臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　國際貿易組織在發展之初，多只著重在貿易自由化之追求，而很少重視資源利用造成環境損害的問題。因此當國際貿易組織限制傳統貿易工具之使用時，許多國家在策略性貿易動機的驅使下，便轉而利用環境政策工具來達成策略性貿易政策的功能，犧牲國內的環境品質以換取本國貿易條件的改善，造成所謂「生態傾銷」的現象。然而，當國際市場上的各國都欲使用生態傾銷來捕捉市場上的經濟租時，將導致各國皆無法由傾銷上獲得相對的利益，反而只會造成全球環境品質一起「向下沉淪」。
本文主要在探討，在策略性行為下，貿易政策受限對出口國環境政策的影響及各國與全球的福利會如何變動。本文分採二種模型：非對稱性單國策略模型與對稱性雙國策略模型，觀察出口補貼政策受限調降，對出口國環境政策及各國與全球福利是否有不同的影響。
由結果得知，在單國策略模型下，出口補貼受限調降，使用污染稅時，策略性出口國的環境政策會變得較寬鬆；使用污染管制時，策略性出口國的環境政策會變得較嚴格。但在雙國策略模型下，出口補貼調降對策略出口國的環境政策之影響，不論在使用污染稅與污染管制下都會變得比較寬鬆。而在福利方面，在單國策略模型下，出口補貼調降會使策略出口國的福利減少，進口國和全球的福利也減少。但在雙國策略模型下，出口補貼調降會使得策略出口國的福利增加，進口國和全球的福利減少。
所以本文認為自由貿易限制出口補貼不見得是好的，因為它不但會扭曲環境品質，還會使得全球福利下降。

　　It is well known that the restriction on the use of export subsidies tends to result in ecological dumping in exporting countries, when those countries have market power. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate that the impacts of an exogenous export subsidy reduction on environmental policy of the exporting country with a strategic trade motive. We also examine the effects of trade liberalization on welfare of the exporting and importing countries, and on global welfare as well.
We show that in the case where there is only one country with strategic motive, when the export subsidy has been reduced, the environmental policy of strategical exporting country will become laxer under an emission tax; the environmental policy of strategical exporting country will become stricter under an emission standard. And the welfare of strategical exporting country, the welfare of importing country, and global welfare all will decrease.
In the case where both exporting countries posses strategic trade motives, when the export subsidies have been reduced, the environmental policy of exporting countries will become less stringent under either an emission tax or an emission standard. As a result, the welfare of the exporting countries will increases, whereas the welfare of importing country and global welfare will decrease.
Thus we demonstrate that free trade is not always welfare-enhancing. It may result in the environmental deterioration and a reduction in the global welfare.

目錄
第一章 緒論……………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究動機與目的……………………………………………………1
第二節 研究方法與限制……………………………………………………3
第三節 論文架構……………………………………………………………4
第二章 文獻回顧………………………………………………………………5
第一節 策略性貿易政策之相關文獻………………………………………5
第二節 策略性環境政策之相關文獻………………………………………6
第三節 綜合整理………………………………………………………… 10
第三章 模型設定…………………………………………………………… 12
第一節 基本設定………………………………………………………… 12
第二節 各國社會福利設定……………………………………………… 14
第三節 廠商行為………………………………………………………… 15
第四章 單國策略下出口補貼調降之影響………………………………… 17
第一節 貿易政策未受限之策略性政策水準…………………………… 17
第二節 出口補貼政策受限制對環境政策之影響……………………… 21
第三節 出口補貼政策受限制對各國福利之影響……………………… 25
第五章 雙國策略下出口補貼調降之影響……………………………… 30
第一節 出口補貼政策受限制對環境政策之影響……………………… 30
第二節 出口補貼政策受限制對各國福利之影響……………………… 33
第六章 結論……………………………………………………………… 37
附錄………………………………………………………………………… 39
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………… 48

參考文獻
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