臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近年來，一些哲學家開始主張雙面向論。這主張的主要想法是結合語意內在論與外在論的優點。雙面向論的主要主張為：所有的語言辭彙與思惟同時具有第一面向與第二面向的的意義。第一面向的意義可以用語意內在論的傳統來理解；然而，第二面向的意義卻是遵循外在論的腳步所建立的。由於如此的結合，雙面向論者論述認為，其理論可以解決關於不同的共同指涉詞之問題，並且與語意外在論相容。
在本論文中，我將介紹雙面向論的哲學基礎。雙面向論其實立基於釵h不同的雙面向語意架構。這些架構的主要特徵是雙重策略。因此，我們可以根據兩種不同的考量來評量某句子是否為真。舉例來說，卡普蘭的指示詞理論、漢博史東與戴維斯的雙面向模態邏輯，以及史坦納克所發展的陳述句的語意模型都屬於雙面向語意架構。雙面向論者認為，評量句子真假值的兩種考量其實是一個辭彙（或是一個句子）與思惟兩種不同的內延。更進一步來說，這兩種不同的內延其實就是兩種不同的意義。
基本上，這兩種評量句子真假值的方式，其實是根據我們如何判斷一個可能世界為真而來。傳統而言，分析哲學家認為我們應該用反事實的方式去理解什麼是一個可能世界。然而，雙面向論者認為，我們應該想像一個可能世界為真，再評量某個句子在這個可能世界中是否為真。舉例來說，若以反事實的想法來理解可能世界的語意，則「水是 H2O 」是一個必然真的句子。然而，假若我們考慮的是一個水不是 H2O的可能世界，則「水是 H2O 」就不是必然真的。因此，一個句子是否為必然真理，依賴於我們如何考量一個句子在一個可能的情境中是否為真。
在本論文中，我將著重於討論兩種雙面向論---脈絡雙面向論與識知雙面向論。由於脈絡雙面向論認為兩種評量句子或思惟的真假值的方式都是根據可能世界的語意而來，因此面臨釵h的困難。但是，若我們認為其中一種意義的評量是根據特一場景而不是可能世界而來，將可以避免這些困難。對脈絡雙面向論而言，兩種評量方式中的可能情境就不全都是脈絡變因。
我將在本論文中論述兩種雙面向論都為內在論，並且，兩者其實都無法真正逃避傳統對於語意內在論的批評。雙面向論因此仍必須面對認知限制性和整體論的問題。

In recent years, some philosophers propose several varieties of two-dimensionalism. The central idea of two-dimensionalism is to combine both the advantages of semantic internalism and externalism. The central tenet of two-dimensionalism is that all linguistic items and thoughts could have primary and secondary meanings. The notion of primary meaning is understood within the semantic internalist tradition, whereas that of the secondary meaning is built by following the semantic externalist footsteps. Thus, because of such a combination, two-dimensionalists argue that their theories can solve the puzzles brought about by co-referential but distinct terms in away that are consistent with semantic externalism.
In the thesis, I introduced the philosophical foundations of two-dimensionalisms. Two-dimensionalisms are based on various two-dimensional semantic frameworks. Kaplan’s theory of demonstratives, Humberstone and Davies’s two-dimensional modal logic, and Stalnaker’s model of assertion all belong to the two-dimensional semantic frameworks. The central characteristic of these frameworks is the double-indexing strategy. It follows that we could evaluate a sentence based on two different considerations. Two-dimensionalists think that the two different considerations of the evaluations are two different kinds of intensions of a term (or a sentence) and a thought. Furthermore, the two different intensions are two different kinds of meanings.
Basically, the two different ways of evaluating a sentence are based on how we consider a possible world as actual. In tradition, analytic philosophers think that we should understand a possible world in counterfactual sense. However, two-dimensionalists propose that we could image that a possible world turns out to be true, and we could evaluate whether a sentence is true in this world. The two different considerations will correspond to two different kinds of modality. For example, “water is H2O” is necessary true, if we understand possible worlds in counterfactual senses. Alternatively, if we consider that a possible world in which water is not H2O turn out to be true, then “water is H2O” is not necessary. Therefore, a sentence is necessary or not depended on how we consider whether the sentence is true in a possible circumstance.
In the thesis, I will concentrate on two varieties of two-dimensionalism, contextual and epistemic two-dimensionalisms. Contextual two-dimensionalism has many difficulties, because contextual two-dimensionalism considers that the two ways of evaluations are both based on possible worlds. Those difficulties may be avoided, if we think that one kind of meaning are evaluated in a scenario rather than in a possible world. For epistemic two-dimensionalism, the possible circumstances in two ways of evaluation are not both contextual parameters.
In the thesis, I will argue that both of the two kinds of two-dimensionalisms are also semantic internalism and they do not really escape from the traditional criticisms to semantic internalism. Two-dimensionalisms still need to face the problem of cognitive limitation and the problem of holism.

Table of Contents

Introduction 1
Chapter 1 The Debates Between descriptive theory of meaning and Semantic
Externalism 6
1.1 The traditional descriptivist picture 7
1.2 The externalist’s challenge 12
1.3 The puzzles for externalists 18
Chapter 2 Foundations of Two Dimensional Semantics 25
2.1 The golden triangle: meaning, modality and reasoning 26
2.2 Kaplan’s Characters 28
2.3 Two-dimensional modal logic 35
2.4 Stalnaker’s model of assertion 43
Chapter 3 Jackson’s Strong Two-dimensionalism 52
3.1 Strong and weak two-dimensionalism 59
3.2 Jackson’s strong two-dimensionalism 59
3.3 The objections to the strong two-dimensionalism 68
Chapter 4 Chalmers’s Epistemic Two-dimensionalism 82
4.1 Epistemic modality and epistemic spaces 83
4.2 Epistemic Scenarios 87
4.3. Two kinds of intensions: epistemic intensions and subjective intensions 90
4.4. Frege’s senses and epistemic intensions 96
4.5 Epistemic intension and narrow content 101
Conclusion 110
References 112

References

Ǻqvist, L. 1977. Modal logic with subjunctive conditions and Dispositional predicates. Journal of Philosophical Logic 2: 1-76
Burge, T. 1979. Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73-122.
Byrne, A. 1999. Cosmic hermeneutics. Philosophical Perspectives 13:347-83. [http://mit.edu/abyrne/www/CosmicHermeneutics.html]
Byrne, A. & Pryor, J. forthcoming. Bad intensions. In (M. Garcia-Carpintero & J. Macia, eds) Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press. [http://mit.edu/abyrne/www/BadIntensions.pdf]
Carnap, R. 1947. Meaning and Necessity. University of Chicago Press.
Chalmers, D.J. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D.J. 2002a. On sense and intension. In Philosophical Perspectives 16: Language and Mind. Blackwell: 135-82. [consc.net/papers/intension.html]
Chalmers, D.J. 2002b. The components of content. In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. [consc.net/papers/content.html]
Chalmers, D.J. 2002c. The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief. In (Q. Smith & A. Jokic, eds) Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. [consc.net/papers/belief.html]
Chalmers, D.J. forthcoming a. The foundations of two-dimensional semantics. In (M. Garcia-Carpintero & J. Macia, eds) Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press. [consc.net/papers/foundations.html]
Chalmers, D.J. forthcoming b. Two-dimensional semantics. In (E. Lepore & B. Smith, eds) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language Oxford University Press. [consc.net/papers/twodim.html]
Chalmers, D.J. unpublished a. The nature of epistemic space. [consc.net/papers/espace.html]
Chalmers, D.J. unpublished b. Soames on two-dimensionalism. Commentary at Arizona State University. [consc.net/papers/soames.pdf]
Chalmers, D.J. unpublished c. Jackson’s two-dimensionalism. [fragments.consc.net/djc/2005/01/jacksons_twodim.html#more]
Chalmers, D.J. & Jackson, F. 2001. Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation. Philosophical Review 110: 315-61. [consc.net/papers/analysis.html]
Crossley, J.N. and Humberstone, I.L. 1977. The logic of 'actually'. Reports on Mathematical Logic 8: 11-29.
Davies, M. 2004. Reference, contingency, and the two-dimensional framework. Philosophical Studies 118: 83-131.
Davies, M. & Humberstone, I.L. 1980. Two notions of necessity. Philosophical Studies 58:1-30.
Evans, G. 1977. Reference and contingency. The Monist 62: 161-89.
Fodor, J. A. 1987. Psychosemantics. MIT Press.
Frege, G. 1892. Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Translated in (P. Geach & M. Black, eds.) Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Blackwell, 1952.
Jackson F.C. 1998a. Reference and description revisited. In J.E. Toberlin (Ed.) Philosophical Perspectives 12: 201-218, Language, Mind, and Ontology, Cambridge MA: Blackwell.
Jackson F.C. 1998b. From Metaphysic to Ethic: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jackson F.C. 2004. Why we need A-intensions. Philosophical Studies 118: 257-277.
Kaplan, D. 1989. Demonstratives. In (J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, eds.) Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kamp, H. 1971. Formal properties of 'now'. Theoria 37: 227-273.
Kripke, S.A. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kroon, F. 1987. Causal descriptivism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65: 1-17.
Lewis, D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell.
Putnam, H. 1975. The meaning of `meaning'. In (K. Gunderson, ed.) Language, Mind, and Knowledge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Schroeter, L. 2004. The rationalist foundations of Chalmers’s two-dimensional semantics. Philosophical Studies 118: 227-255. .
Segerberg, K. 1977. Two-dimensional modal logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 2: 77-96.
Soames, S. 2005. Reference and Description. Princeton University Press.
Stalnaker, R. C. 1978. Assertion. In (P. Cole, ed.) Syntax and Semantics: Pragmatics, Vol. 9. New York: Academic Press. Reprinted in his 1999: 78-95.
Stalnaker, R.C. 1999. Content and Context. Oxford University Press.
Stalnaker, R. C. 2004. Assertion revisited: on the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics. Philosophical Studies 118: 299-322.
Vlach, F. 1973. Now and then: a formal study in the logic of tense anaphora. Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA.