(100.24.122.117) 您好!臺灣時間:2021/04/12 04:51
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果

詳目顯示:::

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:朱陳啟康
論文名稱:內部人持股比例與公司績效之關係-以台灣上市電子公司為例
指導教授:顏銘錫
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立政治大學
系所名稱:財務管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2005
畢業學年度:94
語文別:中文
論文頁數:56
中文關鍵詞:Marginal q內部人持股股權結構
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:5
  • 點閱點閱:406
  • 評分評分:系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
在公司績效的決定因素的研究中,本研究採用Marginal q作為衡量企業投資效率的指標,發現內部人持股比例與公司經營績效間之關係綜合「利益收斂說」以及「掠奪性假說」兩種效果,隨內部人持股比例呈倒U字形先增後減的非線性關係。其他控制變數方面:機構投資人能擔任監督管理者的角色、有效降低代理成本增進公司價值;規模對公司績效大致呈正面影響,惟效果並不顯著;在Tobin's q模型,研發活動支出比例對公司績效有正面的影響;在Marginal q模型,研究發展支出比例對公司績效影響不顯著。本研究亦考量董監質押比例的影響,結果顯示,公司績效僅與董監質押行為負相關與質押比例則無顯著關係。本研究亦採用一個新的衡量內部人持股變數—平均每位董事/監察人持股,該變數亦能精確衡量內部人持股。考量模型內生性的問題後,內部人持股比例與公司績效之關係,並未因此改變。
We investigate the determinants of the performance of the firm measured by Tobin's q and Marginal q in our study, and find a curvilinear relation between firm value and insider ownership. The traditional measure, Tobin's q, suffers from several drawbacks. Among which the endogeneity is the most serious one which may cause the relationship spurious.

As for other controlling variables, we found that institutional investors are able to supervise the management effectively, which implies lower agency cost. The size of the firm is contributive to the value of the firm; however, the influence is not significant. R&D has positive and significant impacts on Tobin's q as we expect. There is less reason to expect a positive relationship between R&D and Marginal q. Indeed, we didn’t find any significant relation in our regression result. We also include the mortgage ratio of the insiders in our study. We conclude that performance is related to whether the insiders mortgage or not. The extent of mortgage doesn’t matter. We construct a new variable –average insider ownership– which could also measure the extent of insider holding well. Considering the possibility of endogeneity, the relation between insider ownership and performance of the firm is still consistent with the result of our study.
目錄
謝辭 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
目錄 v
圖次 vii
表次 viii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 5
第二章 文獻探討 7
第一節 理論文獻 7
第二節 國外實證文獻 10
第三節 國內實證文獻 15
第四節 績效與股權結構之內生性問題 17
第三章 研究方法 20
第一節 公司績效的衡量 20
第二節 研究分析方法與假說 26
第三節 研究樣本 29
第四節 研究變數的操作型定義與衡量 31
第五節 研究限制 33
第四章 實證結果與分析 34
第一節 基本統計分析 34
第二節 迴歸分析 38
第五章 結論與建議 48
第一節 結論 48
第二節 對後續研究之建議 50
參考文獻 51
英文部分 51
中文部分 55
英文部分
1.Agrawal, Anup, and Charles R. Knoeber, 1996, “Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31, 377-397.

2.Aho, Michael and Howard F. Rosen, 1980, “Trends in Technology-Intensive Trade: with Special Reference to U.S. Competitiveness”, Economic Discussion Paper No.9, US, Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs.

3.Anderson, Ronald C., and David M. Reeb, 2003, “Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500”, Journal of Finance 58, 1301-1328.

4.Barnhart, Scott W., and Rosenstein, Stuart, 1998, “Board composition, managerial ownership, and firm performance: an empirical analysis”, The Financial Review 33 (4),1.

5.Benston George ,1985, “An Analysis of the Causes of Savings and Loan Association Failures”, Monograph Series in Finance and Economics; New York University Graduate School of Business, Salomon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institutions, Monograph 1985-4/5.

6.Berle, Adolf A., and Gardiner C. ,Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Harcourt, Brace and World, New York.

7.Brickley, James A., Ronald C. Lease, and Clifford W. Smith Jr., 1988, “Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments”, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 267–291.

8.Cho, Myeong-Hyeon, 1998, “Ownership structure, investment, and the corporate value: An empirical analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics 47, 103-121.

9.Chung, K.H. and S.W. Pruitt, 1994, “A Simple Approximation of Tobin’s q”, Financial Management 23, 70-74.

10.Chung, K.H., and S.W. Pruitt, 1996, “Executive ownership, corporate value, and executive compensation – A unifying framework”, Journal of Banking and Finance 20, 1135-1159.

11.Coles, Jeffrey L., Michael L. Lemmon, and J. Felix Meschke, 2003, “Structural models and endogeneity in corporate finance”, Working paper, Arizona State University and University of Utah.

12.Demsetz, Harold, 1983, “The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm”, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 375-390.

13.Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn, 1985, “The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences”, Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155-1177.

14.Demsetz, Harold, and Belen Villalonga, 2001, “Ownership structure and corporate performance”, Journal of Corporate Finance 7, 209-233.

15.Fama, E. 1980, “Agency problems and the theory of the firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288-307.

16.Gugler, K. and B. B. Yurtoglu, 2003, “Average Q, Marginal q, and the Relation Between Ownership and Performance”, Economics Letters, 78(3), 379 - 384.

17.Gugler, K., D. C.Mueller and B. B.Yurtoglu, 2003, “Separating the Wealth and Entrenchment Effects of Insider Ownership on Investment Performance”, WP University of Vienna.

18.Hermalin, B., and Michael Weisbach, 1991, “The effects of board compensation and direct incentives on firm performance”, Financial Management 20, 101-112.

19.Himmelberg, Charles P., R. Glenn Hubbard and Darius Palia, 1999, “Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance”, Journal of Financial Economics 53, 353-384.

20.Holderness, Clifford G., Randall S. Kroszner, and Dennis P. Sheehan, 1999, “Were the good old days that good? Changes in managerial stock ownership since the Great Depression”, Journal of Finance 54, 435-470.

21.Jensen, Michael C. and Wil1iam H. Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.

22.Jensen, Michael C. and Richard Ruback, 1983, “The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence”, Journal of Financial Economics 11, 5-50.

23.Jensen, Michael C., 1986, “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers”, American Economic Review, Vol.76, 323-329

24.Kaplan, S. and D. Reishus, 1990, “Outside directors and corporate performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 389-410.

25.Kole, A., 1994, “The bundling of compensation plan”, University of Rochester unpublished manuscript.

26.Lang, Larry H. P. and Robert H. Litzenberger, 1989, “Dividend announcements: cash flow signalling vs. free cash flow hypothesis”, Journal of Financial Economics 24, 181-191.

27.Leland, Hayne E., and David H. Pyle, 1977, “Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation”, Journal of Finance 32, 371-387.

28.Loderer, Claudio, and Kenneth Martin, 1997, “Executive stock ownership and performance: Tracking faint traces”, Journal of Financial Economics 45, 223-255.

29.McConnell, John J., and Henri Servaes, 1990, “Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value”, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-612

30.McConnell, John J., Henri Servaes, and Karl V.Lins, 2004 ,”Changes in Equity Ownership and Changes in the Market Value of the Firm”, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4411.

31.McFarland, Henry, 1988 , “Evaluating q as an Alternative to the Rate of Return in Measuring Profitability”, Review of Economics and Statistics 70 , 614-22.

32.Modigliani, F. and M. Miller,1958, “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and The Theory of Investment”, American Economic Review 48: 261-97.

33.Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315.

34.Mueller, D.C., and E. Reardon, 1993, “Rates of Return on Corporate Investment”, Southern Economic Journal 60 (2), 430–453.

35.OECD, 1999, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development , Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD, Paris.

36.Shanklin W. and J. Ryans, 1988, “Organizing for High-Tech Marketing”, Readings in the Management of Innovation, Harper Business.

37.Sherman, B., 1982, “Successful marketing Strategy for high tech firms”, Journal of Retailing 58, 25-43.

38.Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, “A Survey of Corporate Governance”, Journal of Finance 52, 737-783.

39.Stulz, René M., 1988, “Managerial control of voting rights”, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 25-59.


中文部分
1.牛延苓,民國89年,股權結構、董事會組成與公司績效關係之研究─以高科技產業與傳統產業為例,國立中央大學企業管理研究所碩士論文
2.王元章,民國90年,內部人持股、風險、股利、負債、投資與公司價值,證券市場發展,第13卷第3期,pp.29-69。
3.伍忠賢,民國91年,公司治理的第一本書,商周出版,pp.13~165。
4.江健成,民國90年,公司治理對目標公司績效影響之研究,私立輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。
5.周行一、陳錦村、陳坤宏,民國85年,家族企業、聯屬持股與公司價值之研究,中國財務學刊,第4卷第1期,pp.115-139。
6.林明謙,民國90年,股權結構、董事組成對大股東介入股市行為影響之研究,輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文
7.林淑棻,民國92年,公司股權結構、董事會組成結構以及財務政策與公司經營績效關係之研究 ,國立政治大學財務管理研究所碩士論文
8.邱毅、張訓華,民國80年,股權結構、董事會組成與企 業財務績效,台北市銀月刊,第二十二卷第五期,pp.11-32。
9.俞海琴,民國83年,內部人士持股比率與融資策略關係之實證研究,管理評論,13卷2期,pp.109-131。
10.柯承恩,民國89年,「我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議」,會計研究月刊,第174期,pp.75~81與pp.79~83。
11.洪麗芳,民國93年,股權結構、財務決策與公司績效關聯性之研究,中原大學會計研究所碩士論文
12.張旭玲,民國87年,我國股票上市公司股權結暨經營績效之研究,國立成功大學會計研究所碩士論文 
13.張明峰,民國80年, 股權結構對公司績效影響之研究 ,國立政治大學企業管理研究所碩士論文
14.陳麗娟,民國93年,董事會組成、股權結構、關係人交易與企業績效關係之研究─以紡織業及電子業為實証,國立成功大學EMBA碩士論文
15.楊俊中,民國87年, 股權結構與經營績效相關性之研究 ,國立台灣大學會計學系碩士論文
16.葉銀華,民國91年,台灣公司治理的問題與改革之道,證券管理雜誌第20卷第11期
17.葉銀華、邱顯比,民國85年,資本結構、股權結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究:代理理論,台大管理論叢,第7卷第2期,pp.57~59。
18.詹家昌,民國91年,經理人固守職位、 誘因與專屬投資決策,2002年財務金融學術研討會發表論文。
19.熊大中,民國88年,我國企業財務危機與董監股權質押關連性之研究,成功大學會計研究所未出版論文。
20.遲銘俊,民國93年,董事會組成與股權結構對高階主管更迭、公司價值與績效之關聯性-以台灣上市(櫃)金融業及電子業為例 ,國立成功大學企業管理學系碩士論文
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
系統版面圖檔 系統版面圖檔