臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

當經濟體系中存在非自願性失業時，政府會有誘因補貼勞動要素，此時最適租稅的制訂將與完全就業的勞動市場下有所不同。過去探討此議題的文獻鮮少將資本要素考慮進去，本文假設廠商可選擇將資本用來投入生產或是研發降低污染的技術（R＆D），而政府對降低污染的資本給予免稅的優惠。主要發現為：當政府同時運用環境稅與資本稅的稅收來補貼勞動，若原本市場上污染的外部性大於（小於）失業造成的社會成本，則環境稅應制訂高於（低於）邊際損害。
本文模型呈現環境稅稅率與稅基的大小關係，說明了為什麼當環境稅的稅基太窄時，其最適稅率應低於邊際損害，加強了某些實證文章理論基礎。另一方面，本文也發現最適環境稅率的水準與「邊際損害本身的大小」有關，環境的外部成本越嚴重，環境稅越有可能設立高於邊際損害。

In an economy with involuntary unemployment due to firm-worker bargaining over each firm’s surplus, the government has an incentive to subsidize the use of labor. In this situation, the optimal tax policy will be different from that under a competitive labor market. Literature on this subject has seldom considered capital as an additional input. We assume that a firm can allocate capital between production and the pollution abatement R&D. The capital used in R&D is free of tax. Our main finding is: when the government uses both the environmental and capital taxes to subsidize the labor, the environmental tax should be set higher (lower) than the marginal damage, provided that the externality of the pollution is larger (smaller) than the social costs of unemployment. This paper also shows that the relationship between the environmental tax rate and its tax base. We highlight the theoretical basis by illustrating why the optimal environmental tax rate should be set lower than the marginal damage when the tax base is too narrow.

目 錄


第一章 緒論 .................................................................................................. 1
第一節 研究目的與動機 ......................................................................... 1
第二節 研究方法 ..................................................................................... 3
第二章 文獻回顧 ........................................................................................ 4
第一節 雙重紅利 ..................................................................................... 4
第二節 最適環境稅 ................................................................................. 5
第三節 非自願性失業 ............................................................................. 7
第四節 資本流動性與資本市場的扭曲 ................................................. 8
第三章 模型設定 ........................................................................................ 10
第一節 工會 ..................................................................................... 10
第二節 廠商 ............................................................................................. 11
第三節 政府 ............................................................................................. 12
第四章 資本稅為外生的情況 ................................................................. 15
第一節 無法對勞動補貼下之環境稅分析 ............................................. 16
第二節 環境稅稅收補貼勞動 ................................................................. 17
第五章 資本稅為外生的情況 ................................................................. 19
第一節 無法對勞動補貼下之環境稅分析 ............................................. 19
第二節 環境稅、資本稅補貼勞動 ........................................................... 20
第六章 結論 .................................................................................................. 23
附錄 .................................................................................................................. 25
參考文獻 ......................................................................................................... 30

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