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Author:王麗亭
Author (Eng.):Li-Ting Wang
Title:公司治理、股利政策及應計品質與公司價值之關係
Title (Eng.):Corporate Governance, Dividend Policy, Accrual Quality and Corporate Value
Advisor:姜家訓姜家訓 author reflink
advisor (eng):Jia-Xun Jiang
degree:Master
Institution:輔仁大學
Department:會計學系碩士班
Narrow Field:商業及管理學門
Detailed Field:會計學類
Types of papers:Academic thesis/ dissertation
Publication Year:2006
Graduated Academic Year:94
language:Chinese
number of pages:109
keyword (chi):公司治理股利政策應計品質現金流量請求權席次控制權
keyword (eng):Corporate GovernanceDividend PolicyAccrual QualityCash Flow Rights
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本研究以1998年至2004年台灣上市櫃公司為樣本,探討公司治理架構與現金股利政策、應計品質之關係,以及現金股利政策與應計品質對於公司價值之影響。實證結果如下:
ㄧ、當控制股東之現金流量請求權愈高,則發放現金股利之可能性愈高,現金股利率愈高,且應計品質愈佳。表示當控制股東持股較高時,則其利益將與少數股東趨於一致(誘因效果),並有助於提升財務報表之應計品質。
二、若控制股東對於董事會之席次控制權愈高,則發放現金股利之可能性愈低,現金股利率愈低,且應計品質較差。表示當董事會受到控制股東所掌控時,則控制股東將會剝削少數股東之利益(鞏固地位效果),並降低財務報表之應計品質。
三、在控制影響現金股利政策之固有經濟因素後,公司治理因素對現金股利之增額需求可以降低權益之資金成本。其次,對於應計品質較差之公司,公司治理因素對現金股利之增額需求對降低權益資金成本之影響程度較大。此外,在控制影響應計品質之固有經濟因素後,公司治理因素對應計品質之增額需求可降低負債之資金成本。再者,對於未發放現金股利之公司,公司治理因素對應計品質之增額需求對降低權益資金成本之影響程度較大。
四、受到公司治理機制影響而發放現金股利或是改善應計品質之公司,其未來無論在現金基礎與應計基礎的績效皆有較佳的表現。表示較佳的公司治理機制(如控制股東之現金流量請求權愈高或其未擁有過高的董事會席次控制權)可作為傳遞公司未來績效較佳之工具。
大體而言,健全的公司治理機制對於現金股利政策與應計品質皆有正面的影響,其有助於公司減輕代理問題並降低外部融資之資金成本,以及傳遞公司未來績效良好的訊息,故可作為公司向外部投資人溝通的工具,進而降低資訊不對稱與代理衝突。
The thesis examines the relationship among corporate governance structure, cash dividend policy, accrual quality and firm value. The sample consists of observations selected from listed and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan from 1998 to 2004. The empirical results are summarized as follows.
1.As the cash flow rights held by the controlling shareholder increases, both the likelihood of cash dividends payment and the level of cash dividends will get higher. Moreover, the accrual quality will get better. The finding shows that when the ownership of the controlling shareholder gets higher, the incentive effect will dominant, and thus the interest of the controlling shareholder will be more congruent with minor shareholders, in turn it helps for improving the accrual quality of financial statements.
2.If the proportion of seats of the board of directors controlled by the controlling shareholder increases, then the likelihood of cash dividends payment and the level of cash dividends are lower. Further, the accrual quality will get worse. The finding shows that when the board of directors is high affiliated with the controlling shareholder, the entrenchment effect will dominant, and thus the controlling shareholder will exploit minor shareholders’ interests and impair the accrual quality of financial statements.
3.The predicted excess cash dividends arising from corporate governance structure incrementally decrease the cost of equity capital after controlling other variables. In addition, the effect of cash dividends on the firms with worse accrual quality will get stronger. Besides, the predicted excess accrual quality arising from corporate governance structure is negatively correlated with cost of debt. Furthermore, for the firms paying no cash dividends, the predicted excess accrual quality arising from corporate governance structure incrementally decreases the cost of equity capital.
4.For firms with excess cash dividends or accrual quality arising from corporate governance structure, they will have better performance in the future. The finding shows that as firms with better corporate governance mechanisms (they are proxy by the cash flow rights held by the controlling shareholder is higher or the board of directors is not high affiliated with the controlling shareholder) signal positive future operating performance.
Overall, our evidences support the views that better corporate governance structure can strengthen cash dividend policy and improve accrual quality, and the predicted excess cash dividends or accrual quality arising from corporate governance structure can be the monitoring role in mitigating the agency problems effectively and thus reduce the cost of capital. In addition, cash dividends and accrual quality are effective signal about future performance of firms. They can be regarded as tools to communicate with stakeholders, and further, to mitigate asymmetric information and agency conflicts.
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的與架構 14
第三節 論文架構 16
第二章 文獻探討 17
第一節 所有權結構、董事會結構與代理問題 17
第二節 公司治理與股利政策之關係 21
第三節 公司治理與應計品質之關係 26
第四節 股利政策與應計品質之關係 31
第三章 研究方法 36
第一節 研究假說之發展 36
第二節 實證模式之建立 42
第三節 樣本選取 62
第四章 實證結果 66
第一節 敘述統計量 66
第二節 單變量檢定 73
第三節 多元迴歸結果 83
第四節 敏感性分析 94
第五章 結論與建議 102
第一節 研究結果之彙述 102
第二節 研究限制 104
第三節 研究建議 105
參考文獻 106
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