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研究生:黃家思
研究生(外文):Chia-Szu Huang
論文名稱:探討公司採取抵抗措施與公司控制之關係
論文名稱(外文):Defensive Techniques and Corporate Control
指導教授:沈仰斌沈仰斌引用關係
指導教授(外文):Yang-Pin Shen
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:元智大學
系所名稱:財務金融研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2005
畢業學年度:93
語文別:英文
論文頁數:55
中文關鍵詞:委託書爭奪戰抵抗手段
外文關鍵詞:Proxy ContestProxy FightTakeover Defense
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:173
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  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
本文以1988~2004年在美國三大市場(AMEX, NYSE 和NASDAQ)發生委託書爭奪戰的上市公司為樣本,探討公司持有超額現金以及公司採取抵抗措施對委託書爭奪戰結果的影響。在我們的觀點中,我們認為現金的多寡可能是影響委託書爭奪戰結果的重要變數,實證結果發現市場派獲勝時,目標公司所持有的現金是比較多的,因此仍然是支持代理問題假說;當我們加入抵抗手段的控制變數後,我們發現當公司採取直接影響股權的方式是最直接且有效的。此外,本文亦針對事後表現進行研究,我們發現公司持有較多現金,事後的表現會較差;當市場派獲勝且公司持有較多現金,事後的表現會是最差的,這也意謂著爭奪戰期間可能市場有非理性的預期以及過度反應所造成。
This paper analyzes a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors in the 1988-2004 period. Even if cash-rich firms are more likely to become the targets of proxy contests. In our opinion, the takeover-deterrence effects of excess cash may be an important variable which could influence the results of proxy contests. We find that the result of proxy contest which dissident victory holds more cash than management victory, and REPO Variable (directly affects the outcome of proxy contests through its effect on the distribution of votes) is the most significant factor in increasing the probability of dissident success in proxy contests. We also find that when the dissidents succeed in a proxy contest and it’s a cash-rich firm, abnormal returns following the proxy contest are significantly negative. This suggests that, in cases where dissidents win and with higher cash holding, the market has unrealistic expectations and investor overreaction around proxy contests.
Contents
1. Introduction 1
2. Theory and Hypotheses 3
2.1. Excess Cash Holding 3
2.2. Takeover Defenses 4
2.2.1. Stock Repurchases 4
2.2.2. Poison Pills 5
2.2.3. Restructuring / Reorganization 5
2.2.4. Recapitalization 6
2.2.5. ESOP’s / Pension Funds 6
2.2.6. Litigation and Defensive Bylaw 6
2.2.7. Other Defenses 7
2.3. Inefficient Management Hypothesis 7
2.4. Low Dividend Payout Hypothesis 8
2.5. Debt Financing as a Defense 8
3. Definition of Variables 9
3.1. Excess Cash 9
3.2. Takeover Defenses 10
3.3. Pre-contest Performance 11
3.4. Dividend Payout 11
3.5. Debt Ratio 11
4. The Proxy Contest sample 12
5. Empirical Findings 14
5.1. The Probability of a Proxy Contest 14
5.1.1. Settlement Viewed as Dissident Failure 14
5.1.2. Settlement Viewed as Dissident Success 16
5.2. Post Performance of Proxy Contests 17
5.2.1 Performance Measurement 18
5.2.2. The Buy-and-Hold Approach 18
5.2.3. Excess Cash and Post Performance of Proxy Contests 19
5.2.4. Proxy Contest Outcomes and Post Performance 20
5.2.5. The Interaction of Excess Cash and Proxy Contest Outcomes 21
6. Robustness of Results 24
6.1. The Probability of a Proxy Contest 24
6.2. Post Performance of Proxy Contests 24
7. Conclusion 25
References 27
References
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Borstadt, Lisa F., and Thomas J. Zwirlein, 1992, The efficient monitoring role of proxy contests: An empirical analysis of post-contest control changes and firm performance, Financial Management 21, 22-34.
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DeAngelo, H., and L. DeAngelo, 1989, Proxy contests and the governance of publicly held corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 23, 29-59.
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Mulherin, J. Harold, and Annette B. Poulsen, 1998, Proxy contests and corporate change: Implications for shareholder wealth, Journal of Financial Economics 47, 279-313.
Myers, Stewart, and Nicholas. Majluf, 1984, Corporate financing decisions when firms have investment information that investors do not, Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-221.
Nohel, Tom, and Vefa Tarhan, 1998, Share repurchases and firm performance: New evidence on the agency costs of free cash flow, Journal of Financial Economics 49, 187-222.
Opler, Tim, Lee Pinkowitz, René Stulz, and Rohan Williamson, 1999, The determinants and implications of corporate cash holding, Journal of Financial Economics 52, 3-46.
Pinkowitz, Lee, 2002, The market for corporate control and corporate cash holdings, Working paper, Georgetown University.
Sridharan, Uma V., and Marc R. Reinganum, 1995, Determinants of the choice of the hostile takeover mechanism: An empirical analysis of tender offers and proxy contests, Financial Management 24, 57-67.
Stulz, René M., 1988, Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 25-54.
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