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研究生:張民忠
研究生(外文):Ming-Chung Chang
論文名稱:寡占廠商的策略性環保行為
論文名稱(外文):The Strategic Behavior of the Oligopoly Firm in Environmental Protection
指導教授:胡均立胡均立引用關係邱永和邱永和引用關係
指導教授(外文):Jin-Li HuYung - Ho Chiu
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:東吳大學
系所名稱:經濟學系
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2005
畢業學年度:93
語文別:中文
論文頁數:88
中文關鍵詞:定額權利金單位權利金訊息不對稱差別取價
外文關鍵詞:price discriminationinformation asymmetryroyalty feefixed fee
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經濟發展的過程中,因為忽略環境保護,所以人類正面臨生態與環境的危機,例如:溫室效應、臭氧層破洞等。廠商採行策略性環保行為有其重要的環境與經濟效果。策略性環保行為不但有利於經濟持續發展而且也有利於增加廠商的利潤。
本論文分析環境與經濟的議題。第一個主題為「異質雙占下策略性環境技術授權」;第二個主題為「訊息不對稱下環境技術的策略性運用」;第三個主題為「環保補充包與差別取價」。
在第一個議題中,我們比較兩種授權方式:定額權利金的授權方式與單位權利金的授權方式。我們有兩個主要的結果:第一、單位權利金的授權方式比定額權利金的授權方式造成較小的環境傷害。第二、就社會福利的角度而言,定額權利金的授權方式不一定優於單位權利金的授權方式。
在第二個議題中,我們利用兩階段賽局探討訊息不對稱對於環境技術策略性運用之影響。研究發現:增加污染稅率會提高兩廠商採用環境技術的門檻,而且使得訊息較少的廠商延後採用環境技術;此外,我們也證明兩廠商間的訊息對稱會造成兩廠商採用環境技術。
在第三個議題中,我們討論環保補充包的經濟效果與環保效果。研究發現:廠商可以透過發行環保補充包來達到差別取價的目的。此外,補充包的價格競爭與完整財的價格競爭皆可以擴大補充包的使用量,有利於環境保護。
Because of neglecting environmental protection during economic development, people in the world suffer from ecological and environmental crises, for example, greenhouse effect, ozone layer depletion, etc. Environmental strategies adopted by firms do have their important environmental and economic effects. These strategic environmental strategies are beneficial not only to sustainable development but also to the firm’s profits.
Three environmental and economic issues are analyzed in this thesis. The first topic is titled “Strategic Environmental Licensing in a Differentiated Cournot Duopoly.” The second topic is titled “Strategic Adoption of Environmental Technology under Asymmetric Information.” The third topic is titled “Refill Packs and Price Discrimination.”
In the first topic, we compare two licensing methods: a fixed fee and a royalty. We have two major results: First, a royalty licensing brings a lower equilibrium pollution amount than a fixed-fee licensing does. Second, the fee licensing method is not necessary superior to the royalty licensing method in the social welfare.
In the second topic, we use a two-stage game to analyze the effect of a strategic adoption of environmental technology under asymmetric information. An increase in the emission tax rate raises the threshold for both firms to adopt the environmental technology and induces the firm with less information to its delay adoption of the environmental technology. We also show that information symmetry always induces two firms to adopt the environmental technologies.
In the third topic, we discuss the economic and environmental effects of refill packs. The firm can achieve the price discrimination effects by selling the refill packs. Besides, the price competition in refill packs and in complete goods can increase usage of refill packs. This is good for the environmental protection.
目 錄

第一章 緒論 8
第一節 研究動機與目的 8
第二節 研究方法 9
第三節 研究流程 11
第四節 研究架構 12
第五節 緣起及文獻回顧 13
第二章 異質雙占下策略性環境技術授權 20
第一節 異質雙占的污染防治模型 20
第二節 定額權利金的授權方式 22
第三節 單位授權權利金的授權方式 24
第四節 不同授權方式下的污染防治效果 25
第五節 社會福利分析 29
第六節 本章結論 35
附錄 2-1 36
附錄 2-2 38
附錄 2-3 40
第三章 訊息不對稱下環境技術的策略性運用 42
第一節 模型設定 42
壹、參賽者同時移動的模型設定 42
貳、參賽者先後移動的模型設定 44
第二節 賽局求解與均衡結果 46
壹、第二階段的產量決策 46
貳、第一階段的採行決策 49
參、污染稅率不確定之均衡分析 57
第三節 社會福利分析 59
第四節 本章結論 61
附錄 3-1 62
附錄 3-2 63
附錄 3-3 66
第四章 環保補充包與差別取價 68
第一節 基本模型 68
第二節 第二期潛在廠商進入市場,競爭完整財 72
第三節 第二期潛在廠商進入市場,競爭補充包 76
第四節 本章結論 78
第五章 結論與建議 79
第一節 結論 79
第二節 未來研究建議 80
參考文獻 82
參考文獻
壹、中文
胡均立(2004)。環保補充包與差別取價,國科會研究計畫(NSC92-2415-H-009-002)。
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貳、英文
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