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研究生:蘇秀惠
研究生(外文):Hsiu-Hui Su
論文名稱:銀行持股對公司經營績效與企業價值之影響
論文名稱(外文):The Effects of Bank Equity Stakes on Firm Performance and Value
指導教授:陳家彬陳家彬引用關係李嘉聖李嘉聖引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chia-Pin ChenJia-Sheng Lee
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:靜宜大學
系所名稱:企業管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2005
畢業學年度:93
語文別:中文
論文頁數:69
中文關鍵詞:企業價值經營績效銀行持股銀行往來關係
外文關鍵詞:PerformanceFirm valueBanking relationshipsBank equity stakes
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國內外許多相關研究都顯示企業與銀行維持密切往來關係可取得較低放款利率,因為透過密切之往來過程可以降低資訊不對稱及代理成本的問題,因此銀行往來關係具有存在的價值。除了透過放款過程與企業建立往來關係外,銀行也可以持有公司股票建立密切的往來關係。就像其他亞洲及歐洲國家一樣,在台灣地區的銀行法允許銀行持有一般企業的股票,這樣的制度除了提供銀行建立密切往來關係外,也為銀行提供一種涉入公司治理之工具。本研究的主要目的在於探討被銀行持有股權的企業是否具有較佳經營績效或較高企業價值。

根據實證結果可以得到以下幾點主要結論。首先,銀行持股對公司經營績效與企業價值具有正面影響,尤其在低銀行持股比例、具較高企業價值與商業銀行持股樣本的公司中,對公司經營績效與企業價值更具提升效果。其次,有銀行持股的公司有較低流動性限制的問題,且對公司經營績效與企業價值為正向關係。此外,以相對規模小的公司而言,銀行持股比率對公司績效與企業價值的正向影響更為明顯。由此可知,銀行入股企業可以為雙方帶來正面效益,且銀行持股對企業經營上的專業監督隨著銀行持股比例增加而提高,進而提升公司績效與企業價值。銀行藉由持股關係可獲得資訊利益、降低交易成本、監督成本與資訊不對稱問題;而企業會因為銀行持股關係帶來穩定的資金供應、降低破產成本、提高面對財務危機的生存機率及有較低的融資限制問題,提昇公司績效與價值。
Prior studies generally indicate that maintaining close relationship with banks grants the borrowers favorable loan rates, because of the lessened information asymmetry and agency cost problems. In addition to making loans to businesses, banks can also hold their shares to establish even stronger relationship with the borrowers. In Taiwan, like some European and other Asian countries, the government regulations allow bank equity stakes in borrowing firms, providing an alternative tool for involving corporate governance. The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the bank equity stakes and the performance and value of the borrowing firms.

The empirical results show that, first, bank equity stakes has positive influence to the performance and value of the firms. Especially for the companies with low bank shareholding ratio, have higher firm value and commercial banks’ shareholding, bank equity stakes would help enhance the performance and value of the firms. Second, firms with shares held by banks have lower liquidity constraints. Third, for the firms in relatively small scale, banks’ shareholding has stronger positive influence to their performance and value. Therefore, bank equity stakes can bring positive benefits to both the banks and firms. Since bank’s shareholding can bring professional supervision and enhance the performance and value of the firms. The bank can obtain information benefits, reduce transaction costs, supervision costs and information asymmetry by holding firm’s shares. And the firms with shares held by banks can ensure stable fund supply, reduce bankruptcy costs, lower liquidity constraints and improve the survival probability in the case of financial crisis.
目錄
中文摘要....................................................... I
英文摘要.......................................................II
目錄..........................................................III
圖目錄.........................................................IV
表目錄......................................................... V
第一章 緒 論.................................................. 1
第一節 研究背景與動機..................................... 1
第二節 研究目的............................................4
第三節 章節安排與研究流程................................. 5
第二章 文獻探討............................................... 7
第一節 銀行持有借款企業股權及進入董監事會的利益與成本..... 8
第二節 銀行持有企業股票對企業價值及績效之影響.................12
第三章 研究設計...............................................16
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源.................................16
第二節 研究架構與研究假說.....................................16
第三節 模型建立與變數選取.....................................22
第四章 實證結果分析...........................................30
第一節 敘述性統計分析.....................................30
第二節 銀行持股對公司經營績效與企業價值影響的實證結果.....33
第三節 各分類子樣本之比較結果.............................45
第五章 結論與建議.............................................56
第一節 結論...............................................56
第二節 建議...................................................58
第三節 研究限制與未來研究建議.................................59
參考文獻.......................................................61
附錄...........................................................65
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