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研究生:韓天德
研究生(外文):Han, Tien Der
論文名稱:OptimalnumberoffirmstocolludeinaCournotmarket
論文名稱(外文):Optimal Number of Firms to Collude in a Cournot Market
指導教授:林啟智林啟智引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chi-Chih Lin
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:佛光人文社會學院
系所名稱:經濟學系
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2006
畢業學年度:94
語文別:英文
論文頁數:40
中文關鍵詞:勾結社會福利最適處罰古諾市場
外文關鍵詞:collusionsocial welfareoptiaml sanctioncournot market
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  本研究探討在古諾(Cournot)市場、同質廠商與線性需求函數的假設下,最適的結合組織成員數,以及結合組織對社會福利的影響。
  研究結果顯示,不論市場規模的大小,若對結合行為的處罰不存在,則結合組織將有動機勾結市場上的所有廠商達到獨占以獲取最大利潤。若將結合行為的外部性視為結合組織必須面對的處罰,則結合組織在成立時考慮的就不只是利潤,同時也會考慮它必須面對的處罰而間接考慮社會福利的變化,進而促使結合組織僅會結合市場上 34% 的廠商而非所有廠商來獲取最高利潤,同時增加社會福利。簡單的說,透過對結合組織的處罰,結合行為的外部性因而被內部化。所以,若一個結合組織會成立,則該結合組織對社會福利必然有益,一個對社會福利有害的結合組織則一定不會成立。
  另外,一個結合組織若要對社會福利有益,則其市場佔有率就不能太高。然而,一個市場占有率不高的結合組織並沒有辦法使其成員廠商在結合後擁有較結合前更高的利潤。若廠商在結合後無法獲取更高的利潤,則廠商就沒有動機成立結合組織。因此,對社會福利有益的結合組織未必會成立。本模型中的結合組織即是因此而皆不會成立,即使是考慮對結合行為的處罰後仍對社會福利有利的結合組織,因為其偏低的市場占有率無法使其成員廠商在結合後較結合前獲取更高利潤。此外,市場規模的大小對結合組織的成立與否也有很大影響,因為市場規模愈大,結合組織的必須市場佔有率就愈高,因此,市場規模愈大,結合組織就愈難成立。
This paper is based on linear demand and traditional Cournot model. There are n identical firms in a market producing homogenous goods.
The results of this paper show that no matter what the size of a market is, a cartel will collude with all firms in a market to make the highest profits when there is no sanction. When the externality of collusion is viewed as sanction and imposed on a cartel, the cartel will take profits and social welfare into consideration simultaneously. Thus a cartel will collude with 34% of firms instead of all firms in the market to not only make the highest profits but also create the highest social welfare. That is, the externality of collusion is internalized by the sanction. Therefore, if a cartel is formed, then the cartel is efficient, while a cartel will not be formed if it is inefficient.
If a cartel is efficient, the market share of it must be small. However, the required market share of a cartel has to be large enougha cartel to with small market share can not make its member firms more profitable than how they are when they do not participate in the cartel. Without higher profits, firms are lack of incentives to collude. Thus an efficient cartel will not necessarily be formed. Therefore,That is also the reason why no cartel in our model will be formed in every size of the market even though the cartel itself is profitable and socially desired after the sanction is imposed. Moreover, the size of a market is also crucial to collusion because the bigger a market is, the larger the required market share of a cartel has to be. Therefore, the bigger the market is, the harder the cartel is formed.
CHINESE ABSTRACT....................................................I
ABSTRACT...........................................................II
INDEX.............................................................III
1. INTRODUCTION.....................................................4

2. THE MODEL........................................................5
2.1. STAGE 1........................................................5
2.2. STAGE 2........................................................6
2.3 COMPARISON......................................................7
2.3.1 Quantity......................................................7
2.3.2. Profit.......................................................8
2.3.3 Market equilibrium............................................9

3. DISCUSSION ON SOCIAL WELFARE AND SANCTIONS......................11
3.1 DEFINITION OF OPTIMAL SANCTION AND EFFICIENCY..................11
3.2 THREE MAJOR ISSUES.............................................18
3.2.1 A sufficient condition for firms to collude..................18
3.2.2 Change of net external social welfare........................20
3.2.3 Sanction.....................................................22
3.3 CONFIRMATION...................................................24

4. OPTIMAL NUMBER OF FIRMS TO COLLUDE AND TWO IMPORTANT RESULTS....25

5. LIMITATIONS IN THIS STUDY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH...26

6. CONCLUSION......................................................27

APPENDIX A TABLES..................................................29

APPENDIX B EQUATIONS...............................................37

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