臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

上市審議委員會為公司申請上市過程中，專業且獨立的外部決策單位，過去鮮有研究探討審議委員所扮演的中介角色，能否降低資訊不對稱進而促進資本市場的發展。台灣證券交易所於每次審核公司申請上市時，由3-4位交易所內部人士，以及8位以上專業外部人士組成委員會審議。本研究鎖定上市審議委員會開會相關資訊，包括投票結果、詢問事項、建議事項，探究影響審議委員投票因素，以及委員會投票結果對上市公司訂定承銷價、首次交易價格、以及後續財務績效與風險的影響。
由logit模型的結果顯示，會計師簽具保留意見或變更會計師（負向）、公司規模（正向）以及上市前一年稅前純益佔實收資本比（正向）以及是否為電子產業(負向)，為影響委員是否全數通過及核准申請公司上市的關鍵因素。對比全數通過與非全數通過兩群樣本之上市後績效差異發現，全數通過群組後續的財務績效指標（包括ROE、ROA、EPS、P/E）顯著大於非全數通過群組，且其差異於上市後兩年達到最大。
上市審議委員之投票結果顯示，隨著反對票數的增加，上市價格的訂定及上市後的獲利表現呈現反向的變動，而股價波動呈正向增加，獲得較多上市審議委員認同之公司在價格、獲利及風險上表現較好，上市審議委員的投票結果確有保障獲利及風險控管的功效。

One of the major functions of the SEC reviewing board, the first independent and surveillance intermediary, is to ameliorate asymmetric information between IPO firms and outside investors and therefore to facilitate capital market developments. It is astonishing to find that the issue was sparsely covered in literature. In most cases the reviewing board in Taiwan comprises of 3-4 bureaucratic insiders and more than 8 outside professionals. In this study we would like to investigate the impact of the reviewing board in general on IPO firms’ offer price metrics, initial price metrics, and post-IPO financial performance measures.
The results from logit regressions show that a consensus agreement among the board, unanimously voting for an IPO application, is more likely attain when the applicant is large in capitalization and profitable. In contrast, it is less likely to attain when the associated accountant is being changed or with reserved opinions regarding the firm’s reports and/or when the applicant is an electronic firm. We find that the voting outcome of the reviewing board provides a discerning effect that the firms in the unanimously approved group are associated with higher financial performance measures (ROE, ROA, EPS, and P/E) than the firms in the non-unanimously approved group with the differences being more significant in two years after IPOs.
The offer prices and profitability measures are negatively associated with an increase in member’s veto. Moreover, the non-unanimous firms exhibit higher price volatility as compared to the unanimous ones. The overall picture support the surveillance function of the SEC reviewing board that is effective in assuring the quality of IPO firms.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究架構與流程 3
第二章 文獻探討 4
第一節 上市審議之相關法規 4
第二節 中介機構對IPO公司資訊揭露及監督效果 9
第三章 研究方法 14
第一節 研究樣本 14
第二節 變數定義 15
第三節 資料分析方法 20
第四章 實證結果與分析 22
第一節 上市審議結果影響因素之分析 22
第二節 上市審議結果對IPO公司績效之影響 37
第五章 結論與建議 58
第一節 研究結論 58
第二節 研究限制與建議 59
參考文獻 60
附錄 63

中文文獻
1、李春安，民國88年，『聲譽模式下我國上市公司擴充型投資專案宣告對股價影響之研究』，政治大學企業管理研究所博士論文。
2、林象山，民國84年，『承銷商信譽對新上市股票之影響』，中國財務學刊，第三卷第一期，119-143頁。
3、洪長輝，民國86年，『創業投資事業之認證功能』，中正大學財務金融學系碩士論文。
4、項政，民國88年，『會計師查核意見、財務危機與股價反應之研究』，中央大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
5、熊大中，民國89年，『我國企業財務危機與董監股權質押關連性之研究』，成功大學會計研究所碩士論文。
6、詹靖怡，民國87年，『新上市股票長期績效~有無創投投資之實證研究』，政治大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
7、劉容慈，民國91，『整合公司治理、會計資訊與總體經濟敏感度之財務危機模型』，輔仁大學金融所碩士論文。
英文文獻
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3. Christopher B. Barry and Chris J. Muscarella, John Michael R. Vetsuypens, 1990, ” The role of venture capital in the creation of public companies”, Journal of Financial Economics 77, 447-471.
4. Datar, S., G.A. Feltham and J.S. Hughs, 1991, ”The Role of Audits and Audits Quality in Valuing New Issues,” Journal of Accounting and Economics,3-49.
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6. George J. Stigler, 1964, ”Public regulation of the securities Markets”, Journal of business 34, 117-142.
7. Hayne E. Leland and David H. Pyle, 1977, ”Imformational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation”, The Journal of Finance 32, 371-387.
8. James R. Booth and Richard L. Smith, 1986, ” Capital Raising, Underwriting and The Certification Hypothesis”, Journal of Financial Economics 15, 261-281.
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10. Krishnagopal Menon and David D. Williams, 1991,” Auditor Credibility and Initial Public Offerings ”, The Accounting Review 66,313-332.
11. Megginson, W. L. and K.A.Weiss, 1991,”Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public Offerings, Journal of Financial 46, 879-903.
12. Peter Dodd, Nicholas Dopuch, Robert Holthasen and Richard Leftwich, 1986, “Qualified Audit Opinions and Stock Prices: Information Content, Announcement Dates, and Concurrent Disclosures”, Journal of Accounting and Economics 6, 3-38.
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14. Sheridan Titman and Brett Trueman, 1986, ”Information Quality and The Valuation of New Issues”, Journal of Accounting and Economics 8 , 159-172.
15. William A. Sahlman, 1990, “The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations”, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 473-521.