跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(34.204.169.230) 您好!臺灣時間:2024/03/02 23:47
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:吳筱雯
研究生(外文):Hsiao-Wen Wu
論文名稱:高階管理團隊社會資本之價值攸關性-公司最終所有權結構的調節效果
論文名稱(外文):The Value Relevance of Top Management Teams' Social Capital- The Moderation Effect of Ultimate Corporate Ownership Structure
指導教授:謝佩君謝佩君引用關係楊朝旭楊朝旭引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:會計所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
畢業學年度:94
語文別:英文
論文頁數:53
中文關鍵詞:最終控制權所有權結構社會資本高階管理團隊價值攸關性
外文關鍵詞:Value relevanceTop management teamsSocial capitalOwnership structureUltimate control
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:198
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
Prior research has suggested that top management teams’ (TMTs’) outside directorate networks would have beneficial effect on firm performance by virtue of accessing strategic resources and information from outside linked firms. However, there is evidence suggesting that when executives have lower corporate ownership, that is, firms have greater agency problems, external directorships could be harmful to firm value. The results imply that agency problems resulted from the deviation of control and cash flow rights (ownership) may moderate the relationship between TMTs’ outside directorships and firm value. The aim of this study attempts to explore the value relevance of TMTs’ social capital and examine the moderation effect of controlling shareholders’ divergence in control and cash flow rights on the relationship between TMTs’ social capital and firm value. Our results indicate that there is a positive association between TMTs’ social capital and firm value for firms without divergence in control and cash flow rights, but becomes negative for divergent firms. Our study contributes to the literature by documenting that controlling shareholders’ ownership structure serves as an important moderate variable between TMTs’ social capital and firm value-creation.
Prior research has suggested that top management teams’ (TMTs’) outside directorate networks would have beneficial effect on firm performance by virtue of accessing strategic resources and information from outside linked firms. However, there is evidence suggesting that when executives have lower corporate ownership, that is, firms have greater agency problems, external directorships could be harmful to firm value. The results imply that agency problems resulted from the deviation of control and cash flow rights (ownership) may moderate the relationship between TMTs’ outside directorships and firm value. The aim of this study attempts to explore the value relevance of TMTs’ social capital and examine the moderation effect of controlling shareholders’ divergence in control and cash flow rights on the relationship between TMTs’ social capital and firm value. Our results indicate that there is a positive association between TMTs’ social capital and firm value for firms without divergence in control and cash flow rights, but becomes negative for divergent firms. Our study contributes to the literature by documenting that controlling shareholders’ ownership structure serves as an important moderate variable between TMTs’ social capital and firm value-creation.
LIST OF TABLES...............................................................ii
LIST OF FIGURES.............................................................iii
Abstract......................................................................1
Chapter 1 Introduction........................................................2
1.1 ISSUES CONCERNED..........................................................2
1.2 EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY......................................5
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY...................................................6
Chapter 2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development........................7
2.1 SOCIAL CAPITAL ............................................................7
2.2 TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS’ (TMTS’) SOCIAL NETWORKS AND FIRM VALUE...........10
2.2.1 Top management teams’ external ties...................................10
2.2.2 Board interlocks.......................................................11
2.3 POSITIVE INCENTIVE VERSUS NEGATIVE ENTRENCHMENT EFFECTS OF CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS.................................................................13
Chapter 3 Research Method....................................................16
3.1 REGRESSION MODEL.........................................................16
3.2 VARIABLE DEFINITION......................................................18
3.3 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION.....................................21
Chapter 4 Data Analysis and Empirical Results................................23
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS...................................................23
4.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS........................................................32
Chapter 5 Conclusions........................................................36
5.1 REVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS..............................................37
5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE.....................................38
5.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS........................................................39
Appendix A: The Computation Method of Ultimate Corporate Ownership Structure ....................................................................40
References...................................................................42
Adler, P. S. and S. W. Kwon (2002), “Social capital: Prospects for a new concept,” Academy of Management Review 27 (1), pp. 17-40.
Adler, P. S. and S. W. Kwon (1999), “Social capital: The good, the bad, and the ugly,” Working Paper, University of Southern California, Los Angeles.
Amir, E. (1996), “The effect of accounting aggregation on the value-relevance of financial disclosures: The case of SFAS No 106,” The Accounting Review 4, pp. 573-590.
Amir, E. and B. Lev (1996), “Value-relevance of nonfinancial information: The wireless communications industry,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 22, pp. 3-30.
Borgatti, S. P., M. G. Everett and L. C. Freeman (1999), UCINET 5.0 Version 1.0, Analytic Technologies, Natick, MA.
Brown, S., K. Lo and T. Lys (2000), “Use of R-squared in accounting research: measuring changes in value relevance in the last four decades,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 28, pp. 83-115.
Burt, R. S. (1992), Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Butterfield, F (1983), China: Alive in bitter sea, Coronet Books, New York.
Carpenter, M. A. and J. D. Westphal (2001), “The strategic context of external network ties: examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic decision making,” Academy of Management Journal 44, pp. 639-660.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov and H. P. Lang (2000), “The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporation,” Journal of Financial Economics 58, pp. 81-112.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov and H. P. Lang (2002), “Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings,” Journal of Finance 57, pp. 2741-2742.
Clark, K. D (2001), “A Relational Approach to Top Management Groups: Social Capital, Information Processing, Co-optation, and Efficiency,” Ph,D, dissertation, University of Maryland College Park.
Core, J.E., R. W. Holthausen and D. F. Larcker (1999), “Corporate governance, CEO compensation and firm performance,” Journal of Financial Economics 51, pp. 371-406.
Demers, E. and B. Lev (2001), “A rude awakening: internet shakeout in 2000,” Review of Accounting Studies 6, pp. 331-359.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989), “Making fast strategic decisions in high-velocity environments,” Academy of Management Journal 32, pp. 543-576.
Fan, Y. (2002), “Questioning guanxi definition, classification and implications,” International Business Review 11, pp. 543–561.
Feltham, G. A. and J. A. Ohlson (1995), “Valuation and clean surplus accounting for operating and financial activities,” Contemporary Accounting Research 11, pp. 689-731.
Fernandez, R. M., E. J. Castilla and P. Moore (2000), “Social capital at work: Networks and employment at a phone center,” American Journal of Sociology 105 (5) , pp. 1288-1357.
Ferris, S. P., M. Jagannathan and A. C. Pritchard (2003), “Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments,” Journal of Finance 58, pp. 1087-1111.
Freeman, L. C. (1979), “Centrality in social networks: conceptual clarification,” Social networks 1, pp. 215-239.
Friedman, R. A. and D. Krackhardt (1997), “Social capital and career mobility,” The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 33 (3) , pp. 316-334.
Geletkanycz, M. A. and D. C. Hambrick (1997), “The external ties of top executives: implications for strategic choice and performance,” Administrative Science Quarterly 42, pp. 654-681.
Hambrick, D. C. and P. Mason (1984), “Upper echelon: the organization as a reflection of its top managers’,” Academy of Management Review 9, pp. 193-206.
Haunschild, P. R. (1993), “Interorganizational imitation: the impact of interlocks on corporate acquisition activity,” Administrative Science Quarterly 38, pp. 564-592.
Haunschild, P. R. and C. M. Beckman (1998), “When do interlocks matter? Alternate sources of information and interlock influence,” Administrative Science Quarterly 43 (4), pp. 815-844.
Haveman, H. A. (1993),” Ghosts of managers past: Managerial succession and organizational mortality,” Academy of Management Journal 36, pp. 864-881..
Hirschey, M., V. J. Richardson and S. Scholz (2001), “Value relevance of nonfinancial information: the case of patent data,” Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 17, pp. 223-235.
Jacobs, J. (1965), The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Penguin Books.
Jenson, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976), “Theory of the firm, managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3, pp. 305-360.
Kao, J. (1993),” The worldwide web of Chinese business,” Harvard Business Review 71(2), pp. 24–36.
Khanna, T. and K. Palepu (2000), “Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business groups,” The Journal of Finance 55 (2) , pp. 867-890.
Kim, Y. (2001), “Social Capital among Corporate Upper Echelons and its Impacts on Executive Promotion and Firm Performance,” Ph.D. dissertation. Texas A&M University..
Kraatz, M. S. (1998), “Learning by association? Interorganizational networks and adaptation to environmental change,” Academy of Management Journal 41, pp. 621-643.
Krackhardt, D. and J. R. Hanson (1993), “Informal networks: The company behind the chart,” Harvard Business Review 71(4) , pp. 104-111.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer (1999), “Corporate ownership around the world,” Journal of Finance 54, pp. 471-517
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishey (2002), “Investor protection and corporate valuation,” The Journal of Finance 57 (3) , pp. 1147-1170.
Lemmon, M. L. and K. Lins (2003), Ownership structure, corporate governance and firm value: Evidence form the East Asian financial crisis, The Journal of Finance 58 (4) , pp. 1445-1468.
Lev, B. (2001), Intangibles: Management, Measurement and Reporting. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC.
Loderer, C. and U. Peyer (2002), “Board overlap, seat accumulation and share prices,” European Financial Management 8 (2) , pp. 165-192.
Luo, Y. and M. Chen (1996), “Managerial implications of guanxi-based business strategies,” Journal of International Management 2, pp. 193–316.
Means, G. C (1939), The Structure of the American Economy, Part 1, Basic characteristics, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office.
Mintzberg, H. (1973), The Nature of Managerial Work, Harper and Row, New York.
Mizruchi, M. S. (1996), “What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of research on interlocking directorates,” Annual Review of Sociology 22, pp. 271-298.
Mizruchi, M. S. and L. B. Stearns (1988), “A longitudinal study of the formation of interlocking directorates,” Administrative Science Quarterly 33, pp. 194-210.
Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1988), “Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics 20, pp. 293-315.
Nahapiet, J. and S. Ghoshal (1998), “Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational advantage,” Academy of Management Review 23, pp. 242-266.
Nicholson, G. J., M. Alexander and G. C. Kiel (2004), “Defining the social capital of the board of directors: an exploratory study,” Journal of the Australian and New Zealand Academy of Management 10 (1) , pp. 54-72.
Ohlson, J. (1995), “Earnings, book values and dividends in security valuation,” Contemporary Accounting Research 11, pp. 161-82.
O’Reilly, C. A. III. and S. Flatt (1989), “Executive team demography, organizational innovation and firm performance,” Working paper, U.C., Berkeley.
Park, S. H. and Y. Luo (2001), “Guanxi and organizational dynamics: Organizational networking in Chinese firms,” Strategic Management Journal 22 (5) , pp. 455-477.
Pennings, J. M., K. Lee and A. van Witteloostuijn (1998), “Human capital, social capital, and firm dissolution,” Academy of Management Journal 41, pp. 425-440.
Perry T. and U. Peyer (2005), “Board seat accumulation by executives: a shareholder’s perspective,” The Journal of Finance 60 (4) , pp. 2083-2123.
Pfeffer, J. and G. R. Salancik (1978), The External Control of Organization: A Resource Dependence Perspective, New York, Cambridge University Press.
Podolny, J. M. (1994), “Markey uncertainty and the social character of economic exchange,” Administrative Science Quarterly 39, pp. 458-483.
Prowse, S. (1992), “The structure of corporate ownership in Japan,” Journal of Finance 47, pp. 1121-1140.
Rajgopal, S., M. Venkatachalam and S. Kotha (2003),” The value relevance of network advantages: the case of e-commerce firms,” Journal of Accounting Research 41 (1) , pp. 135-162.
Smith, K. A. (1991), “The Link between Top Management Team Dynamics and Strategy and Performance,” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland.
Thomas, J. and R. McDaniel (1990), “Interpreting strategic issues: effects of strategy and the information-processing structure of top management teams,” Academy of Management Journal 33, pp. 286-306.
Tsai, W. and S. Ghoshal (1998), “Social capital and value creation: The role of intrafirm networks,” Academy of Management Journal 41, pp. 464-478.
Tsang, W. K. (1998), “Can guanxi be a source of sustained competitive advantage for doing business in China?” Academy of Management Executive 12, pp. 64–73.
Uzzi, B. (1997), “Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: The paradox of embeddedness,” Administrative Science Quarterly 42, pp. 35-67.
Walker, G., B. Kogut and W. Shan (1997), “Social capital, structural holes and the formation of an industry network,” Organization science 8, pp. 109-125.
Wiersema, M. and K. A. Bantel (1992), “Top management team demography and corporate strategic change,”Academy of Management Journal 35 (1) , pp. 91-121.
Yeh, Y. H., C. E. Ko and Y. H. Su (2003), “Ultimate control and expropriation of minority shareholders: new evidence from Taiwan,” Academia Economic Papers 31 (3) , pp. 263-299.
Yeh, Y. H. and T. Woidtke (2005), “Commitment or entrenchment? : Controlling shareholders and board composition,” Journal of Banking & Finance 29 (2005) , pp. 1857-1885.
Yeh, Y. H., T. S. Lee and T. Woidtke (2001), “Family control and corporate governance: Evidence for Taiwan,” International Review of Finance 2, pp. 21-48.
Yli-Renko. H., E. Autio and H. J. Sapienza (2001), “Social capital, knowledge acquisition, and competitive advantage in technology-based young firms,” Strategic Management Journal 22 (6/7) , pp. 587-637
Zahra, S. A. and J. A. Pearce (1989), “Boards of directors and corporate financial performance : A review and integrative model,” Journal of Management 15, pp. 291-334.
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
1. 6. 朱德芳,「論重整中公司之公司治理—以當事人之利害衝突與重整法治之目的為核心,兼論債權人於公司治理中之功能與地位」,東吳法律學報,第17卷第2期,頁193-248 (2005年12月)。
2. 7. 吳光陸,「假扣押執行與公司重整前之緊急處分」,月旦法學雜誌,第86期,頁113-116(2002年7月)。
3. 13. 柯瓊鳳、陳進榮,「從博達案探討重整法規與涉訟財產接管—掌握處理先機 保障債權恢復營運」,會計研究月刊,第225期,頁70-78(2004年8月)。
4. 7. 吳光陸,「假扣押執行與公司重整前之緊急處分」,月旦法學雜誌,第86期,頁113-116(2002年7月)。
5. 6. 朱德芳,「論重整中公司之公司治理—以當事人之利害衝突與重整法治之目的為核心,兼論債權人於公司治理中之功能與地位」,東吳法律學報,第17卷第2期,頁193-248 (2005年12月)。
6. 7. 吳光陸,「假扣押執行與公司重整前之緊急處分」,月旦法學雜誌,第86期,頁113-116(2002年7月)。
7. 6. 朱德芳,「論重整中公司之公司治理—以當事人之利害衝突與重整法治之目的為核心,兼論債權人於公司治理中之功能與地位」,東吳法律學報,第17卷第2期,頁193-248 (2005年12月)。
8. 5. 王志誠,「公司重整法制—重整公司之治理、重整計畫及重整完成」,月旦法學教室,第39期,頁61至69(2006年1月)。
9. 5. 王志誠,「公司重整法制—重整公司之治理、重整計畫及重整完成」,月旦法學教室,第39期,頁61至69(2006年1月)。
10. 5. 王志誠,「公司重整法制—重整公司之治理、重整計畫及重整完成」,月旦法學教室,第39期,頁61至69(2006年1月)。
11. 4. 王志誠,「公司重整法制—重整之聲請程序、重整債權及重整債務」,月旦法學教室,第38期,頁68-79(2005年12月)。
12. 4. 王志誠,「公司重整法制—重整之聲請程序、重整債權及重整債務」,月旦法學教室,第38期,頁68-79(2005年12月)。
13. 4. 王志誠,「公司重整法制—重整之聲請程序、重整債權及重整債務」,月旦法學教室,第38期,頁68-79(2005年12月)。
14. 13. 柯瓊鳳、陳進榮,「從博達案探討重整法規與涉訟財產接管—掌握處理先機 保障債權恢復營運」,會計研究月刊,第225期,頁70-78(2004年8月)。
15. 13. 柯瓊鳳、陳進榮,「從博達案探討重整法規與涉訟財產接管—掌握處理先機 保障債權恢復營運」,會計研究月刊,第225期,頁70-78(2004年8月)。