臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文以三篇論文討論三個與財務報表向下重編盈餘公司有關的議題：（1）宣告財務報表重編後的長期股票績效；（2）重編公司內部人交易行為；（3）重編公司如何操弄盈餘以及操弄動機為何？
本文樣本是從1984年1月至2000年12月，557家因為財務報表違法、舞弊或錯誤而宣告需要重編以前財務報表的公司。
第一篇論文討論公司宣告重編後三年長期股票績效。在不同配對組合下，實證結果顯示，三年長期持有異常報酬（buy-and-hold abnormal return）達-34％。文中也討論公司宣告重編時以及後續分析師預測行為。結果發現，分析師對於重編資訊有反應不足的現象，而且三年的盈餘預測修正與長期異常報酬有顯著正相關。
第二篇論文探討盈餘品質與內部人交易行為。本文假設內部人擁有重編公司盈餘品質不良的私有資訊，內部人會利用此私有資訊從事異常交易。實證結果顯示，內部人早在重編前兩年就已經開始異常出售持股，但是為了避免被發現，愈接近重編期間則交易量愈少，而且內部人異常交易與重編金額成正相關。
第三篇論文採取應計項目分項的方法（disaggregate approach）探討重編項目與特定應計項目的關連性以及重編公司違反一般公認會計原則的動機。實證結果顯示，特定重編項目公司的總應計項目比特定應計項目更顯著。很可能是管理當局為了避免操弄特定項目以致於被發現，所以操弄各種應計項目以達到總金額的目標。尤其在不同盈餘管理動機的成本效益的考量下，如果操弄主要應計項目的效益大於成本，管理當局還是會操弄特定應計項目以達到操弄的目的。因此，應計項目分項的方法可以作為進一步探討盈餘管理的方法。

This dissertation examines three different aspects of downward earnings restatements in three essays: (1) the long-run stock performance of restatement firms following the announcements of restatements; (2) insider trading activities of earnings restatement firms; and (3) how earnings manipulations of restatement firms are effected and what are the incentives for earnings manipulations?
Using extensive keyword (i.e., “restatements,” “restate,” “restated,” “restates,” and “restating”) searches over the period from January 1, 1984 through December 31, 2000, 557 firms are identified as having restated their previously published or filed financial statements due to accounting irregularities, fraud, or errors.
The first essay examines the post earnings restatement announcement of long-term stock performance. Using various benchmark portfolio formulation strategies, I document an average buy-and-hold abnormal return of -34% over the 36-month horizon. I then investigate analysts’ forecast behavior around and after the restatement announcements. I find that market underreactions are associated with a sluggish forecast revisions by financial analysts. This study sheds light on how restatement information is transmitted to the capital markets and provides evidence that the market under reacts to externally initiated corporate events.
The second essay examines the relationship between earnings quality and insider trading. Using downward earnings restatement firms to identify low-quality earnings, I find that insiders outsell non-earnings restatement firms of their holdings over the period from two years before to one year before the beginning of the restatement period. In addition, the amounts of restatement are positively associated with the excess insider selling. I also provide evidence that excess insider selling predicts excessive earnings manipulations that eventually lead to GAAP violation.
In the third essay, I take advantage of the disclosed manipulation of items and approach the earnings manipulation issue by a disaggregate approach. Given that management considers cost/benefits of specific accruals to be manipulated, I examine whether management chooses different items to manipulate under different goals. Overall, the empirical results support the equity offering hypothesis and weakly support the meeting earnings threshold hypothesis. However, the results fail to support the avoidance of debt covenant violation hypothesis, indicating that manipulation under certain monitoring conditions can be conducted in a very subtle manner.

I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. THE LONG-TERM STOCK PERFORMANCE FOLLOWING EARNINGS RESTATEMENTS 5
1. INTRODUCTION 5
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 7
2.1 Research on long-term stock performance metrics 7
2.2 Research on analysts’ forecast behavior 9
3. HYPOTHESES 10
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 11
4.1 Long-term stock performance following downward earnings restatement announcements 11
4.1.1 Benchmark-portfolioapproaches for buy-and-hold abnormal returns 11
4.1.2 Calendar-time abnormal returns 13
4.2 Analysts’ forecast behavior for earnings restatement firms 14
4.3 Association between analysts’ forecast revisions and the post restatement announcement long-term drifts 16
5. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 16
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 18
6.1 Long-term abnormal stock return evidence 18
6.1.1 Long-term abnormal buy-and-hold returns 18
6.1.2 Abnormal returns by restatement characteristics 19
6.1.3 Calendar-time abnormal returns 20
6.2 The source of long-term stock underreaction 21
6.2.1 Earnings forecast revisions around the time of restatement announcements 22
6.2.2 Analysts’ earnings forecast errors for downward earnings restatement firms 23
6.2.3 The relationship between stock performance and analyst forecasts 24
7. ADDITIONAL TESTS 26
8. CONCLUSION 27
REFERENCE 29
CHARPTER TABLES 32



III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EARNINGS QUALITY AND INSIDER TRADING 43
1. INTRODUCTION 43
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 46
3. HYPOTHESES 49
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 51
4.1 Tests of the timing and activity of abnormal insider trading for earnings restatement firms 51
4.2 Prediction of Earnings Restatements with abnormal Insider Trading Activity 54
5. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 56
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 58
6.1 Timing and activities of insider trading 58
6.2 The effect of core/non-core item restatements on insider trading 59
6.3 Probit analysis predicting earnings restatement firms 62
7. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 64
8. CONCLUSION 64
REFERENCE 67
CHARPTER TABLES 71
IV. INCENTIVES OF EARNINGS OVERSTATEMENTS THAT VIOLATE GAAP 82
1. INTRODUCTION 82
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 84
3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 88
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 91
4.1 Test of H4(1) 91
4.2 Test of H4(2) to H4(4) 92
5. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 95
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 96
6.1 The relationship between specific accruals/indexes and the items restated 98
6.2 The relationship between specific accruals/indexes and motivations for earnings manipulation 100
6.3 The cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between specific accruals/indexes and motivations for earnings manipulation 102
7. CONCLUSION 104
REFERENCE 106
CHARPTER TABLES 109
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 124

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