臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

我國於加入WTO後，金融競爭之生態改變，各類金融業者除了合併同業追求規模經濟外，更紛紛尋求異業結合以面對外來金融機構國際化、多元化競爭之威脅。本研究即藉由探討金融控股公司於購併相關事件之資訊宣告時，市場所給予的反應，來瞭解投資人對雙方公司購併完成機率的變化、綜效的觀點、及綜效分配的預期這三者間的連結；研究投資人對金控公司購併消息的宣告抱持著何種態度，藉此瞭解我國投資大眾對政府近年來推動的金融整併政策暨相關法令制度之建置是否具有信心；探討購併宣告對股票價格的資訊效果，並反應股市投資人面對各事件日之敏感性。
本研究將各家金控公司在整個購併過程中所經歷之重大、且共同性高的日期皆列為本研究的事件日，並將各日期歸納整理為共計12類的事件日。此外對各類事件日分別採用Raw Return、Market Adjusted Model、Market Adjusted Model-Industry、及Market Model等4種模型，與3天及5天兩種長度之事件窗口加以研究，目的即希望能將由市場因素所造成的報酬排除於異常報酬之外，並判斷是否有購併資訊提前洩漏之可能性。再者對同一事件兩種長度之事件窗口，分別進行4種模型下之雙尾T統計顯著性檢定、及符號檢定，故每一樣本事件日均有10種檢定，以探討購併的市場資訊對股東財富造成的影響。
本研究為以下幾點提供了實證與說明：
一、主併公司的各購併事件宣告效果。無論是3天或是5天之事件窗口長度，主併公司各類購併相關事件期內之異常報酬均不顯著。此結果與預期相符，究其原因，一為市場消息之提前洩漏，二為市場往往易覺得主併公司所付出之購併成本與換股比例過高，不看好主併公司故沒有明顯反應。此外各模型之累積異常報酬通常在事件窗口長度為5天時比3天時為大，顯示了市場對購併相關事件之反應期間拉長，為購併資訊可能提前洩漏提供了證據。
二、目標公司的各購併事件宣告效果。除了少數幾類事件外，其餘各類購併事件之發生，均對目標公司股東財富造成顯著的影響，於購併相關宣告日左右發現顯著正向之異常報酬。表示市場一般均認為購併相關事件之發生可意味著目標公司合併完成機率的上升，且在購併案中所產生之綜效及綜效之分配上目標公司常為受益方，合併後將更有能力面對台灣加入WTO後國際化金融競爭之威脅。
三、購併事件之宣告就整體而言是否能視為一項好消息之公佈。對主併公司而言雖不顯著偏向正或負任何一方，然而對目標公司而言，各類購併事件期內常出現顯著為正向之反應。上述檢定結果反映了國內投資人對金控公司的合併抱持正面的態度，並對政府近年來推動的金融整併政策具有信心，相信金融機構於整併後將更有助於其競爭力及我國金融政策之發展。
四、不同研究模型的選擇所帶來的結果之不同。通常在Market Adjusted Model與Market Adjusted Model-Industry此二模型下之累積異常報酬不如在其他兩個模型下來的顯著，此結果顯示該段事件期間內之報酬可能有部分是來自於市場表現的反應，而不是由購併事件所產生。

Since the moment that Taiwan participated in the WTO, the financial competition environment has been subjected to change. Therefore, the financial industry does not only start to pursue economy of scale by merger within industry but seek to combine with different industries as well in order to confront the threat of globalization and diversification. First, by observing the effect of merger information announcement corresponding to the M&A transactions, this research seeks the links among probability of M&A success, value of synergy, and distribution of synergy. Second, by discussing how investors view toward merger information announcement, it reveals whether investors are confident with recent regulation of financial integration strategy. Furthermore, it also considers the effect of merger information announcement to the stock price and the sensitivity of event dates.

This research induced twelve different event dates from the important and highly related ones during the process of M&A events. Besides, to exclude the market factors from abnormal return, each event date is measured by four different models including Raw Return Model, Market Adjusted Model, Market Adjusted Model-Industry, and Market Model. It is also measured by two different event windows, three days and five days, to judge if there is any possible information leak. Under the measurement of different models and event windows, this research applied Brown & Warner (1985) Two-Tailed T Test and Sign Test to evaluate the significance of abnormal return and to discuss the influence of merger information announcement on the wealth of shareholders.

The results of this research provide explanation and evidence on 1) the effect of merger information announcement for acquiring firm, 2) the effect of merger information announcement for acquired firm, 3) whether the merger information announcement can be viewed as positive information to the market, and 4) comparison of outcomes between different models.

In this research, acquiring firm abnormal returns for both event windows are found to be insignificant; an outcome perfectly coincides with the anticipation. There are two possible reasons that could be posted to explain the outcome. For the first, the information leak is supposed to exist. For the second, the acquisition cost and exchange ratio are always higher than market anticipation. In addition, it can be concluded that abnormal return for five days is slightly larger than that for three days. This conclusion supports the previous explanation that the information leak actually exists.

Besides few exceptions, almost all merger announcements influenced the wealth of shareholders in acquired firms significantly. We can observe that positive abnormal returns are prevailing around the time of a merger information announcement. Therefore, it is quite sure to infer that the market always views the acquired firms as beneficiaries and considers them to be more eligible for confronting the threat stemmed from international competition.

For acquiring firms, most events seem to be neutral. However, positive influences are found in many events for acquired firms. These outcomes reveal that investors viewed the M&A events of bank holding companies as positive and felt confident with recent regulation of financial integration strategy. It is firmly believed that the integration of financial institutions helps to improve the development of financial strategy.

Usually, the outcomes of both Market Adjusted Model and Market Adjusted Model-Industry seem less significant than those of the other two models. Thus, we can conclude that the so-called abnormal return might not be caused simply by the M&A events but came from the reaction to overall market performance.

謝誌 ………………………………………………………………I
摘要 ………………………………………………………………II
目錄 ……………………………………………………………VII
表次 …………………………………………………………… IX
第一章 緒論 ……………………………………………………1
第一節 研究動機與目的 ………………………………………1
第二節 研究範圍 ……………………………………………………4
第三節 論文架構 ……………………………………………………7
第二章 文獻探討 ……………………………………………………9
第一節 購併種類與操作模式 ………………………………………9
第二節 購併的步驟 ………………………………………15
第三節 購併效益之理論 ………………………………………22
第四節 購併效益之實證研究 ………………………………………25
第五節 異常報酬率估計 ………………………………………34
第三章 金控公司現況及其發展……………………………………40
第一節 金控公司之成立 ………………………………………40
第二節 我國金融控股公司 ………………………………………41
第三節 企業購併有關法令規定……………………………………44
第四節 政府政策及金控公司未來發展方向………………………49
第四章 研究方法 …………………………………………………55
第一節 研究架構 …………………………………………………55
第二節 研究假說 …………………………………………………56
第三節 研究模型建立………………………………………………59
第四節 統計檢定 …………………………………………………63
第五節 資料來源與採樣標準 ………………………………………66
第五章 研究結果 …………………………………………………73
第一節 主併公司購併宣告效果……………………………………73
第二節 主併公司符號檢定 ………………………………………85
第三節 目標公司購併宣告效果……………………………………89
第四節 目標公司符號檢定 ………………………………………102
第六章 結論與建議 ………………………………………………108
第一節 結論 …………………………………………………108
第二節 研究限制 …………………………………………………111
第三節 建議 …………………………………………………112
參考文獻 114
附錄 118
附錄一 各項購併宣告原始資料…………………………………118
附錄二 企業併購法修正條文 ……………………………………161
附錄三 公平交易法修正條文 ……………………………………168
附錄四 證券交易法修正條文……………………………………171
附錄五 金融控股公司法修正條文………………………………175

一、中文部分：
1.王克萍，93年，企業跨國併購策略之研究-以電子零組件通路商為例，國立台灣大學國際企業學研究所
2.王泰允，企業購併實用，80年，遠流出版社
3.伍忠賢，企業購併聖經，87年，遠流出版社
4.伍忠賢，企業購併：理論與實務，89年，新陸書局股份有限公司
5.沈中華、李建然，89年，事件研究法 財務與會計實證研究必備，華泰文化事業公司
6.沈志賢，92年，實質選擇權用於金融機構合併之評價-以國泰金控、世華銀行為例，國立台灣大學國際企業學研究所
7.林純央，93年，金融控股公司換股比例評價之研究-包括財務及非財務因素，國立台灣大學會計學研究所
8.周賓凰、蔡坤芳，85年，台灣股市日資料特性與事件研究法，證券市場發展季刊，第九卷第二期，頁1-28
9.洪宏達，92年，購併活動對主併公司經營績效之影響-以台灣上市公司為例，國立中山大學財務管理研究所
10.胡力中，91年，企業購併成敗與股價變化的關聯性研究-以台灣上市(櫃)企業為例，中原大學企業管理學研究所
11.孫梅瑞，89年，國內上市公司從事公司購併活動對經營績效的影響，國立政治大學企業管理學研究所
12.陳朝鑫，92年，企業成長再造之利器──併購，華南金控月刊，No. 6，頁1-7
13.陳匯中，84年，上市公司購併宣告對股東財富的影響，國立政治大學企業管理學研究所
14.莊素霞，93年，金融控股公司對壽險業影響之研究，國立中山大學財務管理研究所
15.游景翔，92年，廠商合併行為與其生產力之研究，國立台灣大學經濟學研究所
16.葉秋美，92年，台灣企業購併宣告對股東財富之影響，國立政治大學國際貿易研究所
17.蔡嘉文，92年，金融控股公司購併行為之價值分析-以國泰金融控股公司購併世華銀行為例，國立中正大學企業管理研究所
18.簡秀薇，87年，股權結構與購併宣告對股價之影響，淡江大學企業管理學研究所
19.顏錫銘、彭一正，82年，台灣企業國際併購宣告對股東財富影響之實證研究，台銀季刊，第四十四卷第二期，頁139-173
20.台灣證券交易所網站
21.行政院金融局網站
22.聯合知識資料庫
二、英文部分：
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2.Bradley, M., “Interim Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control,” Journal of Business, October 1980, pp. 345-375
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9.Eckbo, B., “Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth,” Journal of Financial Economics 11, April 1983, pp. 241-273
10.Elgers and John J. Clark, “Merger Types and Shareholders Returns : Additional Evidence,” Financial Management, Summer 1980, pp. 66-72
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12.Fama, E. F., Fisher, L., Jensen, M. C., and Roll R., “The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information,” International Economic Review 10, 1969, pp.1-21
13.Firth, M., “Takeovers, Shareholder Returns and the Theory of the Firm,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1980, pp. 235-260
14.Jemison and Sitkin, “Corporate Acquisitions : A Process Perspective,” Academy of Management Review, 1986, Vol. 64
15.Jensen, Michael, and Ruback, Richard, “The Market For Corporate Control,” Journal of Financial Economics 11, April 1983, pp. 5-50
16.Jensen, Michael C., “Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and the Market for Takeovers,” American Economic Review 76, December 1986, pp.323-329
17.Lewellen, Claudio Loderer, and Ahron Rosenfeld, “Merger Decisions and Executive Stock Ownership in Aquiring Firms,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 7, 1985, pp. 209-231
18.Lewellen, Wilbur, “A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger,” Journal of Finance 26, May 1971, pp. 521-537
19.Limmack, R. J. , “ Corporate Mergers and Shareholder Wealth Effects: 1977-1986,” Accounting and Business Research 21, pp. 239-251
20.Mueller, D.C., “A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1969, pp.643-659
21.Pound, J., “Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight,” Journal of Financial Economics 20, 1988, pp.237-265
22.Reed, E. W. and E. K. Gill, “Commercial Banking (4th Edition),” Prentil Hall, 1989, pp. 53-54
23.Roll, R., “The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeover,” Journal of Business, April 1986, pp.197-216
24.Singh, and Cynthia A. Montgomery, “Corporate Acquisition Strategies and Economic Performance,” Strategic Management Journal Ⅷ, 1987, pp. 377-386
25.Stillman, Robert., “Examining Antitrust Policy Towards Horizontal Mergers,” Journal of Financial Economics 11, 1983, pp. 225-240
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