本研究係以資訊不對稱理論來探討銀行在從事汽車貸款時所遭遇之問題，針對本研究欲探討之主題，綜合整理國內外有關資訊不對稱理論及代理理論基礎與應用之相關文獻，其中本研究主要在於探討有關業務代理人的道德風險問題，因此，針對資訊不對稱理論之相關文獻進行研究，進而探究代理理論的意涵及其相關文獻分析，以作為本研究分析之基礎。相關理論如逆選擇又稱為隱藏訊息 (hidden information)，指的是在資訊不對稱下，參與交易之一方，往往會隱藏其私人資訊，甚至提供不實資訊來獲取利益，導致對方蒙受損失之現象，而道德風險是一種事後的資訊不對稱，亦即交易的雙方在簽訂契約之前，並無資訊不對稱之問題，但是簽約之後，另一方則未善盡責任，導致對方蒙受損失。而道德風險（moral hazard）是最早在保險市場中被發現的一種現象。在探討道德風險的相關研究後，更進一步融入代理論論的概念來探討業務代理人可能帶來的代理問題，及從相關文獻中尋求減少代理問題發生的管理機制，並進而回顧各領域間有關代理問題的議題。本次係透過深度訪談法，針對目前國內汽車貸款巿場上巿占率前三名之金融機構進行訪談，同時與個案公司之現行做法進行比較。個案分析，首先將就目前國內汽車貸款市場情況進行說明，進而介紹個案公司之業務與制度，並分析其所面臨之業務員代理人道德風險之問題，如1.因借款戶本身之道德風險：客戶提供財力不實、曾有信用瑕疵者，2.因業務人員之道德風險：業務人員未提供借款人正確基本資料（連絡地址及電話）、業務人員驗車地點不實、未至借款戶公司或住家對保（業務人員對保不實）、業務人員未確實反應客戶申貸條件，3.因車商之道德風險: 車商未提供正確汽車資訊─業務人員應確實查核、人頭戶借款，最後就個案公司採取之對策進行討論。而結論與建議，則提出結論與解決方案供個案公司作為經營策略規劃之參考並對後續之研究提出建議。

This research department probes into questions met while engaged in automobile's granting the loaning of the bank with the information asymmetry theory, focus the topic of the research , use domestic and international relevant information asymmetry theory in order and act for theoretical foundation correlate with ones that are used document synthetically, among them this research lies in probing into the morals risk question about business agent mainly, so, go on research to relevant documents of the information asymmetry theory, then study the meaning of acting as agent the theory and relevant document to analysis, in order to the foundation as originally researching and analyzing. If relevant theory goes against and chooses to be also called and hidden the information (hidden information ), mean it under the information asymmetry, the party that participates in trade, will often hide its private information, even offer unreal information to obtain interests, cause the other side to suffer the lost phenomenon, and the morals risk is the information asymmetry after a kind of thing, namely both sides of the trade do not have question of information asymmetry before signing the agreement , but after contracting, another party has not been good at trying responsibility best , has caused the other side to suffer losses. And the morals risk (moral hazard ) is a kind of phenomenon found in the insurance market earliest.
Behind discussing the relevant research of the morals risk, go still one step further to incorporate and act as agent the concept of the theory to probe into the problem which brings from a business agent, and seek to reduce the mechanism of management that the problem of agency happens from relevant documents, and then review the topic about problem of agency among every field. This department use the in-depth interview to the domestic automobile at present grants the loan the financial institution which is the top three of the car loan market share on interview on the field, compare with the current method of the case company at the same time. The case is analyzed, the domestic market situation of loan for purchasing car will be explained at present at first, and then introduce the business and system of the case company , and analyze the problem of the morals risk of its agents of business personnel faced, such as 1. Risk form the borrower own ethical problem: The customer is offering the unreal financial evidences ,or the borrower has an creditable flaw record, 2. Risk form the agency: Agency has not offered correct basic information of borrower to the debtor (contact the address and telephone), agency did not take the picture of the car in the right place or use the other picture to replace the correct one, business personnel did not react customer demands of the loan terms really, 3.Risk from car trader : The car trader has not offered correct automobile information - Agency should really check the price. Finally discuss on the solution that the case company adopted. And the conclusion and suggestion, propose that the conclusion and solution support the case company as the reference of planning of the management tactics, and the follow-up suggestion of researching and proposing correctly.

第壹章 緒論
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節　研究範圍 5
第四節　研究架構 6
第貳章 文獻探討
第一節 資訊不對稱理論 8
第二節 代理理論 18
第參章 研究方法
第一節 個案研究法 31
第二節 深度訪談法 32
第三節 訪談程序與問題設計 33
第肆章 個案分析
第一節　汽車貸款概述 35
第二節 個案公司概述 42
第三節 個案公司在道德風險上面臨的問題分析 54
第四節　個案公司在道德風險上的解決方式 56
第伍章 結論與建議
第一節　研究結論 61
第二節　建議 63
第三節　研究限制 64

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