臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本篇論文主要是處理麥克‧史密斯的自然主義道德實在論主張。史密斯指出，倫理領域存在有「道德的難題」。這個道德的難題是指，不能調和道德判斷的客觀性、實踐性，以及休謨的心理理論，使得我們的道德思想看起來不融貫，而在後設倫理學出現諸多爭議。史密斯藉由辯護兩項主張，提出化解道德難題的方法。而其為第一項主張辯護的方式，將關連至他所主張的自然主義道德實在論。根據史密斯，道德判斷是描述事實，而且是描述自然事實；道德判斷所傳達的是信念，而且此一信念有自然的內容。但是，穆爾(非自然主義道德實在論)及耶爾(表達主義/情緒論)的論証均指出，道德概念是不可分析的，不能以自然主義的方式來定義道德概念。而且，耶爾由此還進一步主張，道德判斷不是描述事實而是表達態度；道德判斷的內容是非認知的。史密斯認為，自然主義道德實在論，應該重新思考另一種定義的自然主義道德實在論的型式，而史密斯所指的，即是以非化約形式的分析方式，分析道德概念。「道德概念是可分析的」，將為史密斯的第二項主張：可以將道德事實分析為關於行為理由的事實，提供了重要的前提。
本論文首先說明，史密斯所指出的道德難題，以及其為化解道德難題所提出的二個主張。接著，說明穆爾和耶爾對自然主義道德實在論的挑戰，以及史密斯對此挑戰所提出的回應：應該重新看待概念分析的工作，以非化約及概括型態的分析方式(傾向分析)來分析道德概念。本論文也進一步思考非化約分析方式的可能問題。不過，即使能夠合理的主張道德概念是可分析的，是描述事實，但是，是否要以自然主義的型式，來理解道德實在論？史密斯認為，如果有任何型式的實在論，那麼，必定是自然主義道德實在論。史密斯以「隨附主張」來支持道德和較廣的自然主義形式相一致。關於史密斯的隨附主張，也是本論文討論的內容。在本論文最後，將進一步說明史密斯提出的傾向分析，並討論非化約形式的傾向分析，可能隱藏有相對主義的後果。

This thesis discusses Michael Smith’s argument for his theory of Naturalistic Moral Realism. Smith points out, there exists “the moral problem” in ethics. The moral problem occurs when we cannot accommodate both the objectivity and the practicality of moral judgement, if we accept Hume’s theory of human psychology. This problem makes the idea of morality altogether incoherent, and engenders vast discussions and disagreements in contemporary meta-ethical theories. Smith attempts to provide his solution to the moral problem. His solution is, in part, to defend two claims. His defense of the first claim consists in a naturalistic account of moral realism. According to Smith, moral judgements describe some natural states of affairs, and express beliefs that have cognitive natural content. But Moore (a non-natural realist) and Ayer (an expressivist/ emotivist) point out, moral concepts are unanalysisable. They maintain that we cannot define the moral in terms of the natural. Moreover, Ayer claims that moral judgements do not describe any natural states of affairs; rather, they express attitudes. For Ayer, moral judgements have only non-cognitive content. Smith argues that his naturalistic moral realism can make sense of another form of definitional naturalism, which offers a non-reductive way of analysis (dispositional analysis). That moral concepts are analyzable provides an important premise for Smith’s argument for his second claim, that is, moral facts are facts about the reasons that we all share.
In this thesis, first, I explain what ‘the moral problem’ is and Smith’s claim about how to solve the problem. Then, I explain Moore’s and Ayer’s arguments against the idea that moral concepts are analyzable. And I explain Smith’s responses to both of them. But even if it can be justifiable that moral concepts are analyzable, is it also reasonable and necessary to argue for naturalistic moral realism? I will discuss Smith’s arguments. In the final chapter, Smith’s idea of dispositional analysis is further discussed, and I shall offer my tentative reflections about Smith’s claims.

前 言………………………………………………………………………….………1
第一章 道德的難題及化解………………………………………………….……....7
第一節 何謂「道德的難題」……………………………………………….…7
第二節 解決「道德的難題」的主張………………………………………....15
第三節 道德事實…………………………………………………………..…..20
第四節 本章結語…………………………………………………………..…..21

第二章 不可分析的道德概念：穆爾及耶爾 vs. 可分析的道德概念：史密斯….23
第一節 穆爾以及耶爾：反對自然主義道德實在論…………………...…….24
第二節 史密斯的回應：待決問題論証及表達主義的挑戰.……………...…28
第三節 非化約形式概念分析的進一步思考……………………………...….55
第四節 本章結語……………………………………………………….….......58

第三章 自然主義型式的道德實在論…………………………………………...…..60
第一節 反對低限道德實在論…………………………………………...…….61
第二節 價值性質隨附於自然性質………………………………………...….65
第三節 本章結語………………………………………………………………79

第四章 可分析的道德概念再說明：傾向分析仍具有客觀性… ………..…...…81
第一節 客觀的概念---邁奇、麥克道爾與史密斯……………………………85
第二節 傾向分析所隱藏的相對問題…………………………………......…101
第三節 本章結語……………………………………………………...….…..109

結 論………………………….……………………………………………...….…..110

參考書目………………...……………………………………………….…...………117

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