臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

公司治理 (corporate governance) 概念一般泛指公司管理與監控的方法。早在1970年代公司治理的概念即已出現，直到1997年亞洲金融危機發生後，這個議題才又被廣泛討論。理由是金融危機發生之後，各界所提出未來防制金融危機的方法中，強化公司治理機制已被公認為企業對抗危機的良方。而1998年經濟合作暨開發組織 (OECD) 召開之部長級會議中，更明白揭示公司治理運作不上軌道，是亞洲企業無法提昇國際競爭力之關鍵因素之一。2001年美國恩龍案 (Enron) 後陸續引發的金融危機，更突顯公司治理的重要性。是以，強化企業公司治理實為重要之急務。有鑑於此，證券暨期貨管理委員會 (證期會) 於1998年起即開始向國內公開發行公司宣導公司治理之重要性。
本研究之主要目的：
1.探討不同的董事會組成對公司經營績效之關聯性。
2.探討不同的股權結構對公司經營績效之關聯性。
本研究期間為2005年 (民國94年) 的台灣傳統產業上市公司，樣本公司產業類別乃參考台灣證券交易所的產業屬性歸類。經整理後樣本公司家數為196家，而樣本公司資料來源為台灣經濟新報社財務資料庫（TEJ）。
本研究實証結果發現：
1.董事會規模與公司經營績效呈顯著負相關。
2.外部董事之比例與公司經營績效則呈現顯著正相關。
3.經理人持股比例與公司經營績效呈顯著正相關。
4.董監事持股比例與公司經營績效呈顯著正相關。
5.機構投資人持股比例與公司經營績效呈顯著正相關。
6.大股東持股比例與公司經營績效呈顯著負相關。

The concept, corporate governance, has been emerging since the early 1970’s in response to the perceived lack of effective board oversight that contributed to the poor performance problems. In 1997 there were numbers of scandals and corruption within Asian financial markets that led to severe Asian financial crises. Inadequate corporate governance system has been concluded the major reason suffering the serious consequences on the Asian financial crises. The impact arising from Enron and Corporate America has now put the issue under a spotlight. Therefore, the attention to enhance corporate governance is being emphasized hereafter. Furthermore, OECD, in its ministerial meeting as of 1998, also pointed out the lack of corporate governance has been one of the root causes of the recent Asian financial crisis. The Asian financial crises provide lessons for Taiwan to esteem the importance of corporate governance. Knowing that inadequate corporate governance is identified as the key fact that Asian corporations could not build the competition in world financial markets, Taiwan securities regulator (Securities and Futures Commission, or SFC) has tried its best to emphasize the importance of advocating corporate governance to publicly held companies since 1998. It believes that greater transparency as to corporate governance is needed for enterprises to control risk.
The main findings of this thesis can be summarized as the follows：
1.The board size has a negative relationship with corporate performance.
2.The ratio of the outside directors on the board has a positive relationship with corporate performance.
3.The ratio of the stock holdings by the managers has a positive relationship with corporate performance.
4.The ratio of the stock holdings by the board and supervisors has a positive relationship with corporate performance.
5.The ratio of the stock holdings by the institutional investors has a positive relationship with corporate performance.
6.The ratio of the stock holdings by the block holders has a negative with corporate performance.

中文摘要………………………………………………………………………i
英文摘要………………………………………………………………………ii
誌謝……………………………………………………………………………iii
目錄……………………………………………………………………………iv
表目錄…………………………………………………………………………vi
圖目錄…………………………………………………………………………vii

第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景…………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究動機…………………………………………………………4
第三節 研究目的…………………………………………………………6

第二章 文獻探討……………………………………………………………7
第一節 公司治理…………………………………………………………7
第二節 代理理論…………………………………………………………17
第三節 董事會組成與公司經營績效……………………………………25
第四節 股權結構與公司經營績效………………………………………31
第五節 經營績效…………………………………………………………37

第三章 研究設計……………………………………………………………42
第一節 研究假說…………………………………………………………42
第二節 研究架構…………………………………………………………46
第三節 研究範圍…………………………………………………………49
第四節 分析方法…………………………………………………………53

第四章 實證結果與分析……………………………………………………55
第一節 基本統計資料分析………………………………………………55
第二節 迴歸分析…………………………………………………………58

第五章 結論…………………………………………………………………71
第一節 結論與建議………………………………………………………72
第二節 研究限制…………………………………………………………74
第三節 後續研究…………………………………………………………75

參考文獻………………………………………………………………………76

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