臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

促進競爭是文獻中解釋分購的理由之一，競爭的程度由參與供應商的數目決定，以供應商的家數作參數。我建立一個兩期的模型，用「從做中學」的效果，將競爭的程度用成本結構的差異大小來表現，成本結構差異越大，競爭越激烈，透過模型讓競爭的程度由購買者內生控制。希望透過這一個簡單的模型檢視當廠商數目固定時，購買者會否在考量控制供應商的成本相似下採用分購策略。雖然發現在我模型的設定中，購買者考量兩期之下一定選擇不採用分購策略，但是，仍能發現只考量第二期的購買價格下促進競爭的確是購買者採用分購的原因之一。

第一節�前言……………………………1
第二節�文獻探討………………………3
第三節�模型設定………………………7
第四節�漺薊瘧v標行為………………9
第五節�第二期的均衡形式……………14
第五之一節� 主要均衡…………………14
第五之二節� 非主要均衡………………24
第六節�結論……………………………27
參考文獻…………………………………28
附錄………………………………………30

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