臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究主要目的在估計員工認股權與公司未來盈餘之關係，以檢驗員工認股權能否激勵出公司短期的超額獲利或提升公司之人力資本形成長期超額獲利。因此，本研究視員工認股權為一種企業資產，並假定企業之有形與無形資產投入能為企業產生資產報酬 (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996)。
本研究以2001年至2005年間曾發行員工認股選擇權之台灣上市(櫃)公司為研究樣本，並以營業淨利作為員工認股權之資產報酬。
實證結果發現，當期(t)與前一期(t-1)之員工認股權對當期公司盈餘不具顯著解釋能力。前二期(t-2)與前三期(t-3)之員工認股權對當期公司盈餘則具有正向顯著解釋能力。
本研究進一步以因素分析對員工認股權萃取出兩個因素，稱為短期激勵因素與長期提升因素。將短期激勵因素與長期提升因素代替員工認股權變數，重新對營業淨利進行迴歸分析。實證發現，短期激勵因素對營業淨利不具顯著解釋能力。長期提升因素對營業淨利則具有正向顯著解釋能力。

This study estimates the relation between the value of annual ESO grants and firms’ future earnings to examine whether the short-term excess profit is motivated or the human capital is raised by the ESO grants. Therefore, we view ESO grants as an asset and posit a production function that reflects the fundamental relation between the value of corporate assets and the payoff generated from these assets (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996).
In this study, we adopt the listed firms (TAIEX) that have ever granted ESO compensations during the period 2001-2005 and infer the payoff to ESO grants from operating earnings. The empirical results are summarized as follows.
The regression results indicate the firms’ earnings can not be improved significantly from current year ESO grants and the last year ESO grants. However, the ESO granted both at the last 2 year and last 3 year significantly improve the firm’s earnings.
We farther use factor analysis to extract two ESO factors, namely the short-term motivator and the long-term advance. The regression results indicate again that there is a significantly positive association between the long-term advance factor and the firms’ earnings. However, there is no significantly positive association between the sort-term motivator factor and the firms’ earnings.

目錄
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 智慧資本相關文獻 6
第二節 人力資本相關文獻 10
第三節 員工認股選擇權相關文獻 14
第三章 研究設計 21
第一節 研究假說 21
第二節 變數定義 23
第三節 實證模型 27
第四節 樣本選取與資料來源 29
第四章 實證結果與分析 30
第一節 敘述性統計分析 30
第二節 員工認股選擇權與公司盈餘報導之實證結果 38
第三節 實證問題探討 40
第五章 研究結論與建議 47
第一節 研究結論 47
第二節 研究限制 49
第三節 研究建議 50
參考文獻 51
圖表目錄
圖1-1 研究流程圖 5
表4-1 發行員工認股選擇權對94年度營業淨利之影響 31
表4-2 發行員工認股選擇權次數對94年度營業淨利之影響 33
表4-3 員工認股選擇權之價值 34
表4-4 94年度營業淨利與各變數之敘述性統計 36
表4-5 員工認股選擇權價值與94年度營業淨利之敘述性統計 36
表4-6 Pearson 相關分析 37
表4-7 樣本實證結果 39
表4-8 分別萃取ESO、RD與AD之因素後，迴歸分析結果 44
表4-9 同時萃取RD與AD之因素後，迴歸分析結果 45
表4-10 同時萃取ESO、RD與AD之因素後，迴歸分析結果 46

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