臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本篇論文所要討論的是富蘭克弗 (Frankfurt)和菲雪 (Fischer)/拉維薩(Ravizza)對「其它可能性原則」(the principle of alternative possibilities；簡稱PAP)以及「無道德責任轉移原則」(the principle of transfer of non-responsibility；簡稱Transfer NR)所提出的「富蘭克弗式反例」(Frankfurt-style counterexamples)。一般而言，「決定論」和「道德責任」不相容的論證被哲學家們分為「間接論證」(indirect argument)和「直接論證」(direct argument)，這兩個論證分別仰賴PAP和Transfer NR。富蘭克弗和菲雪/拉維薩則是試圖以例子證明PAP和Transfer NR是錯誤的原則。
在本篇論文我試圖說明富蘭克弗和菲雪/拉維薩的「富蘭克弗式反例」並沒有成功，所以「間接論證」和「直接論證」並沒有受到「富蘭克弗式反例」的威脅。我的論證將仰賴某個關於道德責任、並且被我稱為「最終源頭」的原則(the principle of the ultimate source；簡稱US)。
本篇論文分為三大章。第一章討論「間接論證」和PAP、富蘭克弗對PAP的攻擊以及我對富蘭克弗的回應。第二章討論「直接論證」和Transfer NR、菲雪和拉維薩對Transfer NR的攻擊以及我對菲雪和拉維薩的回應。在回應富蘭克弗和菲雪/拉維薩時，我也討論了幾位哲學家對「富蘭克弗式反例」的看法。第三章為總結。

In this thesis I shall discuss Frankfurt and Fischer/Ravizza’s “Frankfurt-style counterexamples” to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) and the principle of transfer of non-responsibility (Transfer NR). It is common among contemporary philosophers to distinguish between two kinds of arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility: the indirect argument and the direct argument. The indirect argument relies upon PAP and the direct argument relies upon Transfer NR. However, PAP and Transfer NR have come under attacks. Frankfurt, in his influential paper, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, has questioned the plausibility of PAP; and Fischer and Ravizza have similarly questioned the validity of Transfer NR in Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.
The aim of this thesis is to defend PAP and Transfer NR from the so-called “Frankfurt-style counterexamples.” I shall argue that “Frankfurt-style counterexamples” fail to invalidate both PAP and Transfer NR. In my defense of PAP and Transfer NR, I shall rely upon a principle which I call “the principle of the ultimate source” (US).
This thesis has three chapters. The first chapter deals with PAP, the indirect argument, Frankfurt’s attack on PAP and the responses to Frankfurt’s attack. The second chapter deals with Transfer NR, the direct argument, Fischer and Ravizza’s attack on Transfer NR and the responses to Fischer and Ravizza’s attack. In the responses to Frankfurt, Fischer and Ravizza’s attacks, besides presenting my own argument, I shall also discuss responses from some other philosophers. The last chapter is the conclusion.

前言 1

第一章 其它可能性原則 (PAP)
第一節 間接論證和其它可能性原則 13
第二節 富蘭克弗對其他可能性原則的挑戰 22
第三節 對富蘭克弗的回應 26

第二章 無道德責任轉移原則 (Transfer NR)
第一節 直接論證和無道德責任轉移原則 77
第二節 菲雪和拉維薩對無道德責任轉移原則的挑戰 83
第三節 對菲雪和拉維薩的回應 89

第三章 總結 101

附錄─中英對照表 105

參考文獻 107

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