臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

「基本費制」與「基本度制」是廠商普遍採用的收費方式。若市場上只有「低需求者」和「高需求者」兩類的消費者，在消費者偏好不變下，對廠商而言，關於「基本費制」與「基本度制」之優劣，須視「低需求者」和「高需求者」占市場的相對比例之高低而定。此外，當「高需求者」的偏好增加，或消費者由此產品所得到的邊際效用增加時，廠商採用「基本費制」或「基本度制」皆無差異的機率亦增加。並且，廠商的成本結構之差異，不會影響到廠商的最適訂價方式。若消費者的偏好呈現均等分配，對廠商而言，「基本費制」優於「基本度制」。

Minimal charge scheme and minimal purchase requirement scheme are nonlinear pricing schemes often adopted by the firm. Assume that there are only two types of consumers, i.e. low-demand type and high-demand type; we show that ceteris paribus, the more profitable pricing scheme depends on the relative proportion of each type of consumer. Besides that, when the taste parameter of high-demand type is increasing or the marginal utilities that consumers derive from the products are increasing, and then the probability that the firm is indifferent between minimal charge scheme and minimal purchase requirement scheme is increasing, too. And we also show that the pricing scheme is independent of the firm's cost structures. If there is a continuum of consumer types, i.e. uniform distribution, we show that minimal charge scheme is more profitable.

第一章 緒論........................................................01
第一節 前言 01
第二節 研究目的與內容 03
第三節 研究架構 05
第二章 文獻回顧....................................................06
第一節 齊一性費率之非線性訂價法 06
第二節 非齊一性費率之非線性訂價法 08
第三章 離散需求型態的消費者..........................................10
第一節 基本費收費制度 10
第二節 基本度收費制度 16
第三節 市場均衡與比較靜態分析 23
第四章 連續需求型態的消費者..........................................35
第一節 基本費收費制度 35
第二節 基本度收費制度 38
第三節 市場均衡與比較靜態分析 41
第五章 結論........................................................44
第一節 本文結論 44
第二節 模型限制與未來研究方向 45
參考文獻............................................................47
附錄................................................................48

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