臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

我國財務會計準則公報第35號「資產減損之會計處理準則」於2004年7月1日公佈，會計年度結束日期在2005年12月31日(含)以後之財務報表均適用之，並得提前適用。本論文的研究問題是比較提前適用35號公報而提列資產減損之公司與正式適用35號公報而提列資產減損之公司，其盈餘管理誘因及公司治理機制是否有所不同。

由國外相關文獻得知資產減損的本質有二：溝通私有資訊與自利行為。在溝通私有資訊下，管理者運用裁量權，傳遞尚未反映在歷史成本會計中之私有資訊，以增進盈餘之價值攸關性(Rees et al. 1996；Minnick 2004)；在自利行為下，管理者利用GAAP所允許之彈性，投機性地操縱盈餘，以達成洗大澡或平穩損益(Zucca et al. 1992；Riedl 2004)。

管理當局於我國資產減損公報的適用時點及提列金額上，擁有認列損失的裁量權，故公司治理機制是否能夠發揮興利及除弊之功能，當是有趣且投資大眾關心的議題。

本研究之實證模型係採用Riedl (2004)的分析方法，依據不同年度所得出之係數，該方程式可以檢測兩年度間估計係數的差異。其中盈餘管理誘因的變數包括洗大澡、平穩損益及負債比率；公司治理機制的變數包括獨立董事席次、獨立監察人席次、董事長兼任總經理、董事會規模及董監事持股比率。

實證結果發現提前適用公司有較低的盈餘管理誘因及較佳的公司治理機制，而正式適用公司有較高的盈餘管理誘因及較差的公司治理機制。此結果意味著提前適用公司提列資產減損的目的是在溝通私有資訊，亦即健全的管理當局會儘早反應資產的真實價值；而正式適用公司提列資產減損的目的是為了自利行為，亦即投機的管理當局會運用裁量權操縱損益。此結果更隱約意味著公司治理機制在資產減損公報的適用時點及提列金額上扮演興利及除弊的角色，使管理當局儘快傳遞私有資訊以降低資訊不對稱的問題，並且抑制自利行為以減少代理成本的問題，故公司治理機制在資產價值減損的提列上發揮監督之功能。

本論文對於資產減損及公司治理監督盈餘管理的相關研究具有貢獻，其結果可供準則制定者參考。

Taiwan’s Financial Accounting Standards Committee of the Accounting Research and Development Foundation issued SFAS No.35, “Accounting for Asset Impairment,” in July 2004. This accounting standard was effective for financial year ending after December 31, 2005, with early adoption encouraged. The primary objective of this paper is to contrast the earnings management incentives and corporate governance mechanisms of impaired asset write-down firms that adopt the standard in 2004 (early adopters) and 2005 (late adopters).

Based on the literature before, there are two characteristics about write-downs. One is the information signaling perspective, write-downs help managers to convey the private information about the underlying economics beyond the historical cost accounting (Rees et al. 1996；Minnick 2004). The other is the opportunistic behavior perspective, write-downs are employed by managers to engage in “big bath” or “income smoothing” reporting behavior (Zucca et al. 1992；Riedl 2004).

The issuance of SFAS No. 35 allows managers to exercise discretion over the timing and amount of asset write-downs. We investigate whether corporate governance mechanisms are likely to reduce information asymmetry problems and agency cost problems. The contrast of impaired asset write-downs across the two years is an interesting question.

This study adapts a methodology proposed by Riedl (2004) to examine whether earnings management incentives and corporate governance mechanisms dominate the reported write-down firms between 2004 and 2005. The stacking of the equations allows statistical tests of differences in coefficient estimates across the two years. In our research, earnings management incentives variables include BATH, SMOOTH and DEBT; corporate governance mechanisms variables include IB, IS, SAME, BN and BH.

Empirical results reveal that early adopters are associated with lower earnings management incentives and better corporate governance mechanisms, and late adopters are associated with higher earnings management incentives and worse corporate governance mechanisms. These results imply that early adopters use reporting flexibility to reveal their private information about the true value of the firm; alternatively, late adopters use this discretion opportunistically distort the underlying economics of the firm. Moreover, these results suggest that corporate governance mechanisms are introduced to communicate private information and reduce the information asymmetry between the firm and its investors. Meanwhile, the mechanisms are also designed to limit opportunistic behavior and reduce the agency cost between managers and all stakeholders. We argue that corporate governance mechanisms restrict earnings management incentives on the impaired asset write-downs.

This paper contributes to the literature on asset impairments and corporate governance limit earnings management. The results of this study should be of interest to Taiwan’s Financial Accounting Standards Committee due to the multiyear adoption policy.

目錄
摘要…………………………………………………………………………………I
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………II
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………IV


第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………1

第一節 研究動機與目的……………………………………………………1
第二節 研究問題……………………………………………………………3
第三節 研究架構……………………………………………………………5

第二章 文獻探討……………………………………………………………7

第一節 資產減損……………………………………………………………7
第二節 公司治理與盈餘管理………………………………………………11

第三章 研究方法……………………………………………………………16

第一節 觀念性架構與研究假說……………………………………………16
第二節 實證模型與變數定義………………………………………………18
第三節 資料分析方法………………………………………………………21
第四節 研究期間、資料來源與樣本選取…………………………………22

第四章 實證結果與分析……………………………………………………25

第一節 敘述統計分析………………………………………………………25
第二節 相關係數分析………………………………………………………25
第三節 Tobit 模型分析……………………………………………………30

第五章 結論與建議…………………………………………………………33

第一節 研究結論與貢獻……………………………………………………33
第二節 研究限制與建議……………………………………………………34

參考文獻………………………………………………………………………35

圖1-1 資產減損觀念………………………………………………………4
圖1-2 研究流程圖…………………………………………………………6
圖3-1 觀念性架構圖………………………………………………………17

表3-1 變數定義……………………………………………………………21
表3-2 樣本選取……………………………………………………………23
表3-3 樣本公司產業分布…………………………………………………24
表4-1 敘述統計分析………………………………………………………26
表4-2 相關係數分析………………………………………………………28
表4-3 Tobit 模型分析……………………………………………………32

一、中文部分

吳清在與謝宛庭，2005，認列資產減損時點與金額之決定因素及市場反應，2005會計理論與實務研討會，台北。
林有志與廖宜鋒，2005，公司提前採用資產減損公報之盈餘管理動機，2005會計理論與實務研討會，台北。
財團法人中華民國會計研究發展基金會，2004年，財務會計準則公報第35號公報：《資產減損之會計處理準則》，台北：財務會計準則委員會。
馬于雯，2004，我國公司治理、盈餘管理與盈餘資訊性之關聯，私立淡江大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
戚務君與馬瑜霙，2005，我國獨立董事以及獨立監察人制度對異常應計影響之研究，金融風險管理季刊，第一卷第1期：35-60。
陳錦村與葉雅薰，2002，公司改組、監督機制與盈餘管理之研究，會計評論，第34期：1-29。
劉泰麟，2004，公司治理之增額除弊效果，私立東海大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
蘇玟夙，2003，上市公司董事會特性與盈餘管理程度關聯性之研究，國立高雄第一科技大學財務管理研究所未出版碩士論文。

二、英文部分

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