臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

摘要
本文延伸Huck el. (2001) 設立分支部門競爭模型 (divisionalization in contests model) ，在Cournot寡占競爭下，參競的廠商有總量的限制，廠商能選擇設立分支部門，取得市場競爭優勢，以設立分支部門本身投入與利潤間的角力為關注的焦點，並尋求利潤極大解。
本文可分為二階段賽局，在完全資訊的情況下以回溯法 (backward induction) 求解，先由第二階段：在Cournot寡占競爭下，以各廠商選擇投入水準為變數參與市場競爭，試圖求出利潤極大的最佳反應函數。再代回第一階段：市場上有二組競爭廠商，一組是設立一家直營店 (one division) 的廠商，家數為n-k家，另一組是設立二家直營店 (two division) 的廠商，家數為k家，並求得最適策略下的利潤極大、投入水準以及設立二家直營店廠商的家數 (k值) 間之相關性，達到納許均衡下的最適策略 (optimal strategy) 。
從均衡的最適策略下，歸納出下列結論：設立二家直營店廠商的投入水準小於設立一家直營店廠商的投入水準，顯示設立二家直營店能提升競爭力；設立二家直營店廠商的家數增加，會使設立二家直營店廠商的投入水準上升，而使設立一家直營店廠商的投入水準下降；當投入水準增加時，廠商利潤會下降；若設立二家直營店廠商的家數增加，會使均衡利潤下降；在 之間，至少存在一個k值使利潤極大。

ABSTRACT
This paper extended the study of Huck el. (2001) on the divisionalization in contests model. In this model, the manufacturers compete with each other in homogeneous production under Cournot Oligopoly competition. After analyzing the experiences of most competitive markets, it is reasonable to set a restriction with total amount of manufacturers. And the competitors can set up the proper divisionalization in contests while joining the competition. They will seek for the maximum profits after the cost and profit of divisionalization counteract.
We set up a competition of two groups of manufacturer on the market, and divided this research into two stage Game Theory. Then we used, in case of complete information, the backward induction to resolve the function. At the first stage, one of the competitors doesn't set up any branch department (called one division) , and another sets up a branch department (called two division). We describe the former having n-k number of manufacturers, and the latter having k number of manufacturers. Both of the two groups of manufacturer have homogeneous production. And in the second stage, every manufacturer will choose to effort according the parameter in the Cournot Oligopoly competition. They will try to pursuit the maximum profit while reaching the Nash equilibrium to optimal strategy.
The following are the conclusion of this research in Cournot equilibrium: The effort of two division is smaller than one division. In other word, it can promote the manufacturers' competitive capacity for them to set up a proper number of branch departments. The effort of two division will increase by the increasing number of two division and the effort of one division will decrease by the increasing number of two division. The profit will decrease by the increasing effort. The profit will decrease by the increasing number of two division. When number of two division at 1<k<(n+1)/3, there exist at least one k value that can make the maximum profit come true.

目錄
中文摘要……………………………………………………………Ⅰ
英文摘要……………………………………………………………Ⅱ
目錄 …………………………………………………………………Ⅲ
圖表目錄 ………………………………………………………… Ⅴ
第一章 緒論…………………………………………………… 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 …………………………………………1
第二節 研究方法與架構 …………………………………………2
第二章 文獻回顧 ………………………………………………5
第一節 設立分支部門的相關變數 ………………………………5
第二節 設立分支部門的競爭態勢 ………………………………7
第三節 設立分支部門間的合作解與不合作解…………………10
第四節 小結 …………………………………………………… 14
第三章 理論模型與均衡分析 ………………………………16
第一節 模型基本架構 …………………………………………16
第二節 市場競爭下的均衡分析 ………………………………18
第四章 設立二家直營店廠商的最適家數…………………23
第一節 一般求解 ……………………………………………… 23
第二節 數值求解 ………………………………………………24
第五章 結論與建議…………………………………………… 31
第一節 結論 …………………………………………………… 31
第二節 建議 ……………………………………………………32
參考文獻 ……………………………………………………………33
數學附錄 ……………………………………………………………35

參考文獻
[中文部分]
曾彥賓 (2002) ，<台灣連鎖產業連鎖體系成長模式之研究>，國立屏東科技大學，工業管理研究所碩士論文
林敏雄 (2004) ，<異質產品、n家品牌與研發投入>，私立佛光人文社會學院，經濟學研究所碩士論文
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