臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在網際網路中，買賣雙方在時間限制及資訊不完整情況下，藉由智慧型代理人進行議價活動，往往因為議價過程中不能得知對方的時間限制、保留價及議價策略，無法產生有效的議價策略，導致議價失敗或效用不佳。整個議價活動的核心在於雙方所使用的議價策略，議價策略會影響雙方的議價效用及成交率。本研究先針對議價協定進行分析，並對議價協定中四種不同的買賣雙方出價順序提出四個簡單且新穎的動態議價策略演算法，假設當賣方先出價時，以買方觀點為例，該演算法會動態地預測賣方未來的可能出價，並藉由最大化未來買方可能成交效用的概念，動態地改變買方的議價策略。再者，經由本研究針對上述四個動態議價策略演算法的實驗結果顯示，在上述時間限制及資訊不完整情況下，無論是僅單方利用本研究所提出之動態議價策略演算法進行出價，或者是買賣雙方均利用動態議價策略演算法出價，均可以大幅提高買賣雙方的議價效用及成交率。

On the Internet, the bilateral bargaining agents will often fall into failure or cause poor utility value at the end of bargaining under time constraints and with incomplete information. The core of bargaining activities is the bargaining strategies of both agents. In this thesis, we analyse the offering sequence of bargaining protocol and propose four dynamic bargaining algorithms with novel and simple characteristics to make offers. Give an example, if seller makes offer firstly, in the view of buyer, the algorithm will predict the seller’s possible offers for the consecutive rounds with little information about seller’s deadline, reservation price, and bargaining strategy. Then, it revises buyer’s offer function to maximize its utility in one possible agreement point. The experimental results for the four algorithms show that the algorithms will enhance the ratio of reaching agreement and the utility value at the end of the bargaining.

摘要 i
Abstract iv
致謝 v
目錄 vi
表目錄 xi
圖目錄 xii
第一章 緒論 1
1.1研究動機及目的 1
1.2研究流程 3
1.3論文架構 5
第二章 文獻探討 6
2.1 議價定義 6
2.2 自動化議價相關研究 8
2.3自動化議價模式 14
2.3.1資訊狀態 16
2.3.2 岀價函數 17
2.3.3 議價策略 19
2.3.4 議價協定 21
第三章 議價效用函數及動態議價策略演算法 23
3.1 議價效用函數 23
3.2動態議價策略演算法 25
3.2.1賣方先出價 25
3.2.1.1 買方動態議價策略演算法A1 25
3.2.1.2賣方動態議價策略演算法A2 27
3.2.2買方先出價 29
3.2.2.1買方動態議價策略演算法A3 29
3.2.2.2 賣方動態議價策略演算法A4 32
第四章 實驗說明及實驗結果 34
4.1 實驗說明 34
4.2 實驗假設 36
4.3實驗評估方法 39
4.4實驗結果 41
4.4.1實驗類型一：賣方先出價，賣方依照出價函數(2)出價，買方依照演算法A1出價 41
4.4.1.1實驗情況一：買賣雙方議價時限相對大小的影響 41
4.4.1.2實驗情況二：買方初始價與賣方保留價相對大小的影響 47
4.4.1.3實驗情況三：買方保留價與賣方初始價相對大小的影響 53
4.4.2實驗類型二：賣方先出價，賣方依照演算法A2，買方依照出價函數(1)出價 58
4.4.2.1實驗情況一：買賣雙方議價時限相對大小的影響 60
4.4.2.2實驗情況二：買方初始價與賣方保留價相對大小的影響 65
4.4.2.3實驗情況三：買方保留價與賣方初始價相對大小影響 70
4.4.3實驗類型三：賣方先出價，買方依照演算法A1出價，賣方依照演算法A2出價 76
4.4.3.1實驗情況一：買賣雙方議價時限相對大小的影響 76
4.4.3.2實驗情況二：買方初始價與賣方保留價相對大小的影響 82
4.4.3.3實驗情況三：買方保留價與賣方初始價相對大小的影響 87
4.4.4實驗類型四：買方先出價，賣方依照出價函數(2)岀價，買方依照演算法A3出價 94
4.4.4.1實驗情況一：買賣雙方議價時限相對大小的影響 94
4.4.4.2實驗情況二：買方初始價與賣方保留價相對大小的影響 99
4.4.4.3實驗情況三：買方保留價與賣方初始價相對大小的影響 104
4.4.5 實驗類型五：買方先出價，賣方依照演算法A4出價，買方依照出價函數(1)出價 110
4.4.5.1實驗情況一：買賣雙方議價時限相對大小的影響 112
4.4.5.2實驗情況二：買方初始價與賣方保留價相對大小的影響 117
4.4.5.3實驗情況三：買方保留價與賣方初始價相對大小的影響 122
4.4.6 實驗類型六：買方先出價，買方依照演算法A3出價，賣方依照演算法A4出價 128
4.4.6.1實驗情況一：買賣雙方議價時限相對大小的影響 128
4.4.6.2實驗情況二：買方初始價與賣方保留價相對大小的影響 133
4.4.6.3實驗情況三：買方保留價與賣方初始價相對大小的影響 138
4.4實驗總結 146
5.結論與未來發展 149
5.1結論 149
5.2 未來發展 150
參考文獻 151

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