臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近年來我國主管機關規定在若干情況下，企業必須公布審計及非審計公費；這項公費資訊的揭露雖然有所侷限，但應有助於對非審計服務相關問題之研究。本研究主要探討我國企業管理當局是否因代理成本而影響向查核會計師購買非審計服務的決策；本文假設當企業有較高的代理成本時，企業會相對的減少向其查核會計師購買非審計服務，以內部人持股率、大股東持股率及長期負債比率作為代理成本的代理變數，測試其對非審計服務的關聯性。實證結果並不支持本文之假說，亦即並不支持當企業有較高的代理成本時，企業相對的會減少向其查核會計師購買非審計服務。

Recent legislation in Taiwan requires publication of nonaudit fees paid to a company’s auditor, and this disclosure provides th data with which to investigate the joint provision of audit and nonaudit services. A model is developed that seeks to explain a company’s decision to hire nonaudit services from the auditor. The model argues that companies that face potentially high agency costs purchase relatively smaller amounts of nonaudit services from their auditor. High agency cost companies require independent audits in order to reassure investors and creditors; the provision of joint services, which increases the economic bonding of the auditor to the client, may jeopardize independence or the appearance of independence. This study measures agent costs by proxy variables which are internal ownership, largest stockholder ownership and leverage. The results do not provide support for the hypothesis that companies that have higher agency-cost proxies are associated with smaller purchases of nonaudit services from their auditors.

目錄
第一章　緒論 1
第一節　研究背景與動機 1
第二節　研究目的 4
第三節　研究架構 6
第二章　文獻探討 8
第一節　非審計服務之定義與種類 8
第二節　代理理論與企業非審計服務 16
第三節　國內外探討非審計服務與獨立性關聯性之文獻 21
第三章　研究方法 28
第一節　研究假說 28
第二節　變數衡量與實證模型 31
第三節　資料來源與樣本篩選 37
第四節　會計師公費敘述統計 42
第四章　實證結果與分析 45
第一節　LOGIT迴歸模式各變數之敘述統計量 45
第二節　OLS迴歸模式各變數之敘述統計量 50
第三節　LOGIT迴歸模式的實證結果 53
第四節　OLS迴歸模式的實證結果 55
第五節　實證結論 57
第五章　研究結論與建議 60
第一節　研究結論 60
第二節　研究限制及建議 61
參考文獻 63


表目錄
表3-1　實證變數衡量彙總表 36
表3-2　樣本篩選 39
表3-3　樣本產業分佈 40
表3-4　各產業會計師公費資料比較表(n=350) 42
表3-5　非審計公費類別(n=350) 44
表4-1　LOGIT迴歸模式各變數敘述統計量(n=3145) 47
表4-2　LOGIT迴歸模式二組樣本平均值差異之檢定 48
表4-3　LOGIT迴歸模式各變數Pearson差相關係數(n=3145) 49
表4-4　OLS迴歸模式各變數敘述統計量(n=350) 51
表4-5　OLS迴歸模式各變數Pearson相關係數(n=350) 52
表4-6　LOGIT迴歸模式實證結果 54
表4-7　OLS迴歸模式的實證結果 56
表4-8　實證結果彙整表 59

一、中文文獻
1.王書鶴，2003，非審計公費對審計品質之影響─從盈餘管理的角度探討，私立中國文化大學會計研究所碩士論文。
2.王兼善，2003，非審計服務業務與會計師獨立性-對會計師出具繼續經營疑慮意見之影響，國立台北大學會計學研究所未出版之碩士論文。
3.汪泱若，1989，會計師應否從事管理顧問服務？會計研究月刊第47期，第48-55頁。
4.汪泱若 ，1989，會計師應否從事管理顧問服務？會計研究月刊第46期，第52-56頁。
5.胡靜妮，2002，非審計服務與會計師獨立性關係之實證研究，國立台北大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
6.翁文課，民88，非審計服務、事務所規模與審計公費之關聯性研究，國立中正大學會計學系碩士論文。
7.秦嘉明，2003，代理成本愈高盈餘報導品質愈差，會計研究月刊，第212期(7月)：127-135。
8.蔡慧玲，1998，企業對會計師事務所非審計服務之需求研究，國立台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。

二、英文文獻
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2.Beck, P. J., T. J. Frecka, and I. Solomon. 1988a. A model of the market for MAS and audit services: Knowledge spillovers and auditor-auditee bonding. Journal of Accounting Literature 7: 50-64.
3., , and , 1988b. An empirical analysis of the relationship between MAS involvement and auditor tenure: Implications for auditor independence. Journal of Accounting Literature 7: 65-84.
4.Barkess ,L. and R. Simnett, 1994. “The provision of Other Services by Auditors: Independence and Pricing Issues”, Accounting and Business Research,pp.99-108.
5.Datar, S. M., G. A. Feltham and J. S. Hughes, 1991(March). The role of audits and audit quality in valuing new issues. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14: 3-49.
6.DeAngelo, L., 1981 August. Auditor independence,‘Low balling’, and disclosure regulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics)：113-127.
7.DeBerg. C. L., S. E. Kaplan, and K. Pany, March 1991, “An Examination of Some Relationships Between Non-Audit Services and Auditor Change.”, Accounting Horizons, pp.17-28.
8.Defond, M.L, K. Raghunandan and K.R. Subramanyam., 2002 “Do Non-Audit Service Fees Impair Auditor Independence? Evidence from Going Concern Auditor Opinions”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40, No. 4, September 2002, pp. 1247－1274.
9.Firth, M., 1997. The provision of non-audit services by accounting firms to their audit clients. Contemporary Accounting Research 14(2):1-21.
10.Frankel, R., Marilyn, J., and Nelson, K., 2002. The relations between auditors’ fee for nonaudit services and earnings management. The Accounting Review 77(1):71-105
11.Jensen, M. C., and Meckling, W. H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
12.Palmorse, Z. V., 1986, “The Effect of Non-audit Services on the Pricing of Audit Services : Further Evidence” , Journal of Accounting Research,Vol.24,pp.405-411.
13.Pany, K., and P. M. J. Reckers, Spring 1983, “Auditor Independence and Non-Audit Services: Director Views and Their Policy Implications.”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, pp.43-62.
14.Parkash,M and C, Venable, January 1993 “Auditee Incentives for Auditor Independence: The Case of Non-audit Services” The Accounting Review,pp.113-133.
15.Simunic ,D.A.,1984 “Auditing, Consulting, and Auditor Independence”, Journal of Accounting Research,pp.679-702.
16.Simunic, D. A and M. T. Stein. 1987. Product Differentiation in Auditing: Auditor Choice in the Market for Unseasoned New Issues. The Canadian certified General Accountant’s Research Foundation.