臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

摘要

過去經濟學者較少著墨於廠商藉由調整均衡產品線作為反仿冒政策。本研究利用Johnson and Myatt (2003) 所提出的產品升級法（upgrade），探討仿冒品對真品廠商均衡產品線之影響。本文主要結論有以下三點：第一、政府取締寬鬆會增加仿冒商競爭力，真品廠商將從低品質產品線開始停產，讓出低階市場給仿冒；適度取締時，真品廠商將只恢復最低階產品線用以迎戰仿冒；嚴格取締時，仿冒商失去競爭力自動退出市場。第二、對稱寡占真品廠商之均衡產品線與獨占廠商類似，但隨著真品廠商家數增加，仿冒商的生存空間愈小。第三、政府最適取締程度受消費者所得分配影響。

Abstract

The main purpose of this study is to use the upgrades model (Johnson and Myatt (2003)) to investigate how the equilibrium product line of the authentic firm will change in response to the entry of counterfeits. There are three conclusions in this paper. First, if the authentic firm uses product line pruning to leave low-quality market for counterfeiters, he first withdraws from his product line the lowest quality. When the authentic firm adopts fighting brands to fight against counterfeit, he only adds the lowest quality one. And the above finding still holds in oligopoly. The threat of counterfeits will decrease as the number of incumbent firm increases. Finally, we point out that the optimal policy against counterfeit depends on the distribution of the consumers’ income.

目 錄
第一章　緒論 1
第一節　研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 本文架構 3
第二章　文獻回顧 4
第一節 政府與廠商反仿冒策略 4
第二節 多產品品質 6
第三節 本文與文獻之差異 7
第三章 理論模型 8
第一節 基本假設 8
第二節 品質報酬呈遞增 12
第三節 品質報酬呈遞減 18
第四節 生產技術呈U型 21
第五節 一般化效用函數 26
第四章 模型擴充與修改 28
第一節 寡占廠商均衡產品線 28
第二節　價格策略 37
第三節 社會福利分析 39
第五章 結論 43
第一節 結論 43
第二節 未來研究方向 43
附　錄 45
附錄一、仿冒商存在時，獨占真品廠商產品線的臨界點 45
參考文獻 46
一、中文部份 46
二、英文部份 46

參考文獻
一、中文部份
譚令蒂、朱敬一 (1991)，取締仿冒品對廠商創新意願的影響，《人文及社會科學研究彙刊》，1(2)，219-231。

二、英文部份
Champsaur, P., and J.-C. Rochet (1989):“Multiproduct Duopolists,” Econometrica, 57(3), 533-57.
Deneckere, R. J., and R. P. McAfee (1996): “Damaged Goods,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, v. 5, iss. 2, 149-174.
De Fraja, G. (1996): “Product Line Competition in Vertically Differentiated Markets.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14(3), 389-414.
Gabszewicz, J. J., and J.-F. Thisse (1979): “Price Competition, Quality and Income Disparities.” Journal of Economic Theory, 20(3), 340-359.
Gal-Or, E. (1983): “Quality and Quantity Competition,” Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 590-600.
Grossman, G. M., and C. Shapiro (1988): “Counterfeit-Product Trade,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, NO. 1, 79-100.
Grossman, G. M. and C. Shapiro (1988): “Foreign Counterfeiting of Status Goods,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 103, NO. 1, 59-75.
Johnson, J.- P., and D.-P. Myatt (2003): “Multiproduct Quality Compeition: Fighting
Brands and Product Line Pruning,” American Economic Review, v. 93, iss. 3, 748-74
Johnson, J.- P., and D.-P. Myatt (2005): “Multiproduct Cournot Oligopoly,”Working Paper.
Mussa, M., and S. Rosen (1978): “Monopoly and product Quality,” Journal of Economic Theory, 18(2), 301-317.
Salant, S. W. (1989): “When is Inducing Self-Selection Suboptimal for a Monopolist?,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(2), 391-397.
Stokey, N. (1979): “Intertemporal Price Discrimination,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
93, 355-371.