臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在探討資訊透明的決策情境下，作業結構與性別對決策行為的影響。研究中採用蜈蚣賽局作業，以性別組成(對方為同性的男、女及對方為異性的男、女)為組間變項，故事(是否涉及公共利益)、賽局長度（長、短）、雙方利益差距（大、小）、利益增值(高、中、低)為組內變項，122名受試者被隨機組成不同性別的兩人小組，在不知對手為誰的情形下進行決策。以賽局結束時間點、背叛次數為依變項的變異數分析結果，發現決策作業結構的主效果顯著，利益涉及第三方、賽局長度較長、雙方利益差距較小、利益增額較高都會使得賽局結束時間延後、背叛對方的傾向下降。然性別組成的主效果不顯著，只有在第一局時，女性在面對利益涉及第三者時，與對方合作的傾向會顯著高於利益只涉及決策雙方的情境；男性則呈完全相反的趨勢，在利益只涉及雙方時，與對方合作的傾向會高於涉及公共利益的情境。此外，資料也顯示對手為同性的女性合作傾向最低、結束時間最早，而對手為異性的男性與對方合作傾向最高、賽局結束時間最晚，但性別對決策行為造成的差異未達顯著。

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of task structure and gender on Centipede decision-making. One hundred and twenty-two college students were randomly paired into male-male, male-female, or female-female groups to participate in 50 Centipede games. The games were composed by 2 cover stories (third party involved, no third party involved) X 2 game lengths (long, short) X 2 levels of difference between bilateral benefit (big, small) X 3 levels of increment in benefit with time (high, medium, low). Results of experiment showed that when the game involved public benefit, the longer relationship, smaller initial difference in benefit, or the larger benefit increment, a participant’s tendency to defect would be lower. The main effect of gender composition was not significant. Females tended to be more cooperative when the third party’s benefits were involved, but only in the first game. The cooperation in centipede games was generally lower when females are playing with another female. The opposite pattern was found for males who played with females.

摘 要 i
英文摘要 ii
誌 謝 iii
目 錄 iv
表目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻探討 6
第三章 方法 13
第四章 結果 19
第五章 結論與討論 44
參考文獻 48
附錄一 千越建設(開發建設) 50
附錄二 卡布魚(魚群滅種) 52
附錄三 蜈蚣賽局在2(賽局長短) × 2(雙方利差大小) × 3(利益增值程度)作業結構下的報酬分配實例 54
附錄四 實驗指導語 57
附錄五 實驗流程 58
附錄六 操作畫面 59
附錄七 實驗後問題 60
附錄八 24局不同性別組成下結束時間點之故事長度利差增值四因子交互作用簡單主效果分析 61
附錄九 24局不同性別下結束時間點之長度利差增值性別四因子交互作用簡單主效果分析 65
附錄十 24局不同性別結束時間點之故事利差性別三因子交互作用簡單主效果分析 70
附錄十一 第一局和最後一局結束時間點之故事性別局數的簡單主效果分析 72
附錄十二 24局背叛可能性之長度利差增值性別的簡單主效果分析 74

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