臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文旨在探討在經理人更換時，經理人聘任之類型。過去對於經理人更換的研究中，大部份以探討公司績效與經理人更換機率之間的影響關係，少部分有研究經理人選擇之類型。本研究與相關文獻主要的不同，在於本研究著重在探討各變數環境中，若發生經理人更換的情況下，董事會股東對於經理人類型之聘任決定因素為何，是選擇較不易產生代理問題之家族經理人，抑或擁有高專業能力之專業經理人。因此所要強調的是影響選擇經理人之動態問題，故使用研究期間中以確實有發生經理人更換情形之公司為研究樣本，針對經理人更換前後之類型，探討經理人更換類型選擇之影響因素。
本研究以民國87年至民國91年為樣本蒐集期間，研究對象為台灣證券交易所上市之非金融業公司，共得有效樣本262家。透過Probit模型分析後，由實證結果可發現，在全部樣本下，代理問題、經理人能力與董事會結構變數之影響結果，對於本文所建立之假說有相當程度的支持，而在經理人更換前類型、息前稅前盈餘變動量與產業別之不同子樣本群下，此三組變數群之影響程度會有明顯差異，因此在不同之影響環境下，皆會影響聘任經理人類型之決策。

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the determinants of the types of CEO selection while replacing CEOs. In the literature, most studies of the CEO turnover refer to the relationship between corporation performance and the probability of CEO turnover, and only a few studies focus on the types of CEO selection. Therefore, we emphasize on the decisive factors for the board to select a suitable manager under kinds of CEO replacing situations, whether to choose a family manager for fewer agent problems or to choose a professional manager with better capabilities. Because we are interested in the problem of the choice of CEO, the sample consists of the corporations in which the CEO turnover actually happens. We aim at the change of the types of CEO turnover and investigate the effects of various factors on that change.
The data are collected from the listed companies in the Taiwan Stock Exchange between 1998 and 2002. We obtain 262 valid observations excluding financial companies. Several hypotheses relating the choice of the types of CEO to the agency cost, the manager’s ability, and the board structure are developed. Using the Probit econometric model, we find strong evidence to support proposed hypotheses. For further analyses, the sample is divided into different groups according to (1) the types of CEO before replacement, (2) the changes of EBIT before replacement, and (3) the industries. Regression results suggest that the effects of most variables on the choice of the types of CEO do vary across different subsamples.

【目錄】
第一章 緒論
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究方法 3
第三節 本文架構 4
第二章 文獻回顧與假說建立
第一節 代理問題 6
第二節 經理人能力 9
第三節 董事會結構 12
第四節 經理人更換前類型、息前稅前盈餘變動量與產業別效果之假說建立 15
第三章 實證模型與變數定義
第一節 模型設計 17
第二節 變數定義 19
第三節 資料來源 27
第四節 基本統計量 29
第四章 實證結果
第一節 全部樣本下之迴歸結果 35
第二節 不同子樣本群下之迴歸結果 43
第五章 結論及未來研究方向
第一節 主要發現 50
第二節 未來研究方向 52
參考文獻 53
【表目錄】
表3-1 變數定義 28
表3-2 全部樣本之基本統計量 32
表3-3 不同廠商特質下之基本統計量 33
表4-1 經理人更換決策之Probit估計－以全部公司為樣本 41
表4-2 經理人更換決策Probit估計之邊際效果－以全部公司為樣本 42
表4-3 經理人更換決策之Probit估計－以經理人更換前特性分類 47
表4-4 經理人更換決策之Probit估計－以息前稅前盈餘變動量分類 48
表4-5 經理人更換決策之Probit估計－以產業別分類 49

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