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研究生:傅景林
研究生(外文):Jing-Lin Fu
論文名稱:不動產證券化委外管理代理問題之研究
論文名稱(外文):The Study of the Principal-Agent Problem of Externally Managed on Real Estate Securitization
指導教授:白金安白金安引用關係
指導教授(外文):Jin-An Bai
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立屏東商業技術學院
系所名稱:不動產經營系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:其他商業及管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2006
畢業學年度:94
語文別:中文
論文頁數:106
中文關鍵詞:道德危機逆選擇代理問題不動產管理機構不動產證券化
外文關鍵詞:Moral HazardReal Estate SecuritizationReal Estate Operating CompanyPrincipal-Agent ProblemAdverse Selection
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不動產證券化委外管理涉及諸多代理問題,深繫投資人權益,對制度方起步的台灣而言,無論在學術或實務上皆有深入探究之迫切性;是以本文首先透過已實施不動產投資信託法四十餘年的美國相關文獻,探討其委外管理REITs之代理問題,並藉由主理人-代理人賽局來解釋不動產證券化委外管理產生的代理課題,再以個案分析的方式分別指出國內不動產證券化目前已公開發行案例之三種管理型式當中可能隱含的代理問題,並提出應對策略,最後針對大台北地區金融機構從業人員為問卷對象,依篩選出之問卷結果進行實證分析,以瞭解其對國內已公開發行不動產證券化案例三種委外管理型式代理問題之看法。
經實證分析結果發現:大台北地區金融機構從業人員認為「委任發起人之關係企業」可能存在之代理問題大於「委任創始機構」,「委任創始機構」則大於「委任獨立機構」,亦即「不動產投資信託」可能存在之代理問題大於「不動產資產信託」。
Externally advised real estate securitization brought lots of principal-agent problems, and affected rights and interests of invrstors. To Taiwan just put into practice the system, it is imperative either in learning or practice to be probed. For this reason, first of all, the study probes into principal-agent problems of externally advised REITs by means of related of documents of the America have put into practice Real Estate Investment Trust Law fourty years yet. And the study explan principal-agent problems of externally advised real estate securitization by means of principal-agent games, and further, three operation models may exist by principal-agent problems means of case studies, and find the way to deal with a situation. Finally, according to workers of financial institutions of taipei and taipei country proceeds investigation into their perspectives on three models.
The result shows workers of financial institutions of taipei and taipei country consider principal-agent problems of “ to appoint the conglomerate of sponsor ” to be serious than “ to appoint the oringinator”, and principal-agent problems of “ to appoint the oringinator ” to be serious than “ to appoint the independent institution ”. It also means principal-agent problems of “real estate investment trusts” to be serious than “ real estate asset trusts”.
目錄
第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究動機與目的………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究問題之陳述………………………………………………………5
第三節 研究方法………………………………………………………………6
第四節 研究架構………………………………………………………………7

第二章 相關理論與文獻探討………………………………………………………9
第一節 相關理論………………………………………………………………9
第二節 美國REITs委外管理之代理問題…………………………………. 20
第三節 小結………………………………………………………………… 24

第三章 國內不動產證券化委外管理代理問題之分析………………………… 25
第一節 國內已公開發行不動產證券化案例之管理型態………………… 25
第二節 委任發起人之關係企業-富邦一號……………………………… 25
第三節 委任創始機構-嘉新國際………………………………………… 33
第四節 委任獨立機構-新光中山………………………………………… 40
第五節 小結………………………………………………………………… 41

第四章 投資人對代理問題看法分析…………………………………………… 44
第一節 研究假設的建立…………………………………………………… 44
第二節 問卷設計、抽樣與實證分析方法………………………………… 45
第三節 描述性統計分析…………………………………………………… 47
第四節 實證結果分析……………………………………………………… 51
第五節 小結………………………………………………………………… 67

第五章 結論與建議……………………………………………………………… 70
第一節 結論………………………………………………………………… 70
第二節 建議………………………………………………………………… 71

參考文獻…………………………………………………………………………… 73

附錄一………………………………………………………………………… 77
附錄二………………………………………………………………………… 80
附錄三……………………………………………………………………….. 104
參考文獻
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