臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

1997年金融風暴之後，陸續有許多公司爆發財務危機以及管理者掏空公司弊案，之所以會發生財務危機或掏空弊案有可能是因為董監事監督功能不彰所致，因此本文以台灣上市公司為例，從董監事兼職個數角度探討董監事監督功能。研究假說為當公司董監事兼任過多其他公司董監事職位時，是否會受到時間與精力的限制，而無法善盡監督管理者的責任，進而影響公司績效。主要實證結果發現：當非忙碌董監事變成忙碌董監事時，新公司的績效呈現下降的趨勢，但是原公司的績效則是先上升後下降的情況，顯示在原公司中，聲譽效果在事件日剛發生後較強，使得公司績效增加，但隨著時間、精力和能力上的限制，使得董監事無法善盡監督責任，導致無效率監督效果大於聲譽效果，進而造成公司績效下跌。當忙碌董監事變為非忙碌董監事，捨棄公司與保留公司的績效均呈現下降的趨勢。當非忙碌董事會變成忙碌董事會時，公司績效在事件日前後呈現先上升後下跌的趨勢，顯示在事件日前，由於非忙碌董監事比例較高，較易使董事會發揮監督能力，進而改善公司績效。但在事件日後，由於忙碌董監事比例較高，董事會無法善盡監督責任，進而使公司績效下跌。當忙碌董事會變成非忙碌董事會時，公司績效下跌但無明顯之變化。

This article investigates the monitoring function of board of directors according to the number of directorship held by directors. We hypothesize busy directors who hold two or more directorships will harm the firm performance due to ineffective monitoring. There are two contradictory effects with regard to this hypothesis. One is reputation effect and the other is inefficient monitoring effect. The reputation effect claims that busy directors will not have an adverse influence on the firm performance. This is because the busy directors respect for their own reputation and prefer to make more efforts on monitoring managers. However, due to the time and ability constraints, the inefficient monitoring effect proposes that more busy directors will impair the firm performance. Our main result finds that the inefficient monitoring effect dominates the reputation effect so that the firm performance will decrease for those firms with busy directors.

目錄
頁次
目錄................................................................................................................................I
表目錄...........................................................................................................................II
圖目錄..........................................................................................................................III
第壹章 緒論................................................................................................................1
第一節 研究背景................................................................................................1
第二節 研究動機與目的....................................................................................3
第三節 研究流程與論文架構............................................................................6
第貳章 文獻回顧........................................................................................................8
第一節 董事會結構與董監事特性....................................................................8
第二節 董監事監督功能..................................................................................12
第三節 集團企業..............................................................................................14
第參章 研究設計......................................................................................................16
第一節 樣本與變數..........................................................................................16
第二節 研究假設..............................................................................................18
第三節 研究方法..............................................................................................20
第肆章 實證結果與分析..........................................................................................21
第一節 樣本資料初步分析..............................................................................21
第二節 董監事與董事會性質轉化之初步分析..............................................24
第三節 事件研究法之董監事分析..................................................................26
第四節 事件研究法之董事會分析..................................................................29
第伍章 結論與建議....................................................................................................30
第一節 研究結論..............................................................................................30
第二節 研究限制..............................................................................................31
第三節 研究建議..............................................................................................32
參考文獻......................................................................................................................33

國內文獻
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4.吳昆皇，民84年，上市公司董事會組成與特性對企業經營績效之關聯性研究，國立台灣大學商學研究所碩士論文。
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6.孫秀蘭，民85年，董事會制度與經營績效之研究，國立台灣大學財金研究所碩士論文。
7.張明峰，民80年，股權結構對公司績效影響之研究，國立政治大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
8.張峻萍，民87年，公司監理與經營績效之關係，國立台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
9.許士軍，民76，台灣地區集團企業研究: 台灣地區集團企業與經濟發展座談會記錄，第7 版，台北：中華徵信所。
10.黃鈺光，民82年，我國上市公司董事會特性與經營績效之研究，國立政治大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
11.魏早啟，民86年，上市公司董監事特性與經營績效之研究，東吳大學會計學研究所碩士論文。

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