臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

企業首次公開發行之股票普遍存在初期超額報酬現象，其可能來自資訊不對稱導致偏低定價或市場過度反應。為降低資訊不稱所導致的折價，公司可透過訊號的發射向投資人宣告其品質。可用來觀察公司品質之訊號很多，包括：內部人持股比率、會計師及承銷商聲譽、是否有創業投資公司加入等。由於許多公司於上市(櫃)前皆有銀行貸款，而申請銀行貸款需經過信用評等，因此本研究擬探討公司上（上櫃)前銀行貸款資訊是否可作為傳遞公司品質之訊號，並分析其與折價幅度與公司價值之關係。本研究以1999年至2003年於臺灣證券交易所上市(上櫃)的公司為研究對象，樣本數為429家。本研究除探討上市（櫃）公司折價幅度外，更進一步利用複迴歸模型分析其與銀行貸款及公司價值之關係。實證結
果如下：
1. 以全部樣本而言，銀行貸款對IPO折價幅度均無顯著的影響，此一結果可能由於國內企業大部分都有銀行貸款，因此傳遞公司價值訊息較不明顯。
2. 承銷商聲譽及銀行貸款與折價幅度呈現反向關係，顯示承銷商聲譽較好的公司，折價幅度相對較低。此外，與銀行往來可以提高聲譽，因申請銀行貸款需經過信用評等，故銀行貸款亦可向其他資金提供者傳遞公司品質的訊息。
3. 實證結果顯示企業上市（櫃）前有無銀行貸款與公司價值有顯著的關係，說明有銀行貸款可以提高公司的價值。銀行貸款除為我國上市(櫃)公司提供一個相當重要的資金來源，也暗示公司風險控管於一定範圍內，因此，有無銀行貸款可以傳遞公司之訊息，增加其價值。

This study tries to examine the signaling effect of bank loans on IPO underpricing and firm values. Since many firms have bank loans before listing on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, we use bank loans as a signal for quality of firms. The research period of this study is from 1999 to 2003 and the samples consist of 429 firms. The research results reveal that bank loans have no significant effect on reducing IPO underpricing. However, underwriter’s reputation has a significantly negative effect on IPO underpricing. It implies that underwriter’s reputation is a better signal for firm quality than bank loans. Moreover, bank loans have a positive effect on firm values.

目 錄
中文摘要………………………………………………………………… i
英文摘要………………………………………………………………… ii
目錄…………………………………………………………………… iii
圖次……………………………………………………………………… iv
表次…………………………………………………………………………v
第一章 緒論
第一節 研究背景與動機................................ 1
第二節 研究目的..................................... 7
第三節 研究流程..................................... 9
第二章 文獻回顧象................................... 11
第二節 訊息理論..................................... 15
第三節 銀行貸款的角色................................ 17
第三章 研究方法..................................... 24
第一節 資料收集及變數選取............................ 24
第二節 研究假設......................................27
第三節 變數操作及定義.................................29
第四節 實証模型...................................... 32
第四章 實證結果與分析................................. 34
第五章 結論與建議..................................... 44
第一節 研究結論....................................... 44
第二節 研究建議....................................... 46
參考文獻............................................... 47

一、中文部分：
1.陳軒基、葉秀娟、陳右超(2003)，「承銷制度與折價幅度：台灣初次上市櫃股票之實證研究」。證券市場發展季刊，十四卷，四期，頁175-198。
2.林象山、霍熾榮、王郁雯(1998)，「銀行貸款與新股折價及公司價值的關係」。管理學報，十五卷，二期，頁271-293。
3.王郁雯(1996)，「銀行貸款訊號機能之探討--以新上市股票為例」， 國立中正大學財務金融學系碩士論文。
4.王元章(1994)，「新上市股票折價,承銷商信譽及日後增資發行---台灣股市之實證」，證券暨金融市場之理論與實務研究會論文，中山大 學財管所。
5.劉郁純(1992)，「我國新上市股票承銷價格決定因素之實證研究」， 政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。
6.夏侯欣榮(1993)，「台灣區新上市普通股承銷價格之研究」，政治大 學企業管理研究所博士論文。
7.俞海琴、陳慧娟(1999)，「我國上市公司成長、槓桿與托賓Q關聯之 研究」，風險管理學報。頁81-101。
8.楊岱哲(1994)，「訊號與新上市股票價格之研究」，國立交通大學管 科所碩士論文。
9.羅贊興(1990)，「我國新上市公司股票短期報酬之研究」，淡江大學 金融所碩士論文。
10.李廣進(1990)，「台灣地區新上市股票短期投資報酬率之研究」，台大商研所碩士論文。
11.陳盛得(1994)，「新上市股票長期報酬之研究」，中正財金所碩士論文。
12.潘桂玲(1997)，「Fama-french三因子模式下新股上市股票之長期報 酬行為」，國立中山大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
二、外文部分：
1.Allen, F. and G. R. Faulhaber, (1989), Signaling by Under-
Pricing in IPO Market, Journal of Financial Economics, 23：
303-323.
2.Barclay, M. J. and C. W. Smith, (1995) ,The Maturity Structure
of Corporate Debt, Journal of Finance, 50：609-631.
3.Baron,(1982),A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advisement and Distribution Service or new Issues, Journal of Finance, 37：955-976.
4.Beatty, R. and J. Ritter, (1986), Investment Banking, Reputation, and the Under pricing of Initial Public Offering, Journal of Financial Economics, 15：213-232.
5.Benvenister, L. M. and P. A. Spindt,( 1989)，How Investment
Bankers Determine the Offer Price and Allocation of New Issuers，Journal of Financial Economics, 24：343-361.
6.Betty. R. and J. Ritter,(1986),Investment Banking Reputation and the Under Pricing of Initial Offerings, Journal ofFinancial Economics：213-232.
7.Booth, J. and R. Smith,(1986),Capital Raising, Underwriting, And the Certification Hypothesis, Hypothesis, Journal of Financial Economics, 15：261-281.
8.Boyd, J. H. and E. C. Prescott,(1986),Financial Intermediary
Coalitions, Journal of Economic Theory, 38：211- 232.
9.Campbell T. and W. Kracaw,(1980),Information Production, Market Signaling and the theory of Intermediation, Journal of
Finance, 35：863-882.
10.Carter, R. B. and S. Manaster,(1990),Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation，Journal of Finance, 45： 1045-1067.
11.Chemmanur, T. and P. Fulghieri,(1994), Reputation, and the Choice between Bank Loans and Publicly Traded Debt, Review of Financial Studies, 7：475 -506.
12.Chen, C. R. and T. L. Steiner, (2000), Tobin’s Q, Management, and Analyst Coverage a Nonlinea Simultaneous Equation Model, Journal of Economics and Business, 52：365-382.
13.Corwin,S. A,(2003),The Determinants of Underprincing for Seasoned Equity offers ,The Journal of Finance, 58：2249-2279. 14.Diamond,D.,(1984),Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, Review of Economic Studies 51：393-414.
15.Diamond, D,(1991),Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt, Journal of Political Economy, 99：689-721.
16.Gorton and Kahn,(1993),The Desigh of Bank Loan Contracts, Collateral and Renegotiation, Working Paper National Bureau of Economics Research.
17.James, C,(1987),Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans, Journal of Financial Economics 19：217-235.
18.Leland, H. and D. Pyle,(1977),Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Financial Intermediaries, Journal of Finance, 32：371-387.
19.Levis, M,(1990),The Winner's Curse Problem, Interest Costs and
the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, Economic Journal, 100：76-89.
20.Lummer, S. and J. McConnell,( 1989), Further Evidence on the Bank Lending Process and the Uniqueness of Bank Loans, Journal of Financial Economics, 5：99-122.
21.Menon, K. and D. D. Williams,( 1991), Auditor Credibility and Initial Public Offerings, The Accounting Review, 66：313-332.
22.Myers, S. C. and N. S. Majluf,( 1984), Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, Journal of Financial and Economics, 13：187-221.
23.Peman,S,(1980),An Empirical Investigation of the Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Earnings Forecasts, Journal of Accounting Rearch, 18：132-160.
24.Rajan,R,(1992),Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and Arm’ s Length Debt, Journal of Finance, 47：1367-1400.
25.Ritter,J,(1984),Signalling and the Valuation of Unseasoned
New Issues: A comment, Journal of Finance, 39：1231-1237.
26.Rock, K,(1986), Why New Issue are Underpriced, Journal of Financial Economics, 15：187-212.
27.Sloving and Young,(1990),Bank Lending and Initial Public Offerings, Journal of Banking and Finance (October)：729-740.
28.Smith, C. Jr.,(1977),Alternative Methods for Raising Capital: Rights Versus Underwriter Offerings，Journal of Financial Economics, 5：273-307.
29.Stulz,R,M,(1988),Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control, Journal of Financial Economics, 20：25-54.
30.Titman, S. and B. Trueman, (1986), Information Quality and the Valuation of New Issues, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8：159-172.
31.Tinic, S. M,(1988),Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, Journal of Finance：207-226.
32.Trueman ,B,(1986),Why do Managers Voluntarily, Release Earnings Forecasts, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8： 53-71.
33.Welch,(1989),Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Cost, and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, Journal of Finance, 44：421-449.
34.Yosha, O,(1995), Information Costs and the Choice if Financing
Source, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 4：3-20.