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研究生:楊弘斌
研究生(外文):Hung-bin Yang
論文名稱:在強制性申報制度下環保補貼與稽核政策之誘因分析
論文名稱(外文):An incentive analysis on environmentalsubsidy and audit policies under compulsory self-reporting system
指導教授:郭瑞基郭瑞基引用關係
指導教授(外文):Ruey-Ji, Guo
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:東吳大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2005
畢業學年度:93
語文別:中文
論文頁數:73
中文關鍵詞:補貼環保稽核申報
外文關鍵詞:subsidyenvironmental auditself-reporting
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由於廠商與主管機關具有資訊不對稱的情形,若允許廠商可自願性決定是否申報污染資訊,可能會存有污染廠商選擇不申報污染資訊,而主管機關亦未查獲廠商隱匿不報的情況,此時,廠商的污染將對環境造成嚴重的破壞。因此,政府公共政策的適當介入有其必要性,本研究則採取強制性規定廠商申報污染資訊,並同時透過環保補貼、稽核及污染稅課徵等環境管制政策,探討如何制訂最適的環境管制策略促使廠商從事污染防治工作並誠實申報污染資訊,維護社會大眾對環境上享有的權利。
本研究之結論顯示,隨著稽核成本的提高,致使主管機關逐漸降低對廠商的稽核機率,廠商的最適污染清除決策將從高、低環保投資廠商均會執行污染清除,逐漸轉為僅低環保投資廠商會執行污染清除而高環保投資廠商不執行污染清除,乃至最後高、低環保投資廠商均不執行污染清除之情況;而廠商的最適污染申報決策亦將從高、低環保投資廠商均會誠實申報污染資訊,轉為僅低環保投資廠商會誠實申報而高環保投資廠商不誠實申報污染資訊,乃至最後高、低環保投資廠商均不誠實申報污染資訊之情況,此時,主管機關適當的環保投資補貼政策介入,則可促使廠商採取高環保投資,進而減輕相關的社會污染成本負擔。
In situations where the governmental regulators and the firms possess different information regarding the emission status of the firms, the allowance for voluntary report of the correct information to the governmental regulators may lead to the possibility that certain firms may fail to submit such information. As a result, the firms may be causing severe pollution to the environment while the governmental regulators remain ignorant of the concealed information. Therefore, the appropriate intervention of governmental policies is necessary. This study adopts an enforced system whereby it is compulsory for firms to report their emission status to the governmental regulators. At the same time, through the co-investigation of the environmental protection subsidy, the emission charge-and-audit as well as other environmental control policy, an attempt is made to design an optimal environmental policy that would also impel firms to be involved in pollution prevention programs and to produce truthful emission status reports. In doing so, the rights of the public to a clean environment would be protected.

As the conclusion of this study indicates, audit cost is inversely proportioned to the rate at which governmental regulators monitor the firms. Therefore, the higher the audit cost is, the lower the probability of governmental regulators monitoring the firms. As a result, as the audit cost increases, the optimal pollution clean-up of the firms will decrease, as will the truthfulness of their emission status information. Therefore, appropriate interventions by the governmental regulators in terms of environmental protection investment subsidies may impel firms to invest more in environmental protection and thereby reduce the burden of pollution related costs to society.
第一章 緒 論 1
第一節 研究背景及動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究架構 5
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 環境管制政策 6
第二節 環保投資補貼政策 9
第三節 環境污染申報制度 12
第四節 環境稽核政策 14
第三章 模式建立與分析 15
第一節 基本假設與設定 15
第二節 模式分析結果 24
第三節 比較靜態分析 40
第四章 結論與建議 42
第一節 研究結論 42
第二節 研究限制與建議 44
參考文獻 46
附 錄 49

表目錄
【表3-1】相關變數符號說明表 21
【表3-2】樹狀圖下各種結果之期望成本表 23
【表3-3】決策彙總表 39

圖目錄
【圖3-1】樹狀圖 20
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