臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近幾年來公司治理已成為我國公司監控之熱門話題，其中獨立董事更為大家所討論之重點，獨立董事制度其目的在於協助公司朝向公司價值極大化，因此在衡量獨立董事制度是否適合台灣股票市場，應從獨立董事對於公司績效否能產生正面之貢獻決定之，在此台灣證券主管機關希望強制以法令規定所有上市上櫃公司均需獨立董事之同時，是否所有公司均需引進獨立董事或應需要多少獨立董事佔董事會比例方能對公司股東產生正面價值，應是吾人值得思考之問題。
本研究主要探討董事會組成結構中獨立董事或外部董事與公司經營績效間的關聯性。以2003年不含金融類股之台灣上市公司為研究對象，根據其所上傳至公開資訊觀測站網站之年報為資料來源，得出有效樣本597家進行研究，精實證得結果發現：
一、 董事會規模與公司經營績效呈正相關，但不顯著。
二、 獨立董事席次比例與公司經營績效呈正相關，但不顯著。
三、 外部董事席次比例與公司經營績效呈正相關，但不顯著。
四、 獨立董事人數與公司經營績效呈正相關，但不顯著。
五、 外部董事人數與公司經營績效呈正相關，但不顯著。
本研究實證結果顯示，我國上市公司董事會引進獨立董事或外部董事，共同參與公司之決策，對於內部公司經營績效如股東權益報酬率、每股盈餘及外部公司經營績效如本益比及機構投資人比例，均產生正面的關係，代表著獨立董事制度有其存在之價值，但因實證結果所顯現的相關程度遠低於顯著水準，甚至數項分析結果幾近於無關，亦代表獨立董事制度效果未如預期的顯著，如何在成本與效益之間取得平衡有賴未來制度建立者的努力。因此，本研究對於獨立董事制度彙總一些建議，以供後續研究者、上市公司及證券主管機關作為參考。
關鍵字：公司治理、獨立董事、外部董事、經營績效。

In recent, corporate governance has become a hot issue, especially is the independent director system. The goal of the independent director system is maximum the firm’s value. So whether the independent director system is adopt Taiwan’s stock market should be decide on the system have the positive contribution on the corporate performance or not. When Taiwan government wish enforce the independent director system to all listed companies, we must consider whether all listing companies need the independent director and how much the ratio of the independent director number can produce the positive value.
The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between the structure of the board of directors and corporate performance. This study use data on 2003 annual report of the listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation from Market Observation Post System, to produce a “2003 sample” of 597 firms. Main findings include the following:
(1) The scale of the board has a positive relationship with the corporate performance, but is not significant.
(2) The ratio of the independent director number has a positive relationship with the corporate performance, but is not significant.
(3) The ratio of the outside director r number has a positive relationship with the corporate performance, but is not significant.
(4) The independent director number has a positive relationship with the corporate performance, but is not significant.
(5) The outside director r number has a positive relationship with the corporate performance, but is not significant.
The empirical study has confirmed that the independent director system in Taiwan’s listed companies can have a positive impact on the corporate performance as ROE, EPS, PE ratio and the ratio of institution’s investor. But the correlation is lower than the significance level. It is mean the effect of the independent director system is not significant, the system should be to continue improve. Finally, the study provided suggestions about the implementation of these systems.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Independent Director, Outside Director, Corporate Performance.

第一章 緒論-------------------------------------------------------------1 第一節 研究背景---------------------------------------------------------1 第二節 研究動機及目的- -------------------------------------------------3 第二章 文獻探討---------------------------------------------------------5 第三章 各國之獨立董事制度-----------------------------------------------21 第一節 代理理論及公司治理-----------------------------------------------21 第二節 獨立董事制度-----------------------------------------------------25 第三節 我國董事會與獨立董事---------------------------------------------47 第四節 各國獨立董事資格之比較-------------------------------------------54 第四章 研究方法---------------------------------------------------------56 第五章 實證結果分析-----------------------------------------------------58 第一節 敘述性統計分析---------------------------------------------------58 第二節 實證結果分析-----------------------------------------------------62 第六章 結論與建議-------------------------------------------------------71 第一節 結論-------------------------------------------------------------71 第二節 建議-------------------------------------------------------------72 參考文獻------------------------------------------------------------------75

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