臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在日常生活當中，我們會以「理性與否」來評論一個人，而我們也咸認為人類相較於其他動物而言是有理性的。但理性是什麼？如何定義？理性可分為哪些層面？理性僅僅是一項工具，還是可以為目的？理性是相對的還是絕對的？我們可以說動物沒有理性嗎？我們可以認為西方所謂已開發國家的人民是理性的，而亞非某些所謂未開發國家的人民是不理性的嗎？本論文於一開始針對數個心理學的實驗例子來探討這些問題，並介紹理性推論：歸納法與演繹法。
心理學家發現一般人常犯歸納性推論的謬誤有三大類。因「表徵性」所導致的六項推論謬誤，有「對於結果的前機率無知覺」、「忽略樣本大小」、「對於偶發機率的錯誤概念」、「對於有效性的錯覺」、「對於回歸平均值的誤解」以及「連接詞的謬誤」。因「可用性」所導致的兩項推論謬誤，為「可憶起的例子所導致的成見」以及「因搜索群組的有效姓所導致的成見」。因「調整性」與「基點性」所導致的推論謬誤，有「因調整不足所導致的錯誤判斷」以及「對於聯集事件(『且』事件)與交集事件(『或』事件)的錯誤評估」。其他尚未歸入這三類的兩項歸納性推論謬誤，有「只接受與自己意見相同所導致的偏見」以及「過度自信所導致的謬誤」兩項。
另一項推論題型──演繹性推論──以及人們在這項推論底下所會犯的謬誤，為著名的「四張卡片問題」。這類實驗可大致分為「抽象內容條件句推論」以及「具體內容條件句推論」；本論文分別細分為「肯定句問法」及「否定句問法」以細究其選卡邏輯，以及「直述性問法」與「義務性問法」而介紹實驗問題內容。接著，以心理學家Wason的「覺察力模型」及Evans的「驗證或相符」的角度分別分析人們選擇抽象內容卡片的想法與方式，且繼續分析具體內容卡片的題型，並探討其背後可能的理論：Cheng及Holyoak所提出的「應用推論理論」和Cosmides所提出的「社會契約論」。
而由於「四張卡片」實驗題型中，具體內容題型的義務性問法答對率之高，使得學者對此特別關注。因此，本論文考量義務性思考的普遍程度，分別討論其他靈長類動物、幼童以及其他非西方文化人民的義務性思考能力。
最後，本論文由哲學的知識論角度，檢視心理學者的這一系列實驗及其結果，發現他們的解讀並非恰當。先由Sosa回頭評論關於歸納性推論的分析，得出心理學者需要修正這些實驗的內容或結論；再討論Stich的反Dennett天擇論證，而一一駁回。進而以Sosa的相對理性論來說明，我們無法在以一般人為標準的範圍裡，說大多數人類是不理性的；亦即，人類在自己的定義下畢竟是理性的動物，心理學者的數個實驗與解釋並不能抹滅這項事實。

Ordinarily, we may judge people with “being rational or not.” We also think that human beings compared with other animals are rational. But what is rationality? How do we define it? How many levels can we divide it? Is rationality merely taken as an instrument or could be taken as a goal? Is it relative or absolute? Can we say that other animals are irrational? Can we suppose that people in the so-called “well-developed” western countries are rational but that those in the so-called “under-developed” some Asian and African countries are irrational? This thesis first aimed at some examples from psychological experiments to discuss these questions, and also introduced two kinds of rational inference: deduction and induction.
Psychologist found that there are mainly three kinds of deductive inferential biases that people often made. Firstly, there are six kinds of inferential biases discussed that are caused by representativeness; they are “insensitivity to prior probability of outcome,” “insensitivity to sample size,” “misconceptions of chances,” “the illusion of validity,” “misconceptions of regression,” and “the conjunction fallacy.” Secondly, there are two kinds of inferential biases discussed that are caused by availability; they are “biases due to the retrievability of instances” and “biases due to the effectiveness of a search set.” Thirdly, there are two other kinds of inferential biases that are caused by adjustment and anchoring; they are “insufficient adjustment” and “biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events.” Finally, there are two more inferential deductive biases that had not yet been included into these three kinds; they are “confirmation bias” and “over-confidence.”
Another kind of inference—inductive inference—and biases that people made under this inference type is the well-known “Wason’s Selection Task.” This sort of inference can mainly be separated into “abstract content” and “thematic content” inferences. The former was divided into “affirmative” and “negative” conditional inferences as psychologists did to be studied the logic of card choice. The latter was divided into “indicative” and “deontic” conditional inferences to be introduced the experiments. Then, I analyzed through introducing psychologists’ theory the mode people thought in selecting “abstract-content” cards; we had Wason’s “Insight Model” and Evans’ “Verifying or Matching.” Besides, I analyzed the questions presented with “thematic-content” cards and discussed possible theories behind: Cheng and Holyoak’s “Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas” and Cosmides’ “Social Contract Theory.”
Since much more people answered correctly toward deontic questions in thematic-content conditionals than that of other kinds of questions in the Four-Cards experiments, psychologists paid special attention to this phenomenon. Thus, I especially discussed how general deontic reasoning is. Then. I discussed deontic-reasoning ability among other primates, young kids, and people in non-western culture individually.
Finally, I tried through epistemological angle to see this series of experiments and the results made by psychologists, and found out that their explanations were not proper. I first went back to analysis about deductive inferences through Sosa’s discussion, and found out that the contents or explanations of these psychological experiments need to be adjusted. Then, I discussed Stich’s anti nature-selection argument that was against Dennett’s and proved that Stich’s arguments were wrong. Further more, I explained by Sosa’s relative rationalism why we could not declare that most people were irrational since we defined rationality with ordinary people’s general performance. That is, human beings are after all rational animals under their own definition. Psychologists can not deny this very fact with a few experiments and explanations.

緒論……………………………………………………………………………1
第一章 理性及其特徵………………………………………………………5
第一節 理性的分類…………………………………………………………5
第二節 工具理性……………………………………………………………6
第三節 理性的規範層面……………………………………………………8
第四節 理性與推論…………………………………………………………14
第二章 歸納理性推論的謬誤與分析………………………………………18
第一節 表徵性(Representativeness) …………………………………21
第二節 可用性(Availability) …………………………………………31
第三節 調整性與基點性(Adjustment and Anchoring)…………………37
第四節 其他歸納性推論的謬誤與分析…..………………………………41
第三章 演繹性推論的謬誤與分析…………………………………………44
第一節 「四張卡片」的抽象內容條件句推論……………………………44
第二節 「四張卡片」的具體內容條件句推論……………………………50
第三節 對於「四張卡片」之抽象性題型分析……………………………53
第四節 對於「四張卡片」之具體主題性題型分析………………………58
第四章 權利義務責任思考的普遍性………………………………………67
第一節 其他靈長類動物的道德義務責任性思考能力……………………67
第二節 幼兒的權利義務責任性思考能力…………………………………72
第三節 其他民族文化的權利義務責任性思考能力………………………74
第五章 從知識論看心理學的分析與評論…………………………………77
第一節 由Cohen看心理學對於歸納性推論的評論………………………77
第二節 Stich的反天擇論證………………………………………………83
第三節 Sosa的相對理性論…………………………………………………86
結論……………………………………………………………………………89
附錄一…………………………………………………………………………93
附錄二…………………………………………………………………………97
參考書目………………………………………………………………………98

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