本文將探討公司經理人在做決策時，由於經理人是風險趨避者，他本身會傾向一昧地投資無風險的投資計畫案，但股東不樂見於此。因為股東會比較想投資NPV為正的投資計畫案。而不是投資無風險的計畫案。在雙方出現了權益代理問題，因此股東將藉由契約設計來促使公司經理人選擇正確的投資計畫案也藉由契約設計來減少權益方面之代理問題。本篇將以Lambert（1986）為基礎，將代理問題再細分成兩類，藉由賽局理論的分析，來探討股東如何設計契約，經理人知道契約之後如何做決策。

This paper will investigate the problem that a risk aversive manager invariably invest in riskless projects when making decisions. But the principle will not willing to see it due to preferring the project with positive net present value to riskless projects. To solve this equity-agent problem, principle will design a contract to induce manager to choose the best project, and hence diminish the agency problem. Here we will take the study of Lambert (1986) as a base, and separate the agency problem into two parts. By using the game theory analysis, we are going to discuss the problem that how the principle designs the contract, and how the manager makes the decision when facing the contract.

第一章 緒論
第一節 研究背景……………………………………………1
第二節　研究動機與研究目的………………………………4
第二章 文獻回顧
第一節 代理問題文獻回顧…………………………………7
第二節　訊號發射文獻回顧…………………………………13
第三章 模型設計與無代理問題模型分析
第一節 模型設計……………………………………………17
第二節 最佳解………………………………………………18
第三節 代理問題分析………………………………………19
第四章 代理問題與最適契約
第一節　逆選擇情況分析……………………………………25
第二節 雙重代理問題之均衡分析………………………………31
第三節 均衡解分析…………………………………………33
第五章 結論與建議………………………………………………37
附錄…………………………………………………………………39
參考文獻……………………………………………………………45

Akerlof G. , （1970） “The Market for Lemons:Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, ” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488-500
Bascha A. and U. Walz ,（2001） “Genvertible securities and optimal exit decision in venture capital finance,” Journal of Corporate Finance 7, 285-306
Bester H, （1994） “The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation, ” Journal of Money Credit and Banking 26, 72-86
Bernardo A.E. and H. Cai and J. Luo, （2001） “Capital Budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard,” Journal of Financial Economics 61, 311-344
Hayne E. Leland and David H. Pyle (1977), “Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation,” The Journal of Finance, 32
Jensen, M.C. and W. Meckling , （1976） “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and capital structure,” Journal of Economics 3, 305-360
Kanniainen V. and C. Keuschnigg (2003) “The optimal portfolio of start-up firms in venture capital finance, ” Journal of Corporate Finance 9, 521-534
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt（1989）, “Agency Theory：An Assessment and Review, ”　Academy of Management Review, vol.14,No.1 p59.
Lambert R.A , （1986） “Executive effort and selection of risky projects, ”Rand Journal of Economics 17, 77-88
Myers S. and N. Majluf, （1984） “Corporate Financing and Investment decisions when Firms have information that investors do no have,” Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-221
Park C. , （2000） “Monitoring and Structure of Debt Contracts,” Journal of Finance 5, 2157-2195
Rasmusen, E. (1994). Games and information, 2nd ed., Blackwell Publishers Inc., Cambridge, MA.
Sinha U. B. ,(2001) “International joint venture, licensing and buy-out under asymmetric information,” Journal of Development Economics 66, 127-151
Smirnov V. and A. Wait ,(2004) “Hold-up and sequential specific investments,” Rand Journal of economics 35, 386-400
Stephen A. Ross , （1977） “The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signaling Approach,” The Bell Journal of Economics 8, 23-40
Stewart C. Myers , （1977） “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing,” Journal of Economics 5, 147-175
Wang S. and H. Zhou , （2004） “Staged financing in venture capital: moral hazard and risks,” Journal of Corporate Finance 10, 131-155