要能獲得良好市場績效的關鍵因素，不是現存廠商與現有產品市場中的靜態競爭，而是取決於使用新技術的新生產者、或是新產品的實際或潛在競爭。而企業的研發創新可說是提昇產業競爭力的主要途徑之一，唯有不斷創新才能在激烈的競爭中保有不墜的優勢，而創新的根源就是來自於不斷地從事研發活動。因此，除了重視技術研發的活動所帶來的長期利潤外，要如何兼顧研發策略的靈活運用，防範競爭對手的行動，並避免損及自身的利益，就成了重要的課題。
廠商若利用研發合作做為其研發策略，其中契約如何訂定會存在著訊息不對稱的問題。因此，本研究將說明不完全契約理論在契約設計當中，如何特別強調外生強制執行機制。另外藉由研發動態賽局，分析廠商彼此競爭地位不同下，對研發投入的影響。而在具研發外溢效果下的研發賽局中，本研究利用逆向歸納法求解子賽局完美納許均衡，並分析在廠商間有技術不對稱性下的廠商均衡解。
本研究結果說明，由於訊息界定和懲罰的事前特徵性，使得一個簡單的契約，能夠使交易雙方根據這段期間不能修正討價還價規則進行重新談判，從而達到每一方最適的特定投資水準。而在研發競爭效果的分析下，當兩家廠商皆已達到研發初始階段，則當競爭對手在研發的支出越大時，本身將愈能發覺研發的最適支出，而有領先與落後的情況時，則領先廠商會在研發利潤大於最小平均成本下，選擇其最適的研發投入，而落後廠商將可能退出競爭。若兩家廠商皆未達到初始階段，則只要領先競爭對手達到初始階段，其預期償付值將大於最小平均成本，因此皆會著手於研發過程。而缺乏外溢性時，第一階段研發水準的納許均衡，會隨著本身研發成本的增加而減少，並隨著其他廠商研發成本增加而增加。而在有外溢效果下，廠商會因對手的研發投資增加，而減少本身的研發投資。

To obtain the key factor of the good market performance, it is not the static competition in existing firms and product market, but depend on new firms who use the new technology, or the real and potential competition of the new products. The firms’ R&D could refer one of the main ways to promote industry''s competitiveness. So, except the long-term profit from the activity of R&D, how to give consideration to the flexible application of R&D strategies, take precautions against the rival''s action, and avoid decreasing the profit, has become the important subject.
If the firms use the R&D cooperation to be their R&D strategies, how to make the contract will exist the information asymmetry. So, this research will state the theory of incomplete contract in the contract design how to especially emphasize that outside execution mechanism. By the dynamic R&D game, to analyse the impact factor of firms’ R&D investment in the different competitive situation. This research use the backward induction to get the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and analyse the equilibrium under the asymmetric technologies between the firms.
One result of this research states that for the information and penalty, a brief contract can make the two firms couldn’t correct the bargaining rule, and get the ex post renegotiation default option and obtain the optimal special investment levels. Another result states under the analysis of R&D competitive effect when two firms have obtain the initial R&D level, the bigger the rival firm invest R&D, the easier the firm find the optimal R&D investment. When there is no spillover, the Nash equilibrium in the first phase of R&D level will decrease with the increasing of ownself R&D cost, and increase with the decreasing of the other firm’s R&D cost. When the spillovers exist, the firm will decrease ownself R&D investment with the rival increase the R&D investment.

目 錄
中文摘要 …………………………………………………………….. i
英文摘要 …………………………………………………………….. ii
誌謝 ………………………………………………………………….. iii
目錄 ………………………………………………………………….. iv
第壹章 緒論 ……………………………………………………….. 1
第一節 研究背景與動機………………………………….. 1
第二節 研究目的………………………………………….. 2
第三節 研究架構………………………………………….. 3
第貳章 文獻探討…………………………………………………... 5
第一節 影響研發投入因素……………………………….. 5
第二節 研發策略………………………………………….. 9
第三節 研發合作……….……………..………………….. 11
第四節 交易成本與契約理論…………………………….. 18
第五節 技術授權………………………………………….. 20
第參章 模型分析…………………………………………………... 27
第一節 前言……………………………………………….. 27
第二節 研發合作之不完全契約………………………….. 28
第三節 研發競爭效果分析…….…………..…………….. 35
第四節 具有外溢效果下之研發賽局…………………….. 39
本章附錄…………………….……………………………….. 53
第肆章 結論與未來研究方向……………………………………... 56
參考文獻……………………………………………………………… 58

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