臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

1970年，Akerlof以二手車市場為例，引導出因資訊不對稱(information asymmetry)所產生之代理問題。而為了解決資訊不對稱問題，提升公司資訊透明度是首要任務。
依OECD所提出公司治理領域中，在「股東的權利」領域，公司需要在股東會時充分告知股東相關資訊；在「公平對待所有股東」領域，公司需公平公開資訊、不能獨厚內部人；在「利害關係人的角色」與「董事會的責任」領域，公司需提供充分資訊予董事會做決策並依投資人要求揭露，都顯示了資訊充分的重要性，也因此資訊揭露為公司治理之中相當重要的一部分，是相當值得探討的議題。
儘管針對資訊揭露已有不少研究如探討資訊揭露與公司特徵關係；揭露之多寡與公司股價及協助投資人了解公司經營策略、降低權益資金成本之關係等，且我國有關資訊揭露的規範也相當的多，但其在資訊的質與量仍有值得進一步的探討空間，在張日炎(民93)之實證，發現我國企業資訊揭露的充足性仍有不足，處於被動狀態，另外，在公司治理研究報告(周行一、戚務君合著，民92)亦提及我國資訊揭露偏結果、少過程。因此，資訊揭露規範是否過量造成公司成本負擔或資訊內容有揭露是否不夠詳細、資訊品質是否不足等議題，仍為學者可深入了解之領域。
因此，本研究以「問卷調查法」，試圖對於較少學者涉獵到的上市公司資訊揭露之內容重要性及參考頻率，再進行探討個別資訊項目是否存在不可信原因，如公司過度揭露操弄股價，提供不真實「資訊」；或資訊本身是不具時效性的；另一方面，資訊不完整，可能因為存在資訊不對稱，公司會隱藏或提供不實資訊，使投資人產生錯誤選擇，因而蒙受損失；或資訊本身是否不具時效性，導致投資者在選擇投資的當下，無法藉由此資訊從事投資標的物的判斷。
本研究貢獻可提供哪些係攸關但未被揭露的資訊，應該被要求揭露；而較無關公司價值或重覆的資訊，則應適度刪減，以節省資訊揭露成本並突顯真正重要的資訊；另外，本研究亦試圖瞭解加強資訊揭露制度的完善是否對專業投資者之投資決策產生潛在幫助，並將研究結果提供政府參考改善，以讓我國資訊揭露制度更臻完善與對投資大眾有

In 1970, Akerlof professor was brought up information asymmetry by an example of secondhand car market. The most important thing to settle information asymmetry is to disclosure information broadly.
OECD ensures the corporation governance (CG) framework in 1999. It also requires that timely and accurate disclosure are made on all material matters regarding the corporate, including the financial position, performance, ownership and governance of the company. So discussions on information disclosure in CG have significant value to improve corporate transparency.
Studies have researched information disclosure for many years. For example, the relationship between disclosures and corporation’s characteristics or capital cost have been discussed. As a result of CG emerging from some fraudulence event happened in worldwide, many studies discussed about the relationship between disclosures and independent directors or auditors…etc. Nevertheless, studies focuses on examination of quality and quantity of information disclosure are few.
The study examines what information are more important from institutional investor’s viewpoints, and how frequent do investors make use of the information from annual report, fact book, Market Observation Post System on Taiwan Security Exchange and corporate web. If corporate disclosures exist quality defect, what reasons to influence information quality? Furthermore, the study also examines the effect of improving information disclosure from investor’ viewpoints.
From the results of study, we hope to offer some suggestions to authority and make our information disclosure system integrity in the future

目 錄
頁次
謝辭 I
中文論文摘要 II
英文論文摘要 III
目 錄 IV
圖 表 次 VI
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與背景 1
第二節 研究問題與目的 3
第二章 文獻探討 9
第一節 公司治理 9
第二節 資訊揭露相關理論 21
第三章 研究設計 37
第一節 研究流程 37
第二節 變數定義 38
第三節 樣本與問卷的發展 44
第四節 資料分析方法 46
第四章 資料分析與討論 47
第一節 樣本分析 47
第二節 量表信效度及相關分析 49
第三節 投資人對資訊揭露內容之重要性看法及參考頻率 52
第四節 投資人認為較重要資訊卻不常參考之主要原因 56
第五節 資訊揭露對投資人之投資決策之助益 59
第五章 結論與建議 60
第一節 研究結論 60
第二節 研究限制 68
第三節 後續研究建議 68
參考文獻 70

參考文獻
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