foreign investment institution’s stock and corporate value is positive.
4. The relationship between the both same person of managers and Board member and corporate value is not significant.
5. The relationship between the difference of the model of the ultimate owners and corporate value is not significant.
6. The relationship between liability ratio and corporate value is positive.


第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景及研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 論文架構 3
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 代理問題相關文獻 6
第二節 公司治理相關文獻 28
第三節 公司治理工具-董事會有關文獻 52
第四節 股權結構有關文獻 74
第五節 持股型態有關文獻 92
第六節 公司價值有關文獻 98
第七節 公司治理與公司價值關係研究文獻 100
第三章 研究方法 103
第一節 研究分析架構 103
第二節 假設建立 106
第三節 研究變數定義 112
第四節 資料分析方式 113
第五節 樣本與資料來源 114
第六節 研究限制 115
第四章 研究結果與實證分析 116
第一節 Shapiro-Wilk常態檢定 116
第二節 基本分析 117
第三節 相關分析 119
第四節 複迴歸分析 124
第五章 結論與建議 132
第一節 結論 132
第二節 研究建議 137
第三節 後續研究 141
參考文獻 143



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英文文獻
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