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研究生:洪曉吟
研究生(外文):Hung, Hsiao-Yin
論文名稱:聘審活動之遊說賽局
論文名稱(外文):Lobby Game of Employment
指導教授:王智賢王智賢引用關係
指導教授(外文):Wang, Jue-Shyan
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立政治大學
系所名稱:財政研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財政學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2006
畢業學年度:94
語文別:中文
論文頁數:52
中文關鍵詞:非營利組織聘審活動遊說賽局
外文關鍵詞:Nonprofit OrganizationEmploymentLobby Game
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在非營利組織之中,由於經理人與組織之利益不一致,因此在甄選新人的過程中可能產生代理人問題,負責甄選的主管可能因任用的標準及心目中的動機而影響聘審的結果。本研究即探討若非營利組織的聘審主管在心目中對應徵新人存有偏見或者考慮應徵新人未來對自身升遷的影響,並考慮應徵新人可採取遊說聘審主管活動下,討論聘審賽局均衡結果的情況。
In the nonprofit organization, because benefit between the manager and the organization is different, there would be the agent problem in the process of selecting new employees. The manager being responsible for employment may consider his criterion and motive to change the selecting conclusion. In our study, we discuss if the manager has prejudice against applicant or he consider if the new employee will affect his promotion in the future. Moreover, we assume the applicant can lobby the manager. How will it affect the selection conclusion? We will construct a lobbying game theory model to do research and we hope could recommend the improving directions for the employ system in the nonprofit organization.
第一章 前言..............................1
第二章 文獻回顧..........................3
第三章 模型介紹..........................6
第一節 聘審主管對應徵新人存在偏見........6
第二節 聘審主管考慮自身的升遷............8
第三節 聘審主管同時考慮偏見與升遷........9
第四章 均衡分析.........................11
第一節 聘審主管對應徵新人存在偏見.......11
第二節 聘審主管考慮自身的升遷...........21
第三節 聘審主管同時考慮偏見與升遷.......28
第五章 均衡討論.........................38
第六章 結論與延伸.......................40
附錄一..................................42
附錄二..................................45
附錄三..................................47
參考文獻................................50
一、中文文獻
司徒達賢 (1999),「非營利組織的經營管理」,天下遠見出版。

陳金貴 (1994),「美國非營利組織的人力資源管理」,瑞興圖書。

陳萱(2005),「拔擢或打壓」,國立政治大學財政學系研究所碩士論文。
二、英文文獻
Alchian, A. A. and H. Demsetz (1972), “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,” American Economic Review, 62, 777-795.

Baumol, W. J. (1959), Business Behavior, Value and Growth, New York: Macmillan.

Blau, J. R. and G. Rabrenovic (1991), “Interorganizational Relations of Nonprofit Organizations:An Exploratory Study,” Sociological Forum, 6:2, 327-347.

Carmichael, H. L. (1988), “Incentives in Academics: Why is There Tenure,” Journal of Political Economy, 96, 453-472.

Chan, W. (1996), “External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion,” Journal of Labor Economics, 14:4, 555-570.

Chen, K.-P. (2003), “Sabotage in Promotion Tournament,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 19:1, 119-140.

Cyert, R. M. and J. G. March (1963), Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall.

Drucker, P. F. (1990), Managing the Nonprofit Organization: Practices and Principles, New York : Harper Collins .

Dart, R. (2004), “Being “Business-Like” in a Nonprofit Organization: A Grounded and Inductive Typology,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 33:2, 290-310.

Dessein, W. (2002), “Authority and Communication in Organizations,” Review of Economic Studies, 69, 811– 838.

Fama, E. F. (1980), “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,” Journal of Political Economy, 88:2, 288-307.

Friebel, G. and M. Raith (2004), “Abuse of Authority in Hierarchical Communication ,” RAND Journal of Economics, 35:2, 224-244.

Greenwald, B. C., (1986), “Adverse Selection in the Labor Market,” Review of Economic Studies, 53, 325-347.

Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3:3, 305-360.

Kreps, D. M. and R. Wilson (1982), “Sequential Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 50, 863-894.

Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (1988), “The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts,” Econometrica, 56, 1153-1175.

McCambridge, R. (2004), “Underestimating the Power of Nonprofit Governance,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 33:2, 346-354.

Saxton, G.. D. and M. A. Benson, (2005), “Social Capital and the Growth of the Nonprofit Sector,” Social Science Quarterly, 86:1, 16-35.

Sengupta, S. (2004), “Delegating Recruitment under Asymmetric,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22, 1327-1347.

Simon, H. A. (1959), “Theories of Decision Making in Economics and Behavioral Science,” American Economic Review, 49, 253-283.

Wolf, T. (1990), Managing a Nonprofit Organization, New York : Simon & Schuster.
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