(3.237.234.213) 您好!臺灣時間:2021/03/09 13:09
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果

詳目顯示:::

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:李盈穎
研究生(外文):Ying-Yiing Lee
論文名稱:垂直整合與技術合作經濟效果比較-在上游獨佔、下游寡佔產業模型下
論文名稱(外文):The Economic Effect Comparison Of Vertical Integration and Technological Cooperation-Under the Industry Structure Of Monopoly In Upstream and Oligopoly In Downstream.
指導教授:謝登隆謝登隆引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:東海大學
系所名稱:管理碩士學程在職進修專班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:其他商業及管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2005
畢業學年度:93
語文別:中文
論文頁數:75
中文關鍵詞:垂直整合技術合作產品差異化研發報酬遞減
外文關鍵詞:Vertical IntegrationR&D CooperationProduct DifferentiationR&D diminishing return
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:2
  • 點閱點閱:338
  • 評分評分:系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔
  • 下載下載:72
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
本研究主要延伸自Chrysovalantou Milliou(2004)與d,Aspremont and Jacquemin(1988)的研究架構進行,目的為將研發報酬遞減程度及產品差異化程度,納入寡佔市場的垂直整合、技術合作、數量競爭模型之中,進一步探討廠商在垂直整合與技術合作策略的選擇中,所會進行的選擇與影響,並將產品差異與研發報酬遞減的影響納入考量。研究發現,報酬遞減程度愈高、成本越高、產品價格愈高、中間財的需求與價格愈低、研發投入愈低,反之則反。本研究歸納出寡占市場的競爭規則與流程:在起始時下游廠商為各自獨立且與上游廠商無任何整合與聯盟條件之下,下游廠商會選擇與競爭廠商進行技術合作,而不是單獨垂直整合以達到利潤最大化。當合作型態成立後,先行與上游廠商進行垂直整合的廠商可以獲取更高的利潤。此時無法進行垂直整合的競爭廠商利潤則會降低。在利潤的考量下,又無法與垂直整合廠商脫離技術合作的型態,會盡力阻止競爭廠商進行垂直整合。若起始時已有廠商完成垂直整合下,下游廠商的技術合作只會增進彼此的利潤,因此合作是必然的均衡結果。
This study is extending from the research framework of Chrysovalantou Milliou(2004) and d’Aspremont and Jacquemin(1988). The purpose is to include the physical diminishing return and product differentiation into the cournot competition of the vertical integration, and R&D joint venture. Furthermore, discussing the effects of decision making between the strategy of vertical integration and R&D joint venture, and also take R&D diminishing return and product differentiation into consideration. By our studies, the higher diminishing return, the higher cost and final product price, but the lower R&D investment, material price and demand. Vice versa. We conclude the competition procedure of oligopoly structure as following: in the beginning, when the down stream firms are independent and without any strategic integration and cooperation, the down stream firms’ priority choice is to cooperate with competitive down stream firm. After the cooperation existed, the first one to anticipate each other to integrate with upstream firm can obtain the higher profit, the others will suffer the loose of profit. The defeated firm will try to stop the integration of cooperated firm. In the other way, under the condition of integration with up steam firm, the cooperation occurs can improve down steam’s profit. Thus, the cooperation is the necessary equilibrium.
中文摘要 …………………………………………………………………………Ⅰ
英文摘要 …………………………………………………………………………Ⅱ
圖表目錄 …………………………………………………………………………Ⅳ
第一章 研究背景與動機 …………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景 ………………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的 ………………………………………………………………3
第三節 研究動機 ………………………………………………………………3
第四節 研究流程 ………………………………………………………………4
第二章 文獻回顧 ……………………………………………………………………5
第一節 垂直整合相關文獻 ……………………………………………………5
第二節 產品差異化相關文獻 ………………………………………………14
第三節 R&D與技術合作相關文獻 …………………………………………16
第三章 基本模型之設計……………………………………………………………22
第一節 模型建立與設計………………………………………………………22
第二節 市場結構模型…………………………………………………………25
第四章 垂直整合、技術合作模型之建立與分析…………………………………28
第一節 分離獨立模型…………………………………………………………28
第二節 技術合作模型…………………………………………………………31
第三節 垂直整合模型……………………………………………………… 34
第四節 垂直整合且技術合作模型……………………………………………38
第五節 四種寡占模型共同性…………………………………………………41
第五章 垂直整合與技術合作經濟效果之比較……………………………………43
第一節 下游廠商技術合作與否模型比較分析………………………………43
第二節 垂直整合對下游廠商的影響分析……………………………………45
第三節 垂直整合與技術合作模型比較………………………………………51
第四節 技術合作下垂直整合產生與否模型分析……………………………55
第五節 垂直整合下技術合作與否模型比較分析……………………………58
第六節 垂直整合與技術合作經濟效果分析…………………………………63
第六章 結論…………………………………………………………………………65
中英文參考文獻 ……………………………………………………………………67
附錄:程式結果表……………………………………………………………………70
圖表目錄
圖目錄
《圖3-1》分離獨立市場結構示意…………………………………………………26
《圖3-2》技術合作市場結構示意圖………………………………………………26
《圖3-3》垂直整合市場結構示意圖………………………………………………27
《圖3-4》垂直整合且技術合作市場結構示意圖…………………………………27
《圖5-1》有無技術合作市場結構示意圖…………………………………………43
《圖5-2》有無單一垂直整合市場結構示意圖……………………………………46
《圖5-3-1》技術合作市場結構示意圖之一 ………………………………………51
《圖5-3-2》垂直整合市場結構示意圖之二 ………………………………………51
《圖5-4》技術合作下垂直整合與否市場結構示意圖……………………………55
《圖5-5》單一垂直整合下技術合作與否的市場結構示意圖……………………59
《圖6》競爭型態流程………………………………………………………………66
表目錄
《表3-1》本研究符號定義表………………………………………………………23
《表6》競爭流程順序表……………………………………………………………66
吳東欣,「產品差異性與製造業垂直整合之探討」,東海大學管理研究所碩士論文,民國89年。
承立平,「垂直整合與企業競爭力」,台灣經濟研究,第14期,民國80年三月ㄧ日,第93-95頁。
張明宗,「由產業組織看垂直整合、多角化、購併與中小企業」,中央大學產經所與經濟系教授。
廖國鋒,「『猜測變量』對廠商通路選擇影響之研究」,台灣大學商學院博士論文,民國85年三月。
顏銘志,「寡占及資訊不對稱下廠商之垂直整合分析」,中興大學經濟學研究所碩士論文,民國86年。
謝登隆,「個體經濟理論與應用」,志勝出版,民國86年五月。
英文參考文獻
Arrow, K. J. (1975), “Vertical Integration and Communication”, bell Journal of Economics, vol.6, pp.173-184.
Banerjee, S. & Lin, P. (2003), “Downstream R&D, rising rivals’ cost and input price contracts”, International Journal of Industrial Organization vol.21, pp.79-96.
Cartlon, D. W. (1979), “Vertical Integration in Competitive Market under Uncertainty”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol.27, pp.109-189.
Colangelo, G. (1995), “Vertical V.S Horizontal Integration : Pre-Emptive Merging ”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, September, pp.323-337.
Cyrenne, P. (1994), “Vertical Integration Versus Vertical Separation : An Equilibrium Model”, Review of Industrial Organization, vol.9, pp.311-322.
D’Aspremont, C. & Jacquemin, A. (1988), “Cooperative and non-Cooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers”, American Economic Review, vol.78, pp.1133-1137.
De Bondt, R. (1996), “Spillovers and innovative activities”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.15, pp.1-28.
De Bondt, R., Slaets, P., Cassiman, B. (1992), “The degree of spillovers and number of rivals for maximum effective R&D” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.10, pp.35-54.
Delbono, F., Denicolo, V. (1991), “ Incentives to innovate in a Cournot oligopoly” Quarterly Journal of Economics ,vol.106, pp.951-961.
Frank, S. D. & Henderson, D. R. (1992), “Transation Costs as Determinats of Vertical Coodination in the U.S. Food Industries”, American Agriculture Economics Association, pp.941-950.
Greenhut, M. L. & Ohta, H. (1976), “Related market Conditions and Interindustrial Mergers”, The American Economic Review, vol.66, no.3, June, pp.267-277.
Geeenhut, M. L., & H. Ohta (1979), “Vertical integration of successive oligopolists,” American Economic Review, vol.XIX, pp.137-141.
_______ & _______ (1979), “Vertical Integration of Successive Oligopolists”, The American Economic Review, vol.69, no.1, March, pp.137-141.
Kai, U. k. & Xavier, V. (1999), “Excess entry, vertical integration, and welfare”, journal of Economics, vol.30, no.4, pp. 575-603.
Katz, M. L. (1986), “An analysis of cooperative research and development”, rand journal of economics, vol.17, winter, pp 527-543.
Lee, S. H. (1987), “The Price of Final Product After Vertical Integration”, The American Economic Review, vol.77, no.5, December, pp.1013-1016.
Lin, Y. J. (1988), “Oligopoly and Vertical Integration : note”, American Economics, vol.21, pp.297-326.
Lin, Y. J. (1990), “The Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol.63, pp.328-335.
Lynne, P. & George, N. (2001), “Product differentiation and upstream-downstream relations”Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, vol.10, pp.201-233.
McAfee, R. P. (1999), “The Effect of Vertical Integration on Competing Input Suppliers”, Economic Review, vol.35, pp.357-361.
McGuire, T. W. & Staelin, R. (1983), “An Industrial Equilibrium Analysis of Downstream Vertical Integration”, Marketing Science, Spring, pp.161-192.
Michael, H. R. (1998), “Anticompetitive vertical integration by a dominant firm”, American economic review , vol.88, no.5, December, pp.1232-1248.
Moothy, K. S. (1988), “Strategic Decentralization in Channels”, Marketing Science, vol.7, no.4, Fall, pp.335-355.
Motta, M. (1992), “Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.10, pp.643– 662.
O’Brien, D. P. & Shaffer, G. (1993), “On the Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol.XLI, no.2, June, pp.215-221.
Oedover, J. A., Saloner, G. & Salop, S. C. (1990), “Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure”, vol.80, no.1, June, pp.127-142.
_______ & _______ (1992), “Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure Reply”, vol.82, no.3, June, pp.698-703.
Perry, M. K. (1978), “Vertical Integration : The Monopsony Case”, The American Economic Review, vol.88, no.5, pp.561-570.
_______ (1982), ”Vertical Integration by Competitive Firms : Uncertainty and Diversification”, Southen Econonics Journal, vol.49, pp.201-208.
Philippe, C. (1994), “Vertical Integration Versus Vertical Separation : An Equilibrium Model”, Review of Industrial Oganization, vol.9, pp.911-322.
Richard A. D. & David J. R. (1994), “Economics of integration versus bureaucracy costs : does vertical integration improve performance of management”, pp.1167-1206.
Richard T. M. & Kimball, E Bullington. (2004), “Performance Implications of changing Vertical integration strategies”, American business review, pp.93-101.
Riordan, M. H. & Williamson, O. E. (1985), “Asset Specificity and Economic Oganization”, International Journal of Oganization, vol.3, pp.365-378.
Salinger, M. A. (1988), “Vertical mergers and market foreclosure”, quarterly journal of economics, may, pp. 345-356.
Singh, N. & Vives, X. (1984), “Price and Quantity Competition In a Differertiated Duopoly”, Rand Journal of Economic, vol.15, no.4, pp.546-554.
Stigler, G. J. (1951), “The Division of Labor is Limited by the extent of the Market”, Journal of Political Economic, vol.59, pp.185-193.
Willcox, Thomas C. (1995), “Behavioral remedies in a post-Chicago world: It's time to revise the vertical merger guidelines”, Antitrust Bulletin New York, Spring, Vol.40, no.1, pp.227-257.
Williamson, O. E. (1971), “The Vertical Integration of Production : Market Failure Considerations”, American Economic Review, vol.61, May, pp.112-120.
Young A. R. (1991), “Vertical Structure and Nash Equilibrium : A Note”, The journal of Industrial Economics, vol.XXXIX, no.6,December, pp.717-722.
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
系統版面圖檔 系統版面圖檔