臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　企業所有權與經營權分離產生代理問題，代理問題的存在必須提供適當的激勵或監督機制來防止高階經理人追求個人自身利益的行為；高階經理人薪酬契約的設計，可用以降低代理問題，使高階經理人與股東之利益更為一致。近年來，我國陸續爆發上市公司挪用資產或造假帳的案件，這些財務危機公司較可能藉由盈餘管理手段來操縱盈餘，俾提昇個人薪酬水準。
　　本研究旨在以公司治理角度，探討財務危機公司高階經理人之薪酬政策；研究目的有三：（1）探討財務危機公司相較於正常公司，高階經理人的薪酬是否較高；（2）探討財務危機公司之公司治理機制是否對高階經理人薪酬產生影響；（3）探討財務危機公司相較於正常公司，公司治理變數對高階經理人薪酬之敏感性是否具增額效果。
　　以1999年至2005年間發生財務危機之上市櫃公司為研究對象，以危機發生年度前三年為研究期間，並採用相同產業及規模相近之配對方式選取配對正常公司。
　　本研究之實證結果顯示如下：
一、財務危機公司之高階經理人薪酬水準，雖較正常公司高，但未達顯著性。
二、董事長兼任總經理、董事會規模和機構投資人持股比例與財務危機公司之高階經理人薪酬具顯著關係。
三、財務危機虛擬變數和董事長兼任總經理之交互項顯著為正，財務危機虛擬變數和高階經理人持股比例之交互項顯著為負，指出財務危機公司之董事長兼任總經理和高階經理人持股比例對高階經理人薪酬之敏感性具增額效果。

　　Since Jensen and Meckling（1976）proposed the terminology of agency theory, the academics and practioners realized that the agency problem exists in corporations because ownership is separated from management. Consequently, a company must provide monitoring mechanisms or encouragement strategies to prevent the high-level management from emphasizing their own benefits rather than maximizing stockholders’ wealth. The compensation contract for high-level management can reduce the agency problem, and cause the interest of the high-level management consistent with those of stockholders. Recently, there have been many financial scandals occurred in Taiwan owing to the managers seized the assets of the company. For those financially distressed firms, some of the high-level management manipulated corporate earnings to raise their compensations.
　　This study attempts to examine the compensation policy for high-level management of the financially distressed firms from the perspectives of corporate governance. The main purpose has classified into three sub-objectives. First, to explore whether the compensations of high-level management for financially distressed firms are higher than those for non-distressed firms. Second, to examine whether corporate governance has an impact on the compensations of high-level management. Finally, to investigate the sensitivity of corporate governance parameters to the compensations of high-level management and examine whether there is a significant difference between the financially distressed firms and non-distressed firms.
　　This work selects 104 firms in Taiwan which experienced seriously financial distress during the period of 1999 to 2005 and included the three-year period prior to the company experienced financial distress. For comparing purposes, this investigation chooses another 104 non-distressed firms in the same industry which have the similar size as the distressed firms as the matching samples.
　　The empirical results are as follows:
1.The compensations for high-level management of the financially distressed firms are insignificantly higher that those for the non-distressed firms.
2.The findings indicate that the three parameters such as the chairman of the board also pluralized as the CEO of the company, the number of the board members and the percentage of the institutional investors to total investors all have significant relationships with the compensations of high-level management for the financially distressed firms.
3.The interaction of the financially distressed factors has a significantly positive relationship with the chairman of the board also pluralized as CEO. However, the interaction of the financially distressed factors have significantly negative relationship with the percentage of the number of common stocks owned by CEOs to total investors. The findings also suggest that the sensitivity of the chairman of the board also pluralized as the CEO of the company and the percentage of CEOs to the compensations for CEOs of the financially distressed firms have incremental effects.

摘要...I
摘要(英文)...II
目錄...V
表目錄...VI
圖目錄...VI

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究流程 3
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 代理理論與薪酬契約 5
第二節 高階經理人薪酬相關文獻 5
第三節 財務危機相關文獻 13
第三章 研究方法 18
第一節 研究架構 18
第二節 研究假說 18
第三節 變數定義與實證模型 21
第四節 樣本選取與資料來源 27
第五節 資料分析方法 31
第六節 預期實證結果 32
第四章 實證結果與分析 33
第一節 敘述性統計分析 33
第二節 實證結果分析 41
第五章 結論與建議 55
第一節 結論 55
第二節 研究限制 56
第三節 對後續研究者之建議 56
參考文獻 58
中文文獻 58
英文文獻 60
附錄 64

表目錄
表2-1　高階經理人薪酬與董事會組成之相關文獻彙整表 7
表2-2　高階經理人薪酬與股權結構之相關文獻彙整表 9
表2-3　高階經理人薪酬與公司規模之相關文獻彙整表 10
表2-4　高階經理人薪酬與公司風險之相關文獻彙整表 11
表2-5　高階經理人薪酬與公司成長機會之相關文獻彙整表 12
表2-6　財務危機定義之相關文獻彙整表 14
表2-7　財務危機與董事會組成之相關文獻彙整表 15
表2-8　財務危機與股權結構之相關文獻彙整表 16
表3-1　變數衡量 25
表3-2　樣本篩選過程彙整表 28
表3-3　樣本公司產業及年度分佈彙整表 30
表3-4　預期實證結果彙整表 32
表4-1　敘述性統計 35
表4-2　兩群體平均數檢定 37
表4-3　財務危機公司相關係數矩陣 39
表4-4　全部樣本相關係數矩陣 40
表4-5　財務危機前三年合計迴歸模型一之實證結果 42
表4-6　財務危機前三年各年度迴歸模型一之實證結果 45
表4-7　迴歸模型一變數顯著性彙整表 47
表4-8　財務危機前三年合計迴歸模型二之實證結果 49
表4-9　財務危機前三年各年度迴歸模型二之實證結果 51
表4-10　迴歸模型二變數顯著性彙整表 53
表4-11　研究結果彙整表 54
附表A　財務危機公司和正常公司之樣本配對表 64


圖目錄
圖1-1　研究流程圖 4
圖3-1　研究架構圖 18

中文文獻
王嘉穎（2000），「我國上市公司財務危機與監理因素之關聯性研究－實質所有權之探討」，國立臺灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
江宜璋（2000），「失敗公司事件前之風險與報酬分析」，國立中山大學企業管理學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
吳政穎（2000），「我國上市公司股權集中度、薪酬設計與公司經營績效關係之研究」，國立政治大學企業管理研究所未出版博士論文。
呂紹強（2000），「企業財務危機預警模式之研究－以財務及非財務因素構建」，私立淡江大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文
李勤修（2003），「董事會特性與財務危機之關係研究」，私立中國文化大學國際企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
卓怡如（1996），「財務危預警模型之建立－以上市及未上市公司為例」，國立臺灣大學財務金融學研究所未出版碩士論文。
周順賢（1993），「產業訊息及財務穩定性對財務危機模式之實證研究」，私立淡江大學管理科學研究所未出版碩士論文。
官志凱（1999），「從財務比率、更換會計師、會計師查核意見及報告落後探討上市公司之財務危機」，國立中央大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
林佳穎（2002），「財務危機公司特性與公司治理之探討」，國立臺灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
林峰成（1996），「臺灣上市公司高階主管酬勞,公司績效與控制權型態之關聯性實證研究」，國立中正大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
林穎芬（1988），「民營企業最高主管報酬與公司績效之研究」，國立中山大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
施念恕（1996），「會計盈餘、股價與高階主管薪酬之相關性研究」，國立中興大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
徐欣怡（2004），「股權結構、高階管理者薪酬與公司價值之研究」，國立中興大學企業管理學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
許秀靜（2000），「我國財務危機上市公司股權結構之探討」，國立中央大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
郭勁甫（2004），「公司治理對投資與公司價值間關聯性和高階主管薪酬之影響」，國立中正大學財務金融研究所未出版碩士論文。
陳俊勛（2001），「上市公司高階主管薪酬與公司經營績效、風險之關係實證研究」，私立淡江大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
陳隆麒（1992），現代財務管理—理論與應用。台北：華泰書局。
陳碧滋（2001），「我國上市公司股價行為與董監因素關連性之探討」，國立臺灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
陳肇榮（1983），「運用財務比率預測企業財務危機之實證研究」，國立政治大學財政研究所未出版博士論文。
傅鍾仁、歐進士、張寶光（2000），「我國企業經理人薪酬與其經營績效之實證」，台灣經濟學會2000年年會論文。
曾玉潔（2000），「我國高階主管薪酬決定因素之實証研究」，國立中正大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
辜秋屏（1987），「高階主管酬勞與公司績效之實證研究」，國立台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
黃旭輝（1997），「公司成長機會對經理人持股、報償與董事監察人組成影響之研究」，國立政治大學企業管理研究所未出版博士論文。
熊大中（2000），「我國企業財務危機與董監股權質押關連性之研究」，國立成功大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
劉容慈（2002），「整合公司治理、會計資訊與總體經濟敏感度之財務危機模型」，私立輔仁大學金融研究所未出版碩士論文。
劉淑芬（2004），「我國企業經營者薪酬與經營風險之關聯性」，私立逢甲大學保險研究所未出版碩士論文。
潘玉葉（1990），「台灣股票上市公司財務危機預警分析」，私立淡江大學管理科學研究所未出版博士論文。
鄭為庠（1992），「高階主管薪酬計畫與薪酬決定因素之研究」，國立政治大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
蕭虹茹（2001），「管理當局薪酬與相對績效關係之研究」，國立成功大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
儲蕙文（1996），「我國上市公司財務預警制度之研究」，國立政治大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
謝明翰（1999），「企業成長機會與融資政策、股利政策及高階主管報酬之關聯性研究」，國立臺灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
英文文獻
Agarwal, N. (1981), “Determinants of Executive Compensation,” Industrial Relations, pp.36-46.
Altman, E. I. (1968), “Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy,” Journal of Finance, 23, pp.589-600.
Antle, R. and A. Smith (1986), “An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives,” Journal of Accounting Research, 24(1), pp.1-39.
Beaver, W. H. (1966), “Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure,” Journal of Accounting Research, 4, pp.71-111.
Berle, A. A. and G. C. Means (1932), The Modern Corporate and Private Property, New York: Macmillan.
Bizjak, J. M., J. M. Brickley, and J. L. Coles (1993), “Stock-Based Incentive Compensation and Investment Behavior,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, pp.349-372.
Blum, M. (1974), “Failing Company Discriminant-Analysis,” Journal of Accounting Research, 12(spring), pp.1-25.
Boyd, B. K. (1994), “Board Control and CEO Compensation,” Strategic Management Journal, 15(5), pp.335-344.
Coats, P. K. and L. F. Fant (1993), “Recognizing Financial Distress Patterns Using a Neural Network Tool,” Financial Management, 22(autumn), pp.142-165.
Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker (1999), “Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance,” Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), pp.371-406.
Coughlan, A. T. and R. M. Schmidt (1985), “Compensation, Management Turnover Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, pp.43-66.
Daily, C. M. and D. R. Dalton (1994), “Bankruptcy and Corporate Governance: The Impact of Board Composition and Structure,” Academy of Management Journal, 37, pp.1603-1617.
_____ and _____ (1994), “Corporate Governance and the Bankrupt Firm: An Empirical Assessment,” Strategic Management Journal, 15, pp.643-654.
Deakin, E. B. (1972), “A Discriminant Analysis of Predicators of Business Failure,” Journal of Accounting Research, 10, pp.167-179.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989), “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” Academy of Management Review, 14, pp.57-74.
Fama, E. F. (1980), “Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm,” Journal of Political Economy, 88, pp.288-307.
_____ and M. C. Jensen (1983), “Separation of Ownership and Control,” Journal of Law and Economics, 26, pp.301-326.
Finkelstein, S. and D. C. Hambrick (1988), “Chief Executive Compensation: A Synthesis and Reconciliation,” Strategic Management Journal, 9(6), pp.543-558.
_____ and _____ (1989), “Chief Executive Compensation: A Study of the Intersection of Markets and Political Processes,” Strategic Management Journal, 10(2), pp.121-134.
Fox, H. (1983), Top Executives’ Compensation: The Conference Board, New York.
Gaver, J. F. and K. M. Gaver (1993), “Additional Evidence on the Association between the Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16, pp.125-160.
_____ and _____ (1995), “Compensation Policy and the Investment Opportunity Set,” Financial Management, 24, pp.19-32.
Gentry, J. A., P. Newbold, and D. T. Whitford (1985), “Classifying Bankrupt Firms with Funds Flow Components,” Journal of Accounting Research, 23(spring), pp.146-160.
Healy, P. M. (1985), “The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, pp.85-107.
Hill, C. W. and P. Phan (1991), “CEO Tenure as a Determinant of CEO Pay,” Academic of Management Journal, 34(3), pp.707-717.
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp.305-360.
Koh, H. (1991), “Model Predictions and Auditor Assessments of Going Concern Status,” Accounting and Business Research, 3, pp.331-338.
Lambert, R. A. and D. F. Larcker (1987), “An Analysis of the Use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts,” Journal of Accounting Research, 25(supplement), pp.85-129.
Lau, A. H. L. (1987), “A Five-State Financial Distress Prediction Model,” Journal of Accounting Research, 25(spring), pp.127-138.
Masson, R. T. (1971), “Executive Motivation, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance,” Journal of Political Economy, 79, pp.1278-1292.
Meharn, H. (1995), “Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance,” Journal of Financial Economics, 38, pp.163-184.
Murphy, K. J. (1985), “Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration-An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, pp.11-42.
_____ (1998), “Executive Compensation,” Working Paper, University of Southern California.
Oviatt, B. M. (1988), “Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manager-Shareholder Relationship: Incentive for Congruent Interests,” Academy of Management, 13(2), pp.214-225.
Pfeffer, J. (1972), “Size and Composition of Corporate Boards-of-Directors-The Organization and Its Environment,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 3, pp.218-228.
Rappaport, A. (1986), Creating Shareholder Value: The New Standard for Business Performance. New York: Free Press.
Salancik, G. R. and J. Pfeffer (1980), “Effects of Ownership and Performance on Executive Tenure in U.S. Corporations,” Academy of Management Journal, 23(4), pp.653-664.
Simon, H. A. (1957), “Compensation of Executives,” Sociometry, 20, pp.123-139.
Singh, H. and F. Harianto (1989), “Top Management Tenure, Corporate Ownership Structure and the Magnitude of Golden Parachutes,” Strategic Management Journal, 10(special issue), pp.143-156.
Sloan, R. G. (1993), “Accounting Earnings and Top Executive Compensation,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16, pp.55-100.
Smith, C. and R. Watts (1992), “The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend and Compensation Policies,” Journal of Financial Economics, 32, pp.263-292.
Warner, J. B., R. L. Watts, and K. H. Wruck (1988), “Stock Price and Top Management Changes,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.461-492.
Watts, R. and J. L. Zimmerman (1986), Positive Accounting Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Weisbach, M. S. (1988), “Outside Directors and CEO Turnover,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.431-460.
Zahra, S. A. and J. A. Pearce (1989), “Board of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and Integrated Model,” Journal of Management, 15, pp.291-334.
Zmijewski, M. E. (1984), “Methodological Issues Related to the Estimation of Financial Distress Prediction Models,” Journal of Accounting Research, 22, pp.59-86.