臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究探討公司現金增資承銷類型是否會影響其盈餘管理。研究的結果顯示，台灣地區上市公司現金增資時有顯著的盈餘管理（以可裁決性會計項目衡量）現象。採用公開申購公司於現金增資前有大幅度的盈餘管理，但增資後盈餘管理幅度即回復平均水準。相對地，採用詢價圈購公司不論在現金增資前後皆有大幅度的盈餘管理水準，上述結果不論使用原始盈餘管理水準，抑或控制產業因素後皆成立。分析承銷方式差異導致盈餘管理水準差異的原因，可能與目標客戶以及大股東的動機有關：公司選擇公開申購的目標客戶為一般散戶，因此其盈餘管理多集中於現金增資前；公司採用詢價圈購會傾向於現金增資前後皆有大幅度的盈餘管理，有利於大股東前拋後補，或是前補後拋的套利動機有關。考慮公司治理對承銷方式-盈餘管理關係之迴歸分析發現，董事會規模越大的公司，其盈餘管理的幅度越小，總經理兼任董事長的重疊性以及採用詢價圈購的公司，其盈餘管理的幅度較大。

This paper is to investigate the issue of whether the underwriting procedures of seasoned equity offerings affect firm’s earnings management. Using the discretionary account serving the proxy we find that the two underwriting procedures yield different patterns of earning management. Firms adopting fixed price method exhibit a surge of earnings management before SEOs while reverse to its normal level after SEOs. In contrast, firms using bookbuilding method are found to be associated with huge amount of earnings management before and after SEOs. The results also remain sustainable when the level of earning management is adjusted or unadjusted for industry effect. The differences in patterns of earnings management is possibly due to the fact that the target clients and large shareholder’s motives for the two underwriting procedures are substantially different. Firms adopting fixed price method target for small-amount individual investors who are likely to be gullible and that is good for firms engaging earning management right before the equity offer rather than afterward. In contrast, large shareholders of firms using bookbuilding through which high percentage of shares are supposed to be put up for public subscriptions would like to entrench control and therefore engage in price arbitrage during the SEO process. In fact we do find that compared to fixed-price firms, firms that use bookbuilding are associated with a surge of short/long ratio around the SEO window and the prices maintain at the certain level that would benefit insiders to engage in arbitrage activities. When corporate governance is being included in analysis we find that the level of earning management is negatively associated with board size while positively associated with the CEO/chair duality and the adoption of bookbuilding method.

目 錄
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 論文架構 4

第貳章 文獻探討 5
第一節 盈餘管理 5
第二節 公司治理 18
第三節 現金增資承銷配售方式 22

第參章 研究設計與方法 25
第一節 研究假說 25
第二節 變數定義 30
第三節 實證模式 36
第四節 資料來源與樣本選取 37

第肆章 實證結果與分析 40
第一節 敘述性統計分析 40
第二節 單變量分析 43
第三節 複迴歸分析 50

第伍章 結論與建議 57
第一節 研究結論 57
第二節 研究限制 60
第三節 研究建議 61

參考文獻 62

表 目 錄
表3-4-1 研究樣本之增資年度分佈 39
表3-4-2 研究樣本之產業分佈 39
表4-1-1 全部樣本之敘述統計分析 41
表4-1-2公開申購樣本之敘述統計分析 42
表4-1-3 詢價圈購樣本之敘述統計分析 42
表4-2-1 現金增資前後各期之可裁決性應計項目 44
表4-2-2 全部樣本之可裁決性應記項目 45
表4-2-3 不同現金增資承銷方式之可裁決性應記項目 48
表4-2-4 控制產業因素後之可裁決性應記項目 48
表4-3-1 全部樣本Pearson correlation coefficient 51
表4-3-2 全部樣本VIF值 52
表4-3-3 全部樣本迴歸分析 55
表4-3-4 機構投資者持股比例替代變數之迴歸分析 56

圖 目 錄
圖4-2-1 券資比趨勢圖 49
圖4-2-2 股價趨勢圖 49

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