臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文以一個簡單的連續雙佔模型，在兩上下游廠商均對稱的情況下，討論當上游的研發存在外溢效果，而兩上游廠商又同時有外溢訊息時，個別分析上游廠商和下游廠商在不同整合情形下對研發數量、廠商利潤、消費者剩餘和社會福利的影響。整合的型態包括上游水平結合、雙邊垂直整合、單邊垂直整合及上游聯合研發。
　　結果發現，研發數量方面，除了單邊垂直整合廠商及聯合研發上游廠商會隨外溢效果越大而增加研發，和上游水平結合無外溢效果，研發數量不變外，其餘都會隨外溢增加減少研發，這是因為撘便車的效果。而研發會增加的原因則是因為規模經濟的效果。
　　比較無整合、水平整合和聯合研發三種情況：當外溢效果小的時候，上游廠商的利潤從大到小依序是水平結合、聯合研發、無整合情形，但下游利潤則依序是無整合、聯合研發、水平結合，故上下游的目標會不一致；反之外溢效果大時則利益會一致，利潤從大到小的排序均為聯合研發、無整合、水平結合。
　　而就無整合、垂直整合、單邊垂直整合和聯合研發四種情況的利潤而言，當外溢效果小時單邊垂直整合的廠商利潤會優於其他整合；反之在外溢效果大時則聯合研發的廠商利潤最大，會傾向組織聯合研發。總觀產業的利潤，也得到相同的結果，在外溢效果小時單邊垂直整合產業利潤最大；外溢效果大時則是聯合研發佔優勢。
　　消費者剩餘方面，以雙邊垂直整合時最高，水平整合最差。最後從社會福利的觀點，不論外溢效果為何，政府應以垂直整合或單邊垂直整合策略為優先考量，若無法達成，再鼓勵實行聯合研發。

With a successive duopoly market where the upstream firms innovate and produce spillover effect to lower rival''s production cost, and the assumption of symmetric and perfect information about the spillover, this paper explores the effect of different merger and collusive strategies on innovation, firms'' profits, consumer surplus and social welfare.
We found that firms without integration and with vertical integration will decrease the amount of innovation as spillover effect increases, because of free-rider problem. One-side vertical merger and research joint ventures act the other way, and horizontal merger has no spillover effect.
Comparing the cases of unintegration, horizontal merger and research joint ventures, the upstream firms will rank their profits differently from the downstream firms when the spillover effect is small. However, as the spillover is large, they will have the same ranking and the same preference.
When cases, such as unintegration, vertical integration, one-side vertical integration and research joint ventures are compared, one-side vertical integration will be preferred by either the firms or the industry while the spillover effect is small. However, research joint ventures will have its advantage as the spillover effect is getting large.
From consumers’ point of view, vertical integration is the best, but horizontal merger is the worst. Finally, the government should first consider vertical merger or one-side vertical merger to maximize the social welfare. If this can not be done, then it should encourage research joint venture among firms.

目 錄
第一章 前言 1
第二章 文獻回顧 3
第三章 模型假設 10
第四章 案例分析 12
第一節 上下游無任何形式整合 12
第二節 上游廠商水平整合 20
第三節 雙邊上下游垂直整合的競爭 25
第四節 單邊垂直整合的競爭 34
第五節 ＲＪＶ 47
第五章 結論和建議 61
參考文獻 65

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