臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本篇論文主要研究兩項主題：(1)發給CEOs的員工認股權數量與公司資訊不對稱環境及盈餘操弄之間的關係；(2)員工認股權的多寡與營運績效表現的雙重效果對股票市場的影響。針對第一項實證結果顯示，公司內部的資訊不對稱程度愈低愈會發行更多的員工認股權；發愈多員工認股權的公司的確會使管理者從事盈餘管理的手段；這項結果支持盈餘管理假說(Healy,1985)但資訊假說則不被支持。本篇第二項關於績效表現的證據顯示，員工認股權發行數量愈多，愈能促使營運績效改善，結果與Hideaki et al (2004)一致並且營運績效的改善顯示在公司的營運現金流量，在資產報酬率上則沒有顯著的影響；本篇論文進一步考慮盈餘管理對營運績效、市場績效的影響，實證顯示當公司有盈餘操弄時(向上操弄盈餘)，發行員工認股權的數量愈多並且確實改善營運現金流量的公司會有較高的市場超額報酬相較於發行量少的公司，並且股票市場並不會對公司資產報酬率有顯著的反應，這是來自於美國股票市場是為完全效率市場，表示投資人知道公司盈餘管理會使得盈餘不正確並連帶影響資產報酬率，而營運現金流量則比較不易受盈餘管理的影響，因此投資人會對營運現金流量好壞做反應；相對來說，當公司盈餘操弄較少時，股票市場會對發行員工認股權多並且資產報酬率改善的公司有正向的反應，因為此時公司的盈餘是正確的，而盈餘是最能反應一家公司營運績效的指標，所以股票市場對營運績效反應會顯著反應在資產報酬率上而不是營運現金流量。

This thesis studies two main investigations. One is the relation among the amounts of granting executive stock options (ESO), information asymmetry, and the earnings management. Another subject is to examine that stock market reacts to the comprehensive effects of the amounts of ESO and improvement in operating performance. The results provide that firms with higher information transparency grant fewer ESO and manage more earnings following granting ESO. The results do not consist with information hypothesis but support the earnings management hypothesis (Healy,1985). The operating performance actually improves owning to undertake ESO but it only represents in cash flows from operations, which support the prior researches (Hideaki et al., 2004). Furthermore, this study adds earnings management in measurement of performance. On the premise of market efficiency and granting ESO making market reaction good, the existence of higher earnings management induces the cash flows from operations (CFO) being the better target of the corporate performance and stock market reacts to CFO instead of ROA. On the contrary if firms have lower earnings management, ROA can reflect the corporate performance and stock market reacts to ROA. The evidences are consistent with the hypothesis in this thesis.

Contents

1. Introduction 1
2. Hypotheses Development 3
3. Sample 7
3.1. Sample Selection 7
3.2. Sample Characteristic 8
4. Empirical Methodology 9
4.1. Measures of information asymmetry 9
4.2. Estimating the earnings management 10
4.3. Model A- ESO, Earnings management and information asymmetry 12
4.4. Model B- ESO and operating performance 14
4.5. Model C- ESO, operating performance and market performance 15
4.5.1. The Sample A- Closed period is longer than two years 15
4.5.2. The Sample B- Sample A is partitioned by earnings management 16
4.6. Descriptive Statistics 16
5. Empirical Results 17
5.1. Results for Model A - ESO & earnings management & information asymmetry 17
5.1.1. Examinations in year t, year t+1, year t+2 17
5.1.2. Examinations of relationships based on the means of all variables 21
5.2. Results for Model B - ESO & operating performance 22
5.3. Results for Model C - ESO & performance & earnings management 22
6. Conclusions 24
Reference 26


Tables

Table 1. Summary statistics for executive stock options 28
Table 2. Summary statistics for variables in Model A 29
Table 3. Summary statistics for variables in Model B 30
Table 4. Test for ESO & earnings management & information asymmetry (EM: ACOPE) 31
Table 5. Test for ESO & earnings management & information asymmetry (EM: original value) 32
Table 6. Test for ESO & earnings management & information asymmetry (EM: dummy) 33
Table 7. Test for ESO & earnings management & information asymmetry (IA: partition) 35
Table 8. Test for ESO & earnings management & information asymmetry (EM>0) 37
Table 9. Test for ESO & earnings management & information asymmetry (Means) 38
Table10.Test for ESO & earnings management & information asymmetry (Means & dummy) 39
Table 11. Test for ESO & operating performance 40
Table 12. Test for ESO & operating performance & market performance 41
Table 13. Test for ESO & CFO & market performance & earnings management 43
Table 14. Test for ESO & ROA & market performance & earnings management 44

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林博文，陳怡之，洪慈霙，94年，策略聯盟傾向、技術研發與企業無形資產之蓄積，台灣管理學刊，59-74。
楊雨雯，92年，台灣員工認股權與員工分紅對公司績效影響之研究，元智大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
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