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研究生:王一玲
研究生(外文):I-Ling Wang
論文名稱:所有權結構與公司價值間之內生性關係
論文名稱(外文):The Endogenous Relation Between Ownership Structure and Corporate Value
指導教授:王泰昌王泰昌引用關係
指導教授(外文):Tay-Chang Wang
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:會計學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2004
畢業學年度:92
語文別:中文
論文頁數:78
中文關鍵詞:聯立方程模型內生性與非線性關係所有權結構公司價值
外文關鍵詞:simultaneous equationsfirm valuecorporate structureendogenous and nonlinear relation
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:37
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  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:3
本文旨在探討所有權結構與公司價值間之內生性關係。過去文獻指出企業因經營權與所有權分離,進而導致代理問題。本文則以董監事持股及經理人持股作為所有權定義,探討其對於公司價值是否有系統性及非線性的關係,並檢視道德風險問題是否因代理人持股提高而得到舒緩。再者,前人指出公司價值亦可能透過薪酬制度而影響代理人持股公司股份之意願。至此,公司價值與所有權結構間之內生性關係需要更進一步地的檢視而不應被忽略,以確保迴歸結果之一致性。針對所有權結構與公司價值間之內生性關係,本文試圖以 fixed effects 模型、 Hausman and Taylor 模型與聯立方程模型來驗證本文假說。除此之外,本研究亦透過各解釋變數與產業別之交乘項來探討電子業本質是否與其他產業存在差異。
綜合各模型所得較一致性之結論為,當董監事持股或管理者持股比例提高時,可能舒緩道德風險問題,進而提升公司價值;電子業之董監事持股比例對於公司價值亦有遞增但趨緩之顯著影響力。此外,電子業以權益為基礎之獎酬顯著誘使經理人與公司整體利益一致,並舒緩道德風險問題。最後,公司價值對於董監事持股具有顯著正向影響力;而公司價值僅在電子業中對經理人持股產生顯著正向影響力,反應現今電子業獎酬計畫及契約設計之初步狀況。


This study intends to probe into the endogenous relation between ownership structure and corporate value. Prior studies hold that while the power of control and ownership are separated, the agency problem is thus induced. In addition, some scholars maintain that firm value could reversely affect stockholdings of agents through reward plan. Therefore, the endogenous relation between ownership structure and firm value should be further discussed. The empirical results indicate that when the percentage of stockholdings of directors and supervisors is increased, the problem of moral hazard could be relieved and hence firm value is increased. In high-tech industries, there exists a nonlinear relation between the percentage of stockholdings of directors and supervisors, and firm value.
Moreover, equity-based reward empirically provide a great function of incentive alignment in high-tech industries.
Finally, firm value positively affects the stockholdings of directors and supervisors, while it is in high-tech industries that the influence on the stockholdings of managers is sustained.

1 前言
1.1 背景介紹 ................................. 1
1.2 動機與主題 ............................... 3
1.3 本文架構 ................................. 3
2 文獻回顧
2.1 主理人與代理人模型 ....................... 5
2.2 實證研究回顧 ............................. 9
2.2.1 OLS 迴歸模型 ....................... 9
2.2.2 Panel Data Method ................. 14
2.2.3 聯立方程模型 ...................... 15
3 研究設計
3.1 本文假說及控制變數 ...................... 18
3.1.1 本文主要變數及其假說 .............. 18
3.1.2 控制變數 .......................... 23
3.2 研究方法 ................................ 24
3.2.1 OLS 迴歸模型及模型設計 ............ 26
3.2.2 Panel Data 模型及模型設計 ......... 30
3.2.3 聯立方程模型及模型設計 ............ 34
3.3 資料來源與選樣標準 ...................... 38
4 實證結果
4.1 統計敘述 ................................ 39
4.2 OLS 迴歸結果 ............................ 45
4.3 Panel Data 迴歸結果 ..................... 53
4.4 聯立方程模型迴歸結果 .................... 63
5 結論與建議
5.1 結論 .................................... 68
5.2 研究限制與建議 .......................... 69
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