跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(44.201.97.0) 您好!臺灣時間:2024/04/14 04:31
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

: 
twitterline
研究生:姚仁德
研究生(外文):Jen-Te Yao
論文名稱:關於運輸不對稱的三篇文章
論文名稱(外文):Three Essays on Transportation Asymmetry
指導教授:賴孚權賴孚權引用關係
指導教授(外文):Fu-Chuan Lai
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立臺北大學
系所名稱:經濟學系
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2004
畢業學年度:93
語文別:英文
論文頁數:119
中文關鍵詞:誘因不一致運輸不對稱可通用性產品差異化地域限制
外文關鍵詞:Incentive inconsistencyTransportation asymmetryGeneral purposeProduct differentiationTerritorial restrictions
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:289
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:46
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
本論文探討空間的運輸成本不對稱問題,當廠商與消費者之間、或廠商與廠商之間的運輸成本不同,被稱為「運輸不對稱」。本論文將相關的議題列為三章(篇)依次討論如下:
第二章題為「誘因一致與空間定價模式的選擇」,乃是擴展 Gronberg and Meyer (1981) 的模型。結果發現,當廠商與消費者之間存有運輸不對稱的情形時,追求利潤極大化的廠商可能會採取無效率的歧視價格訂價法,而此法與社會期望不符合,故產生誘因不一致的問題。本章最後討論以財政政策來解決此問題。
第三章名為「外溢效果對產品通用性競爭的影響」,乃是應用 Dos Santos Ferreira and Thisse (1996) 的線型城市空間模型、探討運輸成本可被內生化時,外溢效果對產品通用性競爭的影響程度。結果發現,這種影響程度與產品設計的定位(同品牌或不同品牌)有關,而且,沿著〝運輸維度〞所發展的產品垂直差異性與外溢效果成反比,此意謂著傳統的多維度產品特徵理論中的〝差異極大化極小化〞之結論,在本模型中不必然成立。
第四章題為「空間套利下的地域限制」,它研究當上下游廠商(上游廠商具有完全獨占力)簽訂地域限制的商品銷售條款之後,各地可能發生價格差異的現象,而這種現象會產生套利的機會。本文發現均衡時上游廠商的地域授權之利潤大小與下游廠商的運輸效率有關;如果下游廠商運輸技術具備相當效率時,上游廠商的地域限制條款會消除消費者的套利機會,而且此地域限制對上下游廠商都有利,此意謂著以反托拉斯法直接禁止地域限制的實行,並不必然恰當。
最後一章進行總結,強調空間運輸不對稱在現代經濟中扮演重要的角色。
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the role of asymmetric transportation costs played in a spatial framework. When transportation costs are different between agents (a firm, consumers, or third-party carriers such as trucks and railways), the situation is called ''transportation asymmetry" in the context. The issues associated with transportation asymmetry are studied through three essays, which are organized into three chapters as follows.
The second chapter titled ''Incentive Consistency and the Choice of a Spatial Pricing Mode" extends Gronberg and Meyer''s results (1981, Journal of Regional Science) and shows that when freight rates are different between a firm and consumers, the firm (based on a profit-maximizing consideration) may adopt discriminatory pricing with an inefficient transport choice. This inefficient pricing behavior may not be consistent with the social optimum, whereby the problem of incentive inconsistency thus occurs. This chapter also provides a fiscal regime to remedy the inconsistent problem.
The third chapter titled ''Spillovers on Spatial Competition with General Purposeness Products" applies the Launhardt model (1885) extended by Dos Santos Ferreira and Thisse (1996) to investigate the impact of spillovers on the development of a product''s general purposeness, whereby the transportation cost is endogenized. Spillovers play different roles in response to different product-design configurations. Given the configuration of maximum horizontal product differentiation, spillovers increase firms'' equilibrium prices and profits, whereas in the case of minimum horizontal differentiation they reduce the prices and profits. The result also shows that spillovers affect negatively the degree of product differentiation along a costly (vertical) transportation dimension, implying that the principle of maximum-minimum product differentiation does not necessarily hold.
The fourth chapter titled ''Territorial Restrictions under Threat of Spatial Arbitrage" analyzes the incentives for the use of territorial restrictions. Under the restrictions, the price differentials between alternative territories may exceed the cost of cross-border shopping, which naturally causes the phenomenon of commodity arbitrage. However, an optimal design of a territorial-restriction contract is conducted to eliminate this problem. In equilibrium an upstream manufacturer''s profit from licensing retailers may be greater than that of fully monopolizing the market, hinging upon the transportation efficiency of its distributors. Since territorial restrictions are strongly connected to the efficiency of distributors, legal prohibitions against territorial restrictions may be inappropriate.
Through the above studies, one can further understand the importance that transportation asymmetry has played in the modern economy, which is the contribution of the dissertation.
1 Introduction
1.1 A Literature review
1.2 The problems
1.3 The presentation of the dissertation
1.4 References
2 Incentive Consistency and the Choice of a Spatial Pricing Mode
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Methodology
2.3 A simple model with rectangular demand
2.3.1 Mill pricing
2.3.2 Discriminatory pricing (uniform pricing)
2.3.3 The incentive inconsistency problem
2.4 The extended GM model with linear demand
2.5 A spatial pricing model under a free-entry competition
2.6 A fiscal regime solving the incentive
inconsistency problem
2.6.1 Introduction
2.6.2 A fiscal regime in the simple model
2.6.3 The extended GM model under a fiscal regime
2.7 Concluding remarks
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 A. The derivation of Observations 3 and 4 in the
extended GM model
2.8.2 B. The relevant parameter ranges in the free-entry competitive
setting
2.8.3 C. The proof of Proposition 9
2.8.4 D. The simulation equations in the extended
GM model under a fiscal regime
2.9 References
3 Spillovers on Spatial Competition with General Purposeness Products
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Methodology
3.3 The model
3.4 The case of regime H
3.5 ThecaseofregimeV
3.6 Conclusion
3.7 References
4 Territorial Restrictions under Threat of Spatial Arbitrage
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Methodology
4.3 An illustrative model
4.3.1 The case when the manufacturer is more efficient
with tf <tr
4.3.2 The case when a distributor is more efficient
with tr <tf
4.4 The model of two efficient distributors
4.5 Conclusion and remarks
4.6 Appendix
4.7 References
5 Concluding remarks
5.1 References
Chapter 2
Aguirre, I. and M.P. Espinosa, 2004, “Product differentiation with consumer arbi-trage,”International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22, 219—239.
Anderson, S.P., 1989, “Socially optimal spatial pricing,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 19, 69—86.
Anderson, S.P., A. de Palma A and J.-F. Thisse, 1992, “Social surplus and profitability under different spatial pricing policies,” Southern Economic Journal, 58, 934—949.
Beckmann, M., 1970, “Equilibrium versus optimum: Spacing of firms and patterns of market areas,” Research Papers in Mathematical Economics, Department of Economics, Brown University.
Beckmann, M., 1976, “Spatial price policies revisited,” Bell Journal of Economics, 7, 619—630.
Beckmann, M. and J.-F. Thisse, 1986, “The location of production activities,” In P. Nijkamp (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Vol I, 21—95.
Brocker, J., 1998, “Welfare effects of a transport subsidy in a spatial price equilib-rium,” Herausgeber: Die Professoren des, Instituts f¨ ur Wirtschaft und Verkehr, http://www.tu-dresden.de/vkiwv/VWL/home.htm
Claycombe, R.J., 1991, “Spatial retail markets,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 9, 303—313.
Capozza, D.R. and R. Van Order, 1977, “Pricing under spatial competition and spatial monopoly,” Econometrica, 45(6), 1329—1338.
Capozza, D.R. and R. Van Order, 1978, “A generalized model of spatial competi-tion,” American Economic Review, 68, 896—908.
DeCanio, S.J., 1984, “Delivered pricing and multiple basing point equilibria: A reevaluation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99, 329—349.
Durham, C.A., R.J. Sexton and J.H. Song, 1996, “Spatial competition, uniform pricing, and transportation efficiency in the California processing tomato industry,” American Journal of Agriculture Economics, 78, 115—125.
Eaton, B.C. and N. Schmitt, 1993, “Endogenous pricing models in markets for inputs,” In H. Ohta and J.-F. Thisse (eds.) Does economic space matter? Essays in honor of Melvin L. Greenhut, St. Martin’s Press.
Eaton, B.C. and N. Schmitt, 1994, “Flexible manufacturing and market structure,” American Economic Review, 84(4), 875—888.
Espinosa, M.P., 1992, “Delivered pricing, FOB pricing, and collusion in spatial markets,” Rand Journal of Economics, 23, 64—85.
Greenhut, M.L., C.C. Mai and G. Norman, 1986, “Impacts on optimum location of different pricing strategies, market structures and customer distributions over space,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 16, 329—351.
Greenhut, M.L., G. Norman and C.S. Hung, 1987, The economics of imperfect
competition: A spatial approach. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Greenhut, M.L. and H. Ohta, 1972, “Monopoly output under alternative spatial pricing techniques,” American Economic Review, 68, 705—713.
Gronberg, T and J. Meyer, 1981, “Transport inefficiency and the choice of spatial pricing mode,”Journal of Regional Science, 21, 541—549.
Haddock, D.D., 1982, “Basing-point pricing: competitive vs. collusive theories,” American Economic Review, 72(3), 289—306.
Heal, G., 1980, “Spatial structure in the retail trade: A study in product differentiation with increasing returns,” Bell Journal of Economics, 11(2), 565—583.
Heywood, J.S. and D. Pal, 1996, “How to tax a spatial monopolist,” Journal of Public Economics, 61(1), 107—118.
Hobbs, B.F., 1986, “Mill pricing versus spatial price discrimination under Bertrand and Cournot spatial competition,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 35, 173—191.
Holahan, W.L., 1975, “The welfare effects of spatial price discrimination,” American Economic Review, 65, 498—503.
Holahan, W.L., 1978, “Spatial monopolistic competition versus spatial monopoly,”Journal of Economic Theory, 18, 156—170.
Hotelling, H., 1929, “Stability in competition,” Economic Journal, 39, 41—57.
Laffont, J.J. and D. Martimont, 2002, The theory of incentives: the principal-agent model. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
Monaco, K., J.S. Heywood and R. Rothschild, 2004, “Delivered pricing and merger with demand constraints,” Economic Inquiry, 42(1), 49—59.
Musgrave, R. and P. Musgrave, 1980, Public finance in theory and in practice. Mc. Graw Hill.
Norman, G., 1981, “Spatial competition and spatial price discrimination,” Review of Economic Studies, 48(1), 97—111.
Norman, G., 2002, “The relative advantages of exible versus designated manufacturing technologies,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 32, 419—445.
Norman, G. and J.-F. Thisse, 1999, “Technology choice and market structure: Strategic aspects of flexible manufacturing,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 47, 345—372.
Phlips, L., 1983, The economics of price discrimination, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Puu, T. 2002, “Hotelling’s ice cream dealers with elastic demand,” Annals of Regional Science, 36, 1—17.
Raith, M., 1996, “Spatial retail markets with commuting consumers,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, 447—463.
Stahl, K., 1982, “Location and spatial pricing theory with nonconvex transportation cost schedules,” Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 575—582.
Tan, L.T., 2001, “Spatial pricing policies reconsidered: Monopoly performance and location,” Journal of Regional Science, 41, 601—616.
Thisse, J.-F. and X. Vives, 1988, “On the strategic choice of spatial price policy,”American Economic Review, 78, 122—137.
Villegas, D.J., 1982, “Comparative performance of spatial models of economic markets with linear household demand,” Southern Economic Journal, 893—908.
Wrede, M., 2003, “Uniform pricing versus mill pricing,” Journal of Regional Science, 43, 167—179.
Chapter 3
Ansari, A., N. Economides, and J. Steckel, 1998, “The max-min-min principle of product differentiation,” Journal of Regional Science, 38(2), 207—230.
d’Aspremont, C., J. J. Gabszewicz, and J.-F. Thisse, 1979, “On Hotelling’s stability in competition,” Econometrica, 47(5), 1145—1151.
d’Aspremont, C. and A. Jacquemin, 1988, “Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers,” American Economic Review, 78(5), 1133—1137.
De Bondt, R., 1996, “Spillovers and innovative activities,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15, 1—28.
De Frutos, M.A., H. Hamoudi, and X. Jarque, 1999, “Equilibrium existence in the circle model with linear quadratic transport cost,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 29, 605—615.
DeGraba, P.H. and M.W. Sullivan, 1995, “Spillover effects, cost savings, R&D and the use of brand extensions,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13, 229—248.
Degryse H., 1996, “On the interaction between vertical and horizontal differentia-tion: An application to banking,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 44, 169—186.
Degryse, H. and A. Irmen, 2001, “Attribute dependence and the provision of qual-ity,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 31, 547—569.
Dos Santos Ferreira, R. and J.-F. Thisse, 1996, “Horizontal and vertical differentiation: the Launhardt model,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, 485—506.
Economides, N., 1986, “Minimal and maximal product differentiation in Hotelling’s duopoly,” Economics Letters, 21, 67—71.
Economides, N., 1989, “Quality variations and maximal variety differentiation,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 19, 21—29.
Garella, P.G. and L. Lambertini, 1999, “Good vs. bad characteristics in vertical differentiation,” Economics Letters, 65, 245—248.
Gabszewicz, J.J. and J.-F. Thisse, 1986, “Spatial competition and the location of firms,” Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics, 5, 1—71.
Hanel, P. and A. St-Pierre, 2002, “Effects of R&D spillovers on the profitability of firms,” Review of Industrial Organization, 20, 305—322.
Hendel, I. and J. Neiva de Figueiredo, 1997, “Product differentiation and endogenous disutility,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 16, 63—79.
Hotelling, H., 1929, “Stability in competition,” Economic Journal, 39, 41—57.
Irmen, A. and J.-F. Thisse, 1998, “Competition in multi-characteristics spaces: Hotelling was almost right,” Journal of Economic Theory, 78, 76—102.
Jaffe, A.B., 1986, “Technological opportunity and spillovers of R&D: Evidence from firms’ patents, and market value,” American Economic Review, 76(5), 984—1001.
Lambertini, L., A. Mantovani, and G. Rossini, 2003, “R&D in transport and communication in a Cournot duopoly”, RISEC (Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali), 50, 185—198.
Launhardt, W., 1885, Mathematische Begrundung der olkswirtschaftslehre, Leipzig: B.G. Teubner. Reprinted in English translation as Mathematical Principles of Economics, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1993.
Motta, M., 1992, “Cooperative R&D and vertical differentiation,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 10(4), 643—661.
Neven, D. and J.-F. Thisse, 1990, “On the quality and variety competition.” In J.J. Gabszewicz, J.F. Richard and L. Wolsey (eds.), Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics, and Optimization, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 175—199.
Salop, S.C., 1979, “Monopolistic competition with outside goods,” Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 141—156.
Spence, M., 1984, “Cost reduction, competition, and industry performance,” Econometrica, 52, 101—22.
Sullivan, M.W., 1990, “Measuring image spillovers in umbrella branded products,” Journal of Business, 63, 309—329.
Tabuchi, T., 1994, “Two-stage two-dimensional spatial competition between two firms,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 24, 207—227.
Vandenbosch, M.B. and C.B. Weinberg, 1995, “Product and price competition
in a two-dimensional vertical differentiation model,” Marketing Science, 14(2), 224—249.
Von Ungern-Sternberg, T., 1988, “Monopolistic competition and general purpose products,” Review of Economic Studies, 55, 231—246.
Yao, J.T. and F.C. Lai, 2004, “A note on the Launhardt model,” Working paper, National Taipei University.
Chapter 4
Aguirre, I. and M. P. Espinosa, 2004, “Product differentiation with consumer ar-bitrage,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22: 219—239.
COM(96)721, 1997, “Green Paper: On vertical restraints in EU competition pol-icy,”Commission of the European Communities.
Dixit, A., 1983, “Vertical integration in a monopolistically competitive industry,”International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1, 63—78.
Furlong, W.J. and G.A. Slotsve, 1983, “Will that be pickup or delivery? An alternative spatial pricing strategy,” Bell Journal of Economics, 14(1), 271—274.
Gronberg, T. and J. Meyer, 1981, “Transport inefficiency and the choice of spatial pricing mode,” Journal of Regional Science, 21, 541—549.
Gupta, B., J.S. Heywood, and D. Pal, 1995, “Strategic behavior downstream and the incentive to integrate: A spatial model with delivered pricing,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13, 327—334.
Gupta, B., A. Kats, and D. Pal, 1994, “Upstream monopoly, downstream competition and spatial price discrimination,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 24, 529—542.
Kanbur, R. and M. Keen, 1993, “Jeux sans fronti´eres: Tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size,” American Economic Review, 83, 877—892.
Lederer, P.J. and A.P. Hurter, 1986, “Competition of firms: discriminatory pricing and location,” Econometrica, 25, 130—139.
Mathewson, G. F. and R. A. Winter, 1983, “Vertical integration by contractual restraints in spatial markets,” Journal of Business, 56, 497—518.
Matsumura, T., 2003, “Consumer-benefiting exclusive territories,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 36(4), 1007—1025.
Nielsen, S.B., 2001, “A simple model of commodity taxation and cross-border shop-ping,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 103, 599—623.
Nielsen, S.B., 2002, “Cross-border shopping from small to large countries,” Economics Letters, 77, 309—313.
Nilssen, T., 1997, “Sequential location when transportation costs are asymmetry,” Economics Letters, 54, 191—201.
Ohsawa, Y., 1999, “Cross-border shopping and tax competition among govern-ments,”Regional Science and Urban Economics, 29, 33—51.
Reiffen, D. and D. T. Levy, 1989, “Vertical integration in a spatial setting: Implications of the successive monopoly distortion,” Economics Letters, 29, 27—81.
Seely, A, 2002, “Cross border shopping and smuggle,” Research paper 02/40, London House of Commons Library, the United Kingdom.
Thisse, J.-F. and X. Vives, 1988, “On the strategic choice of spatial price policy,” American Economic Review, 78, 122—137.
Trandel, G.A., 1994, “Interstate commodity tax differentials and the distribution of residents,” Journal of Public Economics, 53, 435—457.
Chapter 5
Hotelling, H., 1929, “Stability in competition,” Economic Journal, 39, 41—57.
Krugman, P., 1991a, “Increasing returns and economic geography,” Journal of Political Economy, 99, 483—499.
Krugman, P., 1991b, “Geography and trade,” Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. Journal of Political Economy, 99, 483—499.
Lambertini, L., A. Mantovani, and G. Rossini, 2003, “R&D in transport and communication in a Cournot duopoly,” RISEC (Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali), 50, 185—198.
Launhardt, W., 1885, Mathematische Begrundung der Volkswirtschaftslehre, Leipzig: B.G. Teubner. Reprinted in English translation as Mathematical Principles of Economics, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1993.
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top