臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在競爭激烈的市場中不但要保持公司的成長，還要確立公司的經營是有利潤的，要維持這樣的競爭優勢有賴於經營者對市場的敏銳，以及不斷的隨著市場的改變，調整公司的策略。設立分公司固然能夠增加市場的佔有率，但是毫無限制的增加分公司的數量並不能真正為公司帶來利潤，甚至有可能為公司帶來災難。本文主要是以 Huck et al. (2000) 為模型基礎，以簡單之二階段賽局理論分析。多派出的競爭代表，會使得這家廠商整體佔有率增加，並且對於廠商也是有所收益的。另外，文中將會以臺灣的殯葬業為例，在投入成本的調整的推論下對於殯葬業的品質改善，也有正面的意義。本文所得的結論為設立分公司的廠商投入成本低於未設立分公司的廠商，並且看市場的競爭對手有多少，彈性的調整分公司的數量已達到利潤最大，這即是廠商部門化的最適策略。

That company were maintains for progress and establish the profit in market
competes, that for maintain the competes advantage require the superintendent's sense to the market, and constantly adjustmant strategic with the market of competition. To make divisionlize will enhance the effect to profitable but if unlimite to increase the number of firm can't get their benefit, even through make balefulness to the firm. This paper we according to Huck et al. (2000)'s model to analyse the simple games of two stage. The firm sends many agents will increase the firm's profitable. In addition, we consider a example of burial rites in Taiwan. That for improvement quality to adjust the firm's cost will taking the benefit, in this conclusion's present that the firm's cost for send agents less then the firm's cost for non to send agents and concern the number of enemys to maximize firm profit that adjustment the number of divisions. This is divisionalization's optimal strategic.

目 錄
中文摘要 Ⅰ
英文摘要 Ⅱ
目錄 Ⅲ
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 前言 1
第二節 研究動機與目的 3
第三節 研究方法與研究架構 4
第二章 文獻回顧 6
第一節 相關文獻 6
第二節 完全非合作的直營 7
第三節 合作的直營 8
第四節 小結 9
第三章 模型 10
第四章 部門化後廠商之間投入成本的比較 12

Ⅲ
第五章 直營店的最適家數 15
第六章 結論 17
參考文獻 19
附錄 21

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