臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　傳統理論認為公司為股權分散 (Berle and Means, 1932)，亦即經營權與擁有權分別掌握在股東與經理人手中，在此情況下，若兩群體利益不一致，即稱為代理問題 (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)：經理人注重個人職涯，追求短期見效、極大化公司規模的行為；而股東財追求長期、極大化公司價值的行動。如何解決此一利益分歧的問題，讓公司價值上升，一直是公司理財研究的重點。而過往研究提出了兩種解決代理問題的方法：一為給予經理人股份，讓經理人利益與股東一致；二是使股權結構集中，如此使股東相較於經理人，擁有較高的權力而強迫其執行研發投資。本篇，研究股權結構中的另一個面向-「最終控制權」，檢驗由最終控制者角度出發(較高的現金流量權、較低的偏離程度及無參與管理交叉持股、金字塔結構等)，代理問題是否能被解決。

　　與過往針對代理理論的研究相較，本篇著重於公司的“生產力”而非獲利率等會計指標，後者為多數研究公司價值的代理變數。本篇採用的總要素生產力（TFP）經實証結果發現：TFP與會計指標具同向關係，同時又可改善其所具有的缺點。

　　本文研究結果發現：家族控制企業與非家族控制、或是無最終控制者的企業比較，前者擁有顯著較低的生產力。而再深入探討造成生產力差異的原因，本文發現：侵佔效果、控制股東成員擔任公司主要經理人、交叉持股、金字塔結構、及股權質押是造成生產力下降的原因；而誘因效果、大股東但非控制股東成員將有效使公司生產力提升。而用以提昇控制權的各項工具在家族控制公司使用頻率最高、效果也最為顯著。最後，本文以Tobin’s Q及產業因素去除後的生產力指數做強力檢定的正向、且顯著結果亦證明本篇研究的結果的可信。

　This paper links the ultimate control and productivity. The traditional agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is based on the assumption that most firms are widely held (Berle and Means, 1932), and assume that the interests of managers and shareholders are divergent. How to align the interests and increase firm value is important in corporate finance field. When we link this concept with productivity, shareholders seems to be more risk taking in promoting the manufacturing efficiency than managers. In addition to the thinking that giving managers stocks or the concentrated ownership structure to improve the productivity level, this paper adopts the concept of ultimate control and examines the relationship with productivity (TFP). We want to find out whether controller’s type will affect productivity level and the reasons to cause the productivity difference.

　Our results show that the family control companies have lower productivity than non-family control and widely held companies. When further trace out the reason to cause such difference, we find that the entrenchment factor, management regime, cross holding, pyramid structure, and collateral ratio are negatively related to productivity. On the contrary, incentive factor and a large shareholder but not belonging to the controller group is positively related to productivity. Those factors used to enhance control right have the most significant effect on productivity in family-control companies which implies that the popular usage of these tools in this group, and it further causes the productivity to be lower. Besides, the positive and significant relationship between productivity, Tobin’s Q and industry adjusted productivity confirm our results to be credible.

1. Introduction 1
1.1 Research background and motivation 1
1.2 Objectives of research 2

2. Literature Review 3
2.1 Productivity 3
2.2 Ultimate control and firm value 5
2.2.1 Concept of widely held firm 5
2.2.2 The role of family in managing business 5
2.2.3 The influence of ultimate controller on firm value 6
2.2.4 Monitoring mechanism 7
2.3 Research Hypothesis 8
2.4 Research Model 10

3. Research Design 11
3.1 Data Selection and Description 11
3.2 Definition of variables 12
3.2.1 Dependent variables 12
3.2.2 Independent variables 12
3.2.3 Control variables 14
3.2.4 Additional dependent variables (for Robustness test) 16

4. Results and Analysis 17
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 17
4.2 Do family companies perform worse than non-family companies? 20
4.3 What cause the difference of productivity? 22
4.4 Robustness test 25
4.4.1 Tobin’s Q 25
4.4.2 Industry specific TFP 25

5. Conclusions and Suggestions 44
5.1 Conclusions 44
5.2 Limitations and suggestions 45

Reference 46
Appendix 49

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