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研究生:楊舒雯
研究生(外文):Shu-Wen Yang
論文名稱:供應鏈中垂直性合作廣告之研究
論文名稱(外文):Vertical Cooperative Advertising Strategies in A Supply Chain
指導教授:鄒慶士鄒慶士引用關係張旭華張旭華引用關係
指導教授(外文):Ching-Shih TsouHsu-Hwa Chang
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺北商業技術學院
系所名稱:商學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:一般商業學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2006
畢業學年度:94
語文別:中文
論文頁數:74
中文關鍵詞:合作廣告史塔克柏格均衡聶許均衡
外文關鍵詞:Cooperative advertisingStackelberg equilibriumNash equilibrium
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合作廣告是通路協調中的一種成本分攤與決策分享的機制,其中垂直式合作廣告指的是製造商與零售商、或批發商與零售商共同分攤廣告。在過去的文獻中,大部份對於合作廣告的研究,都聚焦在「製造商為領導者、零售商為跟隨者」的關係上。這意味著傳統上,製造商比零售商更具有優勢。但是近十年來,行銷通路出現了許多重大變革,隨著大型零售鏈的出現改變了以往製造商領導掛帥的通路生態,許多配銷通路的權力由製造商移轉到零售商身上,零售商權力逐漸抬頭,甚至凌駕製造商之上。基於此新市場趨勢,本研究發展兩種合作廣告模式,一為代表零售商權力較大的廣告倍率模式,另一為代表製造商權力較大的補助比例模式;並以此兩種模式為基礎,分別探討零售商為通路領導者、製造商為通路領導者及雙方權力相當等不同通路權力狀況下之非合作賽局模型。探討零售商與製造商如何決定最佳的地區性廣告支出及製造商對零售商地區性廣告之補助金額或補貼比例。並就整體供應鏈利益與成員自身利益的角度,了解邊際利潤對雙方合作廣告支出與補助政策之影響,以提供雙方決策之參考。最後將均衡結果帶入雙方及供應鏈報酬函數,以比較不同賽局下雙方及供應鏈系統的偏好變化。
Cooperative advertising is a common channel coordination mechanism in marketing domain. Manufacturers and retailers within a supply chain could share the responsibility on national and local advertising for sales promotion activities. Most literature of cooperative advertising focus on a relationship in which the manufacturer is a leader and the retailer is a follower. Several reviews on market structure show that a shift of channel power from manufacturers to retailers has occurred recently. Based on this shift we develop two cooperative advertising game-theoretic models, one called the participation-multiple model which accounts for the analysis of when the power of the retailer dominates that of the manufacturer and the other called the participation-rate model which models the situation where the power of the retailer is dominated by that of the manufacturer. Under two game-theoretic setting, that is Nash and Stackelberg game, we show that different gaming structures in a supply chain might influence the manufacturer’s subsidy policy and the retailer’s local advertising expenditures. After solving the non-cooperative equilibriums, we show that the strategies on both sides will not only depend on the gaming structure, but also on the marginal profit. Economic insight along with a lot of interesting propositions are subsequently provided to help decision makers develop more effective strategies. Our effort calls for the game theory to be an essential tool in the analysis of cooperative advertising in a supply chain where multiple agents pursue separate and conflicting objectives.
中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 vi
圖目錄 vii
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究目的 3
1.3 研究流程 4
第二章 文獻探討 5
2.1 通路協調與通路促銷 5
2.1.1 通路協調 5
2.1.2 通路促銷 5
2.1.3 通路促銷活動 7
2.2 合作廣告 8
2.2.1 合作廣告的起源與定義 9
2.2.2 地區性廣告與全國性廣告 10
2.2.3 合作廣告文獻 12
2.3 賽局理論 16
2.3.1 賽局理論之歷史沿革 16
2.3.2 賽局理論之種類 17
2.3.3 倒推歸納法 20
2.3.4 通路競爭 22
2.3.5 通路競爭的主要因素 22
第三章 研究設計 26
3.1 模型假設 26
3.2 模型推導 28
3.2.1 合作性廣告倍率模式 28
3.2.1.1 參數介紹 28
3.2.1.2 模型假設 29
3.2.1.3 史塔克柏格均衡 30
3.2.1.4 聶許均衡 35
3.2.2 合作性廣告補貼比例模式 37
3.2.2.1 參數介紹 37
3.2.2.2 模型假設 38
3.2.2.3 史塔克柏格均衡 39
3.2.2.4 聶許均衡 42


第四章 結果分析 44
4.1 廣告倍率模式結果 44
4.1.1 均衡結果與比較靜態分析 44
4.1.2 報酬分析 49
4.2 廣告補貼比例模式數值分析 53
第五章 結論與建議 59
5.1 結論 59
5.2 實務建議 60
5.3 未來研究建議 61
參考文獻 62
附錄
A 特性4-2證明 66
B 特性4-3證明 67
C 證明 68
D 特性4-4證明 69
E 特性4-5證明 70
F 證明 71
G 特性4-6證明 72
H 特性4-7證明 73
I 特性4-8證明 74
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